American Foreign Policy toward International Law and Organizations: 1898-1917 by Boyle, Francis A.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-1983
American Foreign Policy toward International Law
and Organizations: 1898-1917
Francis A. Boyle
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Francis A. Boyle, American Foreign Policy toward International Law and Organizations: 1898-1917, 6 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
185 (1983).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol6/iss2/1
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 6 1983 NUMBER 2





1. INTRODUCTION .............................................. 187
A. Political Realism ........................................ 187
B. Legalism-Moralism ..................................... 188
C. The Legalist Approach to International Relations ......... 190
II. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ORGANIZATIONS ........................................ 198
A. American Legalism as a Reaction to the Spanish-American
W ar .................................................... 198
B. American Legalism as a Rejection of the European Balance
of Power System ........................................ 201
C The American Legalist War Prevention Programfor World
P olitics .................................................. 204
1. A system for the obligatory arbitration of interna-
tional disputes ....................................... 207
a. the First Hague Peace Conference ................ 207
* Copyright 1983 by Francis A. Boyle, Professor of Law, University of Illinois
College of Law at Champaign-Urbana.
This article is part of a dissertation entitled "Realism, Positivism, Functionalism and
International Law," to be submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political
Science at Harvard University. A preliminary version of this article was delivered before
the 76th Annual Convention of the American Society of International Law on a panel
devoted to The Seventy-fifth Anniversary of the Second Hague Peace Conference, held under
the auspices of the Lieber Group on the Law of War, April 23, 1982. This article is
dedicated to Leo Gross. I alone am responsible for its contents.
** A.B., 1971, University of Chicago; J.D., 1976, Harvard Law School; A.M., 1978,
Harvard University; Ph.D., 1983, Harvard University.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J6
b. the Hay Arbitration Conventions .................. 213
c. the Second Hague Peace Conference .............. 215
d the Root Arbitration Conventions .................. 216
e. the abortive planfor compulsory compromis ....... 218
f the golden age of international arbitration .......... 219
2. The foundation of an international court of justice... 221
a. the theoretical basis ............................... 221
b. arbitration versus adjudication .................... 222
c. the plan for a court of arbitral justice .............. 223
d the stalemate over the selection ofjudgesfor a
world court ....................................... 228
e. the Permanent Court of International Justice ...... 233
3. The codification of customary international law ...... 239
4. Arms limitation, disarmament and new procedures
for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.. 252
a. arms limitation and disarmament .................. 252
b. good offices and mediation ........................ 256
c. international commissions of inquiry ............... 257
d Convention on the Opening of Hostilities .......... 259
e. the Porter Convention ............................. 263
5. The Third Hague Peace Conference ................. 266
III. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN .............................. 269
A. International Law and United States Imperial Policy ..... 271
1. The M onroe Doctrine ............................... 271
2. The Roosevelt Corollary ............................. 272
3. The Panama Canal .................................. 274
4. The Dominican Republic Loan Convention .......... 276
5. Cuba and the Platt Amendment ..................... 278
6. The interaction between United States imperial policy
in the Americas and the United States attitude
toward Japanese imperial policy in the Far East ..... 280
7. The Mexican Revolution ............................ 283
B. The Inter-American System .............................. 290
1. The First International American Conference ........ 292
2. The Second International American Conference ..... 296
3. The Third International American Conference ....... 300
4. The Fourth International American Conference ...... 303
5. The Central American sub-system ................... 304
IV. AMERICAN NEUTRALITY DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR .. 307
A. The Bryan Peace Plan ................................... 307
B. The Laws of Neutrality .................................. 312
V. CONCLUSION ................................................. 325
[Vol. 6:185
1983] American Foreign Policy Toward International Law 187
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Political Realism
A cardinal tenet of the "realist" or power politics school of in-
ternational political science is that international law and interna-
tional organizations are "irrelevant" to conflicts between states over
matters of vital national interest. ' These conflicts comprise issues of
international politics which concern the very survival of nation
states, the international system and the human race itself. Consider-
ations of international law do not and should not intrude into such
areas. However, when such considerations do intrude, it should
only be to the extent that they serve as a source of ad hoc or ex post
facto justifications for decisions based on antinomial factors such as
Machiavellian power politics and national interest. In the realists'
view of international relations, international law is devoid of any
intrinsic significance within the utilitarian calculus of international
political decision making. International law, morality, ethics, ideol-
ogy and even knowledge itself are mere components in the power
equation. They are devoid of significance or prescriptive worth, and
when deemed necessary for the vital interests of the state, such com-
ponents are subject to compulsory service as tools of power.2 Since
there are no barriers to the acquisitive nature of nation-states be-
yond their own inherent limitations, members of the realist school
assert that an analysis of international relations must concentrate
exclusively upon the dynamics of power politics.
The reasons for the realists' negative perception of interna-
tional law are more the product of metaphysical speculation than of
solid empirical research. The nations of the world are said to sur-
vive precariously in the Hobbesian state of nature, where life is "sol-
itary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." 3 In this state of nature there
exists no law or justice, no conception of right or wrong, and no
morality. There is only a struggle for survival in which every state is
at war against every other state. The acquisition of power, at the
1. See Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International
Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Irrele-
vance]. For an analysis of the relationship between international political realism and the
American legal realist movement of the 1920's and 1930's, see H. STEINER & D. VAOTS,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 346-52 (2d ed. 1976).
2. See generally H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICs AMONG NATIONS 4-15 (5th ed. 1973).
But cf. Editorial Comment, Lawyer-Secretaries of Foreign Relations of the United States, 3
AM. J. INT'L L. 942 (1909) (the great United States Secretaries of State were lawyers).
3. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1962).
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expense of other states, is a fundamental right and a fundamental
fact of international politics. Sheer physical survival in the Machia-
vellian world of power politics, totalitarianism and nuclear weapons
must be the litmus test for the validity of man's political, philosophi-
cal, moral and legal presuppositions. International law therefore
becomes irrelevant to any matter of importance in international re-
lations. Moreover, international law will not become relevant to in-
ternational politics in the foreseeable or even distant future.
Statesmen who disobey the "iron law" 4 of power politics at the
behest of international law invite destruction at the hands of aggres-
sors. Such statesmen facilitate the destruction of third parties which
cannot realistically hope to remain neutral in a serious conflict be-
tween major powers. Historically, whenever considerations of inter-
national law have entered into attempted solutions for the problems
of international politics, the probability that violence, war, defeat,
death and destruction would ensue has dramatically increased. The
primary case in point was President Woodrow Wilson's approach to
international affairs after the outbreak of the First World War.
B. Legalism-Moralism
On January 8, 1918, President Wilson delivered an address to a
joint session of Congress in which he set forth the war aims and
peace terms of the United States for ending the Great War.5 This
speech contained the fabled Fourteen Points, the last of which laid
the cornerstone for the League of Nations, which was the ill-fated
predecessor to the United Nations. In that speech, Wilson emphati-
cally decreed the death of Machiavellian power politics and all its
essential components: the balance of power, secret diplomacy, trade
barriers, armament races and the denial of self-determination.
These principles of Machiavellian power politics must be com-
pletely replaced by a different system of international relations
based upon antithetical operational dynamics: international organi-
zations and law, collective security, open diplomacy, free trade, free-
dom of the seas, arms reduction and disarmament and national self-
determination. A new era of world history dawned with the League
of Nations; the old world of power politics was left behind as an
evolutionary stage of barbarism to which, like Rousseau's state of
4. See H. MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST 144 (1951).
5. See PRESIDENT WILSON'S STATE PAPERS AND ADDRESSES 464-72 (A. Shaw ed.
1918).
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nature, 6 mankind would never return.
Unfortunately, the world of power politics returned two de-
cades later. The political realists placed the blame for the Second
World War on Wilson and those Western statesmen who adopted
his allegedly "legalist-moralist" approach to the conduct of interna-
tional relations during the interwar period. 7 These leaders had con-
demned the techniques of power politics in favor of an antipower
politics approach to international relations. However, the opposite
should have been done. The Treaty of Versailles 8 and the Covenant
of the League of Nations were not the perfect incarnations of truth,
justice and peace as represented by the leaders of the Allied and
Associated Powers. They were mere instrumentalities of power
politics designed by the victorious nations of the First World War to
secure and perpetuate, with the maximum possible degree of legal
and institutional coercion, the favorable political, economic and
military status quo after the Great War. The Treaty of Versailles
was imposed vi et armis, in contravention of Wilson's express
promises given to induce surrender. The peoples of the world had
been sorely deluded by the ideological rhetoric deceptively em-
ployed by their leaders to fan the flames of patriotic fervor to hasten
the war to its successful conclusion.
If the victors of Versailles intended to keep their ill-gotten
gains, they had to be willing to employ military force against a
vengeful Germany whenever the latter attempted to resist the terms
of the so-called peace. But the Western democracies lacked the req-
uisite Nietzscheian will to fight to preserve their dominance. They
preferred to trust in their own illusions by putting their faith into
such meaningless pronouncements as Wilson's Fourteen Points, the
Kellogg-Briand Pact9 and its corollary, the Stimson Doctrine;' 0 into
6. See Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations oflnequality Among Men,
in THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES 77 (R. Masters ed. 1964).
7. See, e.g., E. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919-1939, at 22-40 (2d ed.
1946).
8. Treaty of Versailles, June 20, 1919, 2 Bevans 42, reprinted in 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 151
(Supp. 1919).
9. Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact obligated the signatories to renounce war "as an instrument of
national policy in their relations with one another." Id art. 1, 46 Stat. at 2345-46, 94
L.N.T.S. at 63.
10. The Stimson Doctrine was a reaction to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. It
was articulated in a January 7, 1932 note to Japan and China which stated that the United
States refused to admit the legality of the situation and would not recognize any treaty be-
tween those two nations which, inter alia, impaired the territorial integrity of China. See
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. i[
such ineffectual organs of the League of Nations as the Council, the
Assembly, and the Permanent Court of International Justice; and
into such vapid and useless legalist-moralist doctrines as neutrality,
disarmament, arbitration, the codification of international law and
the formulation of a definition of aggression. Perhaps most egre-
giously of all, the Western democracies believed in the existence of a
beneficent world public opinion that would guide the world on its
path toward peace.
If Western statesmen had been attentive to the historical imper-
atives of power politics, and not seduced by the chimerical allure-
ments of international law, the Second World War might never
have occurred or would have occurred in the middle 1930's when
the devastation would have been minor in comparison to that which
actually transpired. Western statesmen could have fought the war
on their own terms and at the time of their own choice, not those of
their natural adversaries.
The political realists then argued that the United States, faced
with a communist threat in the aftermath of World War II, must
repudiate its deeply-ingrained legalist-moralist approach to interna-
tional relations in favor of pure Machiavellian power politics to sur-
vive its confrontation with the Soviet Union. In order to avoid a
suicidal Third World War, the Western democracies must not re-
peat the same near fatal mistake they made after the termination of
the First World War, i.e., reliance upon the fictitious and fatuous
strength of international law and organizations to preserve world
peace. Thus arose the political realists' fascination with George
Santayana's hackneyed saying: "Those who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it.""II
C. The Legalist Approach to International Relations
Just as those who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it, those who misinterpret the past are just as likely to repeat
it. Contrary to the underlying assumptions of contemporary inter-
national political scientists, the American legalist approach to inter-
national relations did not begin during or immediately after the
outbreak of the First World War, but well before. This historical
oversight has led political scientists to commit the grievous analyti-
Wright, Editorial Comment.- Stimson Note o/January 7, 1932, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 342 (1932).
See also infra text accompanying notes 499-500.
11. G. SANTAYANA, I THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1905).
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cal error of confusing and compounding positivist international le-
gal studies with the pursuit of international morality. This error has
created some legalist-moralist strawman warranting condemnation
for the Machiavellian "sins of princes" supposed above.' 2 Conse-
quently, throughout the twentieth century, a modern legalist ap-
proach to international relations has been established to function in
a manner diametrically opposed to a moralist attitude toward world
politics.
This self-conscious distinction between law and morality by
turn-of-the-century American international lawyers was explicitly
intended to surmount the objections of John Austin, who denied the
existence of international law as real "law" and maintained instead
that international law represented nothing more significant than the
"rules of positive morality."1 3 In the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, American international lawyers were vigorously en-
gaged in the task of sharply distinguishing a "scientific" or
"positivist" approach to the study of international law from its Gro-
tian natural law heritage and proclivities. These lawyers were desir-
ous of at last repudiating those elements of their Grotian past which
partook of preaching international morality under the guise of an
international law that was piously represented as the incarnation of
natural law. International legal studies had to step irrevocably for-
ward into the twentieth century by developing an actual "science"
of public international law based upon a positivist approach which
was antithetical to the content and methodology of outmoded natu-
ral law and natural right theories. This continued reliance upon
such amorphous concepts by international lawyers gratuitously pro-
vided ammunition for philosophical assault to Austin's omnipresent
proteges.
At the outset of the twentieth century the classic paradigm' 4 for
international legal positivism, which still dominates the profession
after seventy-five years, 15 was expounded in the second volume of
12. See Boyle, The Law ofPower Politics, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 901, 928-29 [hereinafter
cited as Power Politics].
13. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF
THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 121-27, 137-44 (1954).
14. Cf T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) (defin-
ing paradigms as "universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide
model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners").
15. From an international legal positivist perspective, the McDougal-Lasswell juris-
prudence of international law is atavistic because of its self-proclaimed value orientation.
See Irrelevance, supra note 1, at 206-14. This author has developed a "functionalist" ap-
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the American Journal of International Law by the renowned Lassa
Oppenheim, Whewell Professor of International Law at the Univer-
sity of Cambridge.' 6 A "positive" method required a foundation
built upon the recognized rules of international law as set forth in
the customary practice of states and in the formal conventions con-
cluded between them, instead of upon philosophical speculations
about some nonexistent law of nature. The facts of international life
must never be distorted by the hypotheses about what international
law "ought" to be. A true international legal positivist must, there-
fore, perform seven tasks in order to promote the "science" of public
international law: (1) exposition of existing rules of law; (2) histori-
cal research; (3) criticism of existing law; (4) preparation of codifica-
tions; (5) maintaining the distinction between old customary and
new conventional law; (6) fostering international arbitration; and
(7) popularization of public international law, since public opinion
can indeed influence governments in its favor.
The positivist method did not preach that international law
should never concern itself with the promotion of moral values.
Rather it was premised on the admitted assumption that interna-
tional legal positivism, as opposed to the Grotian natural law tradi-
tion, constituted the superior means to progress toward attainment
of the Aristotelian "final cause" of international legal studies-pres-
ervation of peace among nations to the greatest degree possible
under the given historical circumstances. Positivist international le-
gal analysis was more conductive to reaching an agreement among
states over the current and proposed rules of international behavior
than the dogma of Grotian natural law morality, which invariably
masked perceived national interests and was subject to national
prejudices. Consequently, international legal positivism could bet-
ter serve to ameliorate the unavoidable conflict between states in
international relations. Thus, in the first part of the twentieth cen-
tury, war, imperial conquest and the threat and use of force were
accepted facts of international life to which the rules of public inter-
national law were quite readily accomodated.' 7 International law
proach to analyzing the relationship between international law and politics. See Boyle, In-
ternational Law in Time of Crisis.- From the Entebbe Raid to the Hostages Convention, 75
Nw. U.L. REV. 769 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Entebbe].
16. See Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 AM. J.
INT'L L. 313 (1908). See also Editorial Comment, The Whewell Professorship of International
Law, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 862 (1908). But see Pollock, The Sources of International Law, 2
COLUM. L. REV. 511 (1902).
17. Cf Editorial Comment, The Papacy in International Law, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 864,
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was not yet perceived as the means by which these manifestations of
interstate violence could be eliminated. Rather, international law
was seen as a means to reduce their incidence, mitigate their fury
and limit their scope as to protect neutrals and prevent the develop-
ment of a worldwide conflagration. International law was never
perceived as a transcendent end unto itself but only as a means to
achieve the ultimate goal of peace in the human situation.' 8
From the perspective of a turn-of-the-century international le-
gal positivist, Austin committed a serious methodological error
when he mistakenly assumed that international law functioned in a
manner similar to that of municipal law. At the time, there was a
clear cut distinction between the two systems: international law was
essentially a system of customary law, while, by contrast, municipal
law was characterized primarily as a system of statutory law. Con-
sequently, the operational features of each system should be funda-
mentally different, and therefore, the standards used to evaluate
each system must be different. This approach, taken by the posi-
tivists, is corroborated by the literature of contemporary interna-
tional political science which examines the so-called level-of-
analysis problem, namely, that the functional dynamics of interna-
tional relations in comparison to domestic affairs are so basically
dissimilar that they cannot properly support the delineation of use-
ful comparative analogues.' 9
According to these early international legal positivists, Austin's
position that international law was not really law but only positive
international morality also misperceived the essence of the "sanc-
tion" behind municipal law. Instead of perceiving municipal law as
the result of effective domestic public opinion, Austin considered
coercion and punishment as the effective forces. Yet, without con-
sidering the power of public opinion, the phenomenon of customary
law, whether international or municipal, cannot be accounted for,
except, perhaps, by the fictive maxim that what the sovereign per-
mits he also commands. Since there exists no Hobbesian sovereign
in international relations, customary international law binds states
because they are deemed to have consented to be bound by the gen-
eral customs and usage of international intercourse. As such, the
ultimate sanction for international law is community public opinion
865 (1914); Editorial Comment, Peace Through the Development of International Law, 8 AM.
J. INT'L L. 114 (1914).
18. Cf. Editorial Comment, Louis Renault, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 152, 153 (1908).
19. See Power Politics, supra note 12, at 908 n.17 and authorities cited therein.
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which includes fear of war and its correlative: pressure to resort to
war. This explicit or implicit consent of states to be bound by inter-
national law also binds their respective citizens since international
law is incorporated into their domestic legal orders. Citizens are
thereby bound by the rules of international law in their mutual rela-
tions with each other and with foreigners.20
The blossoming of a community of such internally and exter-
nally law-abiding nations by means of a constantly increasing de-
gree of interaction and interdependence throughout the world can
create a truly global public opinion that will serve as the ultimate
sanction of international law.2' Explained in somewhat more tangi-
ble terms, the real sanction behind international law is the exclusion
of a state violating its principles from the benefits of cooperating
with other states and international agencies with respect to vital con-
cerns of national interest. The task of the "new diplomacy" incum-
bent upon international lawyers is to establish a framework for
cooperation among nations in which substantial advantages can be
obtained by joint state action that cannot otherwise be realized by
states acting in isolation from each other. This web of international
legal ties should become so strong that no state would consider dis-
rupting it by resortiig to war; or in the unfortunate event that war
remains a temporary feature of the international system, many of
these legal and institutional patterns of relations can persist to sur-
vive and function despite the outbreak of violent hostilities.22 An
example of the demands of international intercourse is the Univer-
sal Postal Union, which requires the cooperation of all states and is
not subject to the veto power of any one state. Although nations are
exceedingly reluctant to give such an agency more power, it is in this
20. International legal positivists have traditionally favored the "dualist" over the
"monist" argument in favor of a non-hierarchical relationship between international law
and municipal law. International law is not superior to municipal law or vice versa. The
two phenomena co-exist with each other as interdependent and interpenetrated systems. Cf
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Wright, Conflicts of International Law with
National Laws and Ordinances, II AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1917); but see Starke, Monism and
Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 66, 75-78 (1936).
21. See Root, The Sanction of International Law, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 451 (1908); Scott,
The Legal Nature of International Law, I AM. J. INT'L L. 831 (1907); see also Nys, The
Development and Formation of International Law, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. I, 4, 20 (1912); Reeves,
The Influence of the Law of Nature upon International Law in the United States, 3 AM. J.
INT'L L. 547 (1909) (no great influence). But see Lansing, Notes on Sovereignty in a State, I
AM. J. INT'L L. 105 (1907) (Austinian position); Willoughby, The Legal Nature of Interna-
tional Law, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 357 (1908) (critique of Scott).
22. See, e.g., Stowell, Plans for World Organization, 18 COLUM. L.Q. 226 (1916).
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direction that the future development of international relations will
best proceed toward the achievement of world peace.
23
As another step toward achieving world peace, at some point in
the distant future a world federal state could come into existence
organized according to the functional model of the United States,
whereby the nations of the world would each accept a semi-sover-
eign status analogous to that of states in the union.24 Presumably a
world federal law would thereafter govern the relations between
states. This would require the creation of some form of world gov-
ernment with sufficient legislative, judicial and executive power to
promulgate, adjudicate and, if necessary, enforce international law
against recalcitrant states in a manner that would not precipitate a
general condition of global warfare. Since each state had already
consented to be governed, the punishment of the culprit would be
generally accepted as the established means to enforce the law.25
In many respects, this turn-of-the-century "legalist" analysis of
international relations constitutes the genuine precursor of the con-
temporary "functional-integrationist" school of post-World War II
international political science.26 International positivism attempted
to overcome the Hobbesian doctrine that the will of the sovereign is
the source of all law and its corollary that where there is no sover-
eign there is no law. However, international legal positivism suc-
cumbed to another variant of the same fiction: the notion that
sovereign consent is the sole basis for legitimacy in international re-
lations. At the start of the twentieth century reliance upon the con-
cept of sovereign consent, manifested in customary and
conventional international law, was useful to combat the Austinian
denial of international law as real law. Theoretically, sovereign
consent was a tangible factor whose presence could be determined
by objective criteria and thus avoid allegations of preaching Grotian
23. See Reinsch, International Administrative Law and National Sovereignty, 3 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1909). See also Baldwin, The International Congresses and Conferences of the
Last Century as Forces Working Toward the Solidarity of the World, I AM. J. INT'L L. 565
(1907).
24. Cf. W. HULL, THE Two HAGUE CONFERENCES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 496-500 (1908).
25. See, e.g., Lansing, Notes on World Sovereignty, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 13 (1921) (writ-
ten for publication in 1906); Moore, International Law. Its Present and Future, I Am. J.
INT'L L. 11 (1907); Peaslee, The Sanction ofInternationalLaw, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 328 (1916);
Snow, International Law and Political Science, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 315 (1913); Snow, The Law
of Nations, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 890 (1912). See also W. KUEHL, SEEKING WORLD ORDER 88
(1969).
26. See Irrelevance, supra note 1, at 196-98.
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natural law morality under the rubric of public international law.
Nevertheless, toward the end of the twentieth century, stubborn ad-
herence to sovereign consent to the exclusion of all other principles
for legitimization has created a stark predicament for international
legal positivism. Today the nations of the world are striving to de-
velop a system of international relations not based upon the notion
of sovereign consent because this provides an inherent veto power
over the creation of new rules as to each one of the participants.
Rather, such a notion must be replaced by the principle of consen-
sus founded upon reciprocal expectations of state behavior. There is
nothing sacrosanct about sovereign consent as the basic legitimizing
principle of international law and politics. However, an analogy
may be drawn to the beliefs of the social contract theorists such as
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau who considered the consent of the cit-
izen to be the essential basis for political legitimacy within modern
civil society which would undercut the effect of the medieval Chris-
tian Church in Western political philosophy. 27  This analogy
presents the analysis from another perspective: while the principle
of citizen consent still operates in the desired fashion within the mu-
nicipal affairs system, within the system of international relations
sovereign consent has rapidly proven to be increasingly unworkable.
The early international legal positivists explicitly embraced the
classic Machiavellian dichotomy between the "is" (effectual truth)
and the "ought to be" (imaginary truth) of world affairs.28 These
positivists chose to classify international law as effectual truth and
Grotian natural law morality as imaginary truth. This categoriza-
tion of law as an effectual truth instead of an imaginary truth re-
ceived tacit support from Machiavelli himself.29 To an international
legal positivist, the effectiveness of any system of law must depend
upon the existence of some source of underlying power, whether
military, political, economic or ideological in nature. Criticism of
international legal positivists because of their supposed ignorance of
or disregard for the realities of power by international political
scientists demonstrates the political scientist's complete unawareness
of the positivist's Hobbesian and Machiavellian premises.
This article will establish that the attitude of American interna-
tional lawyers toward the role of international law and international
27. See Power Politics, supra note 12, at 931-56.
28. N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 16 (W.K. Marriott trans. 1952).
29. Id. at 7 (need for good laws); id at 21 (fighting by means of law).
[Vol. 6:185
1983] American Foreign Policy Toward International Law 197
organizations in world politics during the crucial period of 1898 to
1917 was not naive, idealistic or utopian. Rather, their attitude was
acutely realistic and relatively sophisticated in their comprehension
of the dynamic interrelationship between power and law in interna-
tional affairs. These turn-of-the-century American international
lawyers, whether as teachers, scholars and polemicists or, as many
of them were, government officials, diplomats and statesmen, did
not shrink from advocating the forceful exercise of American power
around the globe. As a group they were too prone to support and
encourage the United States government in the planning and execu-
tion of its imperialistic endeavors: they formulated arguments and
rationalizations in favor of such imperialistic policies in terms of the
rules of international law and the requirements of maintaining in-
ternational peace and security. At the beginning of this century,
Americans in general demonstrated a marked tendency to believe
international law to consist of whatever the immediate satisfaction
of their national self-interests necessitated, 30 and in this regard
American international lawyers were not essentially different from
their intensely nationalistic compatriots. Apart from a few expres-
sions of regret or dissent, American international lawyers as a group
mounted no significant criticism of the overall conduct of American
imperialist foreign policy from the perspective of those supposedly
sensitive to the needs of a truly international legal order.
During this period, the United States Department of State co-
opted many American international lawyers because of their critical
relevance to the management of the complex difficulties resulting
from the conduct of an American foreign policy that was simultane-
ously striving to reconcile the inexorable demands of a newly
launched imperialism with the tenacious pull of a traditionally
deep-seated isolationism. Thus it was from within the United States
governmental foreign policy establishment that turn-of-the-century
American international lawyers brought to bear their unique per-
spective of international relations directly upon the policy formula-
tion process. In fact, American international lawyers exercised a
more profound influence upon the formation of American foreign
policy during the interim between the Spanish-American War and
the First World War than they have as a group at any time before or
since. Therefore, it is to that historical era, and not the interwar
30. See Hart, American Ideals of International Relations, I AM. J. INT'L L. 624, 634-35
(1907).
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period, that this study must turn in order to delineate the paradig-
matic elements of the classic American "legalist" approach to inter-
national relations.
II. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ORGANIZATIONS
A. American Legalism as a Reaction to the
Spanish-American War
The single most formative event in the development of a dis-
tinctively "legalist" approach to international relations in the
United States was the 1907 publication of the first volume of the
American Journal of International Law under the auspices of the
newly founded American Society of International Law. This was
the first periodical devoted exclusively to international law in the
English-speaking world.3' American scholars and practitioners of
international law thereby created a central forum from which to ar-
ticulate an essentially legalist analysis of international relations that
was purposefully intended to be different from the approach taken
by political scientists. 32 The birth of both the American Society of
International Law and its Journal can be attributed to the experi-
ence of the United States during its war with Spain in 1898. The
sudden and decisive victory in the Spanish-American War stimu-
lated an increased awareness of international affairs throughout the
country and generated a need within the American international le-
gal community to organize a publication which expressed the legal
attitudes toward America's new and far-flung international
relations.33
Prior to the Spanish-American War, the United States had not
subsisted totally within the cocoon of isolationism from the rest of
the world spun by Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe
31. See Editorial Comment, I AM. J. INT'L L. 129, 134-36 (1907). The nucleus for the
Society came from those members of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbi-
tration who wished to found an organization devoted exclusively to international law. Id at
129-30. See also Finch, The American Society of International Law 1906-1956, 50 AM. J.
INT'L L. 293, 295-98 (1956); Raymond & Frischholz, Lawyers Who Established International
Law in the United States, 1776-1914, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 802, 823 (1982).
32. Cf Editorial Comment, The Revista De Derecho Internacional, 16 AM. J. INT'L L.
437, 438 (1922). The first issue of the American Political Science Review had been published
in November, 1906.
33. See A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN,
1817-1967, at 209 (1967); Editorial Comment, I AM. J. INT'L L. 129, 130, 134 (1907).
[Vol. 6:185
1983] American Foreign Policy Toward International Law 199
Doctrine.34 The country had engaged in at least two formal interna-
tional wars with significant hemispheric consequences: the War of
1812 and the Mexican War of 1846. The War of 1812 can be
broadly interpreted as an attempt by the new government to assert
its recently won independence from Great Britain. The Mexican
War of 1846 was an imperialist enterprise designed to fulfill the
country's so-called "manifest destiny" of complete continental ex-
pansion and resulted in the seizure of the southwestern section of
the United States. 35 The numerous expeditions against the Ameri-
can Indians also fit neatly within the category of continental imperi-
alist expansion, though it was argued that since Indian occupation
was not entitled to any respect, their subjugation did not qualify as
an act of imperialism. 36 The net effect of these disputes upon their
contemporaneous global political environments, however, was rela-
tively insignificant when compared with the astounding ramifica-
tions for the United States and the world at large ensuing from the
Spanish War of 1898.
The crumbling Spanish Empire was almost instantaneously dis-
solved, and the United States of America assumed its imperial man-
tle in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines. 37  The
acquisition of Cuba and Puerto Rico situated the United States in
the heart of the Caribbean from where it could control the gateway
to the isthmus of Central America. From this position it was almost
inevitable that America intervene in Colombia to secure the inde-
pendence of Panama in order to construct the canal.38 The acquisi-
tion of Cuba and Puerto Rico also led to the promulgation of the
Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine to justify United States
economic receivership for the Dominican Republic, 39 and led to
34. See J. RICHARDSON, I A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 205 (Farewell Address) and 776 (Monroe Doctrine) (1911).
35. Cf. Editorial Comment, Tripoli, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 149, 155 (1912) (Mexican-Amer-
ican War was unjust and unjustifiable).
36. See Potter, The Nature ofAmerican Territorial Expansion, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 189,
195-96 (1921). See also Potter, The Nature ofAmerican Foreign Policy, 21 AM. J. INT'L L.
53, 58 (1927).
37. Treaty of Peace, Dec. 10, 1898, United States-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 343.
See Editorial Coment, The Scope of Domestic Questions in International Law, 19 AM. J.
INT'L L. 143, 146 (1925) (United States was entitled to abate the international nuisance of
Spain's continued misgovernment of Cuba). See generally F. FREIDEL, THE SPLENDID LIT-
TLE WAR (1st ed. 1958); P. MOON, IMPERIALISM AND WORLD POLITICS 407-56 (1928); J.
PRATr, EXPANSIONISTS OF 1898 (1936).
38. See A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, 2 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRO-
CESS 922-25 (1969).
39. See 9 RICHARDSON, supra note 34, at 7353, 7375-79. The Roosevelt Corollary
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military occupation of Cuba pursuant to the Platt Amendment. 40
These developments paved the way for the subsequent history of
persistent imperialist interventions by the United States into the af-
fairs of Central American and Caribbean countries that has plagued
United States foreign policy toward the region adjoining the Pan-
ama Canal for the past three-quarters of a century.
On the other side of the world, the decision to take over the
Philippines propelled the United States directly into the affairs of
the Orient. Since the major powers of Europe had already staked
out their respective colonial claims in the Far East, the takeover of
the Philippines indirectly involved the United States in the Euro-
pean balance of power. 4' American efforts to preserve and extend
its geopolitical and economic position in that region of the world,
especially the maintenance of its "open door" policy with regard to
China, ultimately set the stage for serious and prolonged friction
with Japan. This friction culminated in Pearl Harbor and American
involvement in the Second World War forty years later.
In the pre-World War I era of international relations, the major
philisophical dilemma confronting American international lawyers
was the reconciliation of the United States' course of world imperi-
alism, commenced by the Spanish-American War, with the tradi-
tional ideals of American foreign policy. Traditional American
foreign policy was based upon the inalienable rights of the individ-
ual, the self-determination of peoples, the sovereign equality and
independence of states, noninterventionism, respect for interna-
tional law, and the peaceful settlement of international disputes.
Such principles were clearly contrary to America's imperialistic ac-
tivities. Within the American international legal community there
alleged a United States right to intervene into the domestic affairs of Central American and
Caribbean countries. Its justification was that United States administration of the public
finances of these nations was necessary to prevent intervention (which was violative of the
Monroe Doctrine) by European nations. See infra notes 372-77 and accompanying text.
40. Army Appropriation Act, ch. 803, art. III, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 31 Stat. 895, 897
(1901). The Platt Amendment was imposed on Cuba as a condition for independence. In-
deed, its terms were incorporated into the Cuban constitution. It required Cuba not to enter
into any treaties that might impair its sovereignty and not to incur debts beyond its ability to
repay. More importantly, the Platt Amendment gave the United States the right to maintain
naval bases in Cuba and the right to intervene in Cuba when American interests were
deemed to be in danger. See L.C. GARDNER, W.F. LAFEBER, T.J. MCCORMICK, CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE at 252, 274 (2d ed. 1976). For a general discussion of the Platt
Amendment, see infra notes 401-11 and accompanying text.
41. See W. LANGER, THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIALISM 1890-1902, at 167-94, 385-
414B, 445-83, 677-786 (2d ed. 1950).
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did exist a minority anti-imperialist sentiment which espoused the
"neutralization" of United States colonial territories similar to
Belgium in order to remove them from the extant zone of interna-
tional contention. 42 However, the majority accepted that American
imperialism, like war, was an irreversible fact of international life
which must be dealt with on its own terms.43 In the majority's opin-
ion, imperialism could be reconciled with American ideals through
recognition that the true purpose of American imperial policy, un-
like that of Europe, must not be territorial aggrandizement and eco-
nomic enrichment, but the ultimate achievement of the American
dream of freedom, independence, dignity and equality for all the
peoples living within the current American imperial domain.
44
These objectives could be secured in a manner consistent with
America's expansive definition of its national security interests by
pursuing a foreign policy that actively promoted international law
and international organizations.
B. American Legalism as a Rejection of the European
Balance of Power System
Near the turn of the century, American analysis of European
politics transpired through the conceptual prism of the "balance of
power"-a phenomenon perceived to be the operative determinant
of international relations between the states of the Old World. By
contrast, the United States was still believed to occupy the fortunate
position of "splendid isolation" vis-A-vis the machinations of Mach-
iavellian power politics on the Continent that it had held through-
out the nineteenth century by virtue of the British navy. 45 The
European balance of power system had extended its tentacles to
worldwide dimensions by including within its grasp the decaying
Ottoman Empire,4 6 Africa,47 the Near East, Central Asia,48 India,
42. See Wicker, Some Effects of Neutralization, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 652 (1911);
Winslow, Neutralization, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 366 (1908).
43. See, e.g., Snow, Neutralization Versus Imperialism, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 562 (1908).
44. See Hart, American Ideals of International Relations, I AM. J. INT'L L. 624 (1907);
Snow, The American Philosophy of Government and Its Effect on International Relations, 8
AM. J. INT'L L. 191 (1914).
45. See, e.g., Editorial Comment, The Baltic and the North Seas, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 646
(1908); Editorial Comment, The Dissolution of the Union of Norway and Sweden, 1 AM. J.
INT'L L. 440 (1907); Editorial Comment, The Integrity of Norway Guaranteed, 2 AM. J. INT'L
L. 176 (1908) (purpose is to keep Russia out of Western Europe). See also Editorial Com-
ment, The Fortfication of the A/and Islands, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 397 (1908).
46. See Editorial Comment, Mediation in the Turko Italian War, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 463
(1912) (favors mediation by great powers); Editorial Comment, The Basis of Mediation in the
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Southeast Asia, China, Japan and the Pacific. Only the Monroe
Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary had prevented Europe from
reasserting its stranglehold over Latin America. Moreover, despite
Europe's presence in the Far East, the American sponsored Open
Door Policy, which guaranteed the exploitation of China for all, was
perceived as a way of maintaining the balance of power for the re-
gion. The rest of the world was duly consigned to the unhappy fate
of becoming the arena for intense rivalry and periodic conflict over
territory between the major imperial powers of Europe and Japan.
In this worldwide struggle for colonies the rules of international law
were not applicable except to the extent that they accorded some
semblance of legitimacy and order to the process of imperial subju-
gation. This was accomplished by recognizing the existence of for-
mal legal statuses known as "protectorates" or "condominiums"
over conquered territories. Consequently, the hegemonial position
of an imperial power could be accepted by one of its cohorts.49 Nev-
ertheless, during this period of colonial conquest, the formation of
new international institutions for the peaceful settlement of inter-
state disputes could ameliorate the imperial rivalries among the
great powers that were not worth a systemic war.
In spite of strong support of an interventionist American for-
War Between Italy and Turkey, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 719 (1912) (mediation undertaken by great
powers); Editorial Comment, Peace Between Italy and Turkey, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 155 (1913)
(Italy unjustified and lawless); Editorial Comment, The Closing and Reopening ofthe Darda-
nelles, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 706 (1912); Editorial Comment, Tripoli, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 149 (1912)
(Italy violated international law by declaration of war on Turkey). See also Editorial Com-
ment, The Use of Balloons in the War Between Italy and Turkey, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 485 (1912).
47. See, e.g., Editorial Comment, Anglo-French-Italian Agreement Regarding Abys-
sinia, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 484 (1907).
48. See, e.g., Editorial Comment, England and Russia in Central Asia, 3 AM. J. INT'L
L. 170 (1909); Editorial Comment, Russia and Persia, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 155 (1912) (joint
protectorate over Persia); Editorial Comment, The Persian Revolution and the Anglo-Russian
Entente, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 969 (1909) (downfall of the Shah and intervention by British and
Russian troops); Editorial Comment, The Recent Anglo-Russian Convention, 1 AM. J. INT'L
L. 979 (1907) (establishing spheres of influence in Persia and assigning Afghanistan to Brit-
ain and Tibet to China).
49. For the history of the establishment of the French protectorate in Morocco, see
Editorial Comment, An Antecedent Algeciras, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 867 (1914); Editorial Com-
ment, Recent Disturbances in Morocco, I AM. J. INT'L L. 975 (1907); Harris, The New Moroc-
can Protectorate, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 245 (1913); Editorial Comment, A New Sultan in
Morocco, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 699 (1909); Editorial Comment, French Protectorate Established
in Morocco, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 446 (1912); Editorial Comment, The Algeciras Conference, 1
AM. J. INT'L L. 138 (1907); Editorial Comment, The Treaty of November 27, 1912, Between
France and Spain Concerning Morocco, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 357 (1913). See also Editorial
Comment, Anglo-French Convention Respecting the New Hebrides, I AM. J. INT'L L. 482
(1907); Editorial Comment, Egypt a British Protectorate, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 202 (1915).
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eign policy in the Western Hemisphere in the aftermath of the Span-
ish-American War, most American international lawyers did not
believe the United States should radically depart from the sage ad-
vice of Washington's Farewell Address. The United States had both
the luxury and the duty to abstain from choosing sides between the
contending alliance systems in Europe since such a decision could
easily precipitate America into war over another state's interests.
Indeed, with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the revi-
val of the Balkan Question by the Austrian annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in 1908, it seemed that Serbia would soon be the
focus of a monumental struggle between Russia and Austria-Hun-
gary and their respective allies.50 In the event of a general war in
Europe, the United States could protect its newly-won possessions
in the Far East and its hegemonial position over Latin America
through isolationism. In addition, the international laws of neutral-
ity would permit American merchants to profit handsomely from
increased trade with both sides of European struggle.
By accepting the policy of isolationism in peace and neutrality
in war, vis-A-vis the European balance of power system, American
international lawyers did not invariably espouse inaction by the
United States in world politics.5' The legalist opinion was to the
contrary, in that it was considered vital for the United States to pur-
sue a foreign policy which actively promoted international law and
international organizations. Such a foreign policy was expressly in-
tended to prevent a general European war that could easily involve
America, as that which occurred in 1812. This task could be accom-
plished by a policy which encouraged the transformation of the mo-
dus operandi of the European balance of power system from the
constant threat and use of force to reliance upon new rules of inter-
national law and new institutions for the peaceful settlement of
international disputes. The United States occupied the ideal diplo-
50. See Editorial Comment, Macedonian Railways and the Concert of Europe, 2 AM. J.
INT'L L. 644 (1908) (end of Austro-Hungarian/Russian entente); Ion, The Cretan Question, 4
AM. J. INT'L L. 276 (1910); Schelle, Studies on the Eastern Question (pt. 1), 5 AM. J. INT'L L.
144, 174 (1911) (violation of Treaty of Berlin by Austria and Bulgaria was flagrant breach of
international law); id (pts. 2 & 3) at 394, 680; Editorial Comment, The Balkan Situation, 2
AM. J. INT'L L. 864 (1908) (violation of Treaty of Berlin); Editorial Comment, The Balkan
Situation, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 688 (1909) (Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be
countered by renewed Russian support to southern Slavs). See also Editorial Comment,
Edward VII, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 662, 664 (1910) (fear of Anglo-German war).
51. See, e.g., Scott, America and the New Diplomacy, INT'L CONCILIATION, Mar. 1909,
at 4-5.
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matic position to implement such a policy to prevent a European
war. America had maintained its traditional isolationism from the
great power politics which did not directly concern its own interests.
America's pristine detachment from the European powers reduced
the inevitable suspicions that often accompany and defeat major
diplomatic initiatives from their outset. America could most safely
and effectively protect both itself and the world at large from the
scourge of future battles not by wielding the dangerous weapons of
power politics and participating in the European balance of power
system, but rather by preserving its distance and thus its perspective
for leadership in the development of international law and interna-
tional organizations.
C The American Legalist War Prevention Program
for World Politics
Given the inherent limitations of the United States' commit-
ment to isolationism in peace and neutrality in war, the pre-World
War I American legalist approach to international relations was as
activist and globalist as could reasonably be expected under such
historical conditions. As a whole, American international lawyers
moved considerably farther and faster toward internationalism than
most of their isolationist foreign policy establishment colleagues.
This was due to their sincere belief in the overriding need for
America to initiate a war prevention program for the great powers
of Europe on the basis of international law and organizations. As it
took shape and matured over the twenty year span from 1898 to
1917, the elements of the American legalist approach to interna-
tional relations developed the following concrete objectives: (1) the
creation of a general system for the obligatory arbitration of dis-
putes between states; (2) the establishment of an international court
of justice; (3) the codification of important areas of customary inter-
national law into positive treaty form; (4) arms reduction, but only
after and not before, the relaxation of international tensions by
means of these and other legalist techniques and institutions; and
(5) the institutionalization of the practice of convening periodical
conferences of all states in the recognized international commu-
nity.52 An additional element of this American legalist program was
52. See, e.g., Editorial Comment, The Fourteenth Lake Mohonk Conference, 2 AM. J.
INT'L L. 615 (1908); De Sillac, Periodical Peace Conferences, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 968 (1911);
Hershey, Conventionfor the PeacefulAdustment of International Dfferences, 2 AM. J. INT'L
L. 29 (1908); Editorial Comment, Joint Resolution to Authorize the Appointment of a Commis-
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to strengthen the well-established international legal institution of
neutrality and the humanitarian laws of armed conflict. This would
serve to further isolate the bulk of the international community, es-
pecially the United States, from some future war which might still
erupt between the great powers of Europe in spite of enactment of
these preventive legalist devices.
Theoretically, the five steps listed above were to be achieved
seriatim, since each stage was to some extent dependent upon fulfill-
ment of the prior goal. However, in practice these legalist objectives
were pursued in a roughly contemporaneous manner because of
their highly interdependent and mutually supportive nature. Fur-
thermore, realization of the fifth stage would have represented the
first step toward the creation of a rudimentary form of a world legis-
lature which, when joined with an effective world court, would have
comprised two-thirds of the branches required for the institution of
a world government patterned after the legislative, judicial and ex-
ecutive departments of the United States.5 3 Nevertheless, not until
after the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 did the majority of the
American international legal community devote much time, effort
or resources to promoting the foundation of some executive "league
to enforce the peace," equipped with an effective international po-
lice force and necessarily accompanied by some degree of progres-
sive disarmament by the great powers.5 4 Such a visionary goal was
endorsed by some American international lawyers as a desirable
destination for the long-term evolution of international relations.55
Yet, prior to the Great War, there seemed to exist a general consen-
sus that such a scheme must not be allowed to detract from the im-
sion in Relation to Universal Peace, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 433 (1911); Editorial Comment, Lake
Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, I AM. J. INT'L L. 140 (1907); Editorial
Comment, Mr. Roosevelt's Nobel Address on International Peace, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 700
(1910); Editorial Comment, President Taft on International Peace, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 718
(1911); Editorial Comment, The Fifteenth Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitra-
tion, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 683 (1909); Editorial Comment, The Eighteenth Lake Mohonk Confer-
ence on International Arbitration, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 725 (1912); Editorial Comment, The
Pennsylvania Arbitration and Peace Conference, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1908).
53. See, e.g., J. ScoTT, 1 THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1988 AND 1907, at
465-66 (1909); Editorial Note, The Congress of Nations, ADVOCATE OF PEACE, July 1906, at
144.
54. See, e.g., Baldwin, The Membership of a World Tribunalfor Promoting Permanent
Peace, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 453 (1918); Brown, The Theory of the Independence and Equality of
States, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 305 (1915); Spencer, The Organization of International Force, 9 AM.
J. INT'L L. 45 (1915).
55. See, e.g., KUEHL, supra note 25, at 91-95 (W.J. Bartnett, Justice David J. Brewer,
John Bassett Moore, Joseph C. Clayton).
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mediate realization of the far more practicable agenda outlined
above.56 Moreover, there was no desire or intention on the part of
these early twentieth century American international lawyers to sur-
render any degree of United States sovereignty to some type of su-
pranational government.5 7
Although admittedly far-reaching, this American war preven-
tion program based on international law and organizations seemed
to stand more than a plausible chance for eventual success at the
turn of the century. This was due to the relative homogeneity of the
system of international relations in the pre-World War I era, at least
in comparison to the endemic heterogeneity so characteristic of the
post-World War II period.58 Publicists and statesmen of this earlier
epoch actually thought in terms of the existence of a real interna-
tional community of states.5 9 This world community basically con-
sisted of the countries of Europe, North America, South and Central
America, the Ottoman Empire60 and Japan. 61 The rest of the world
was viewed essentially as an arena for intense colonial competition
among the great powers. This inevitable imperial conffict rendered
even more vital the institution of the foregoing mechanisms.
All of these nations participated in the same system of interna-
tional political and economic relations and were subject to the same
corpus of European public international law. All of the major ac-
tors, except Japan, shared a similar cultural heritage schooled in the
Old Testament, Greece, Rome, medieval Christendom, Renaissance
and Reformation, the European Enlightenment, the Industrial
Revolution, and the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. This
cultural heritage also included the tradition of a "concert" of Euro-
pean powers which determined matters of world politics by mutual
consent and negotiated agreement throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury. The American legalist war prevention program for interna-
56. See supra text accompanying note 52.
57. See, e.g., KUEHL, supra note 25, at 134-37, 144-45, 161.
58. Cf Hoffmann, International Systems and International Law, in THE STATE OF
WAR 88 (1965).
59. See, e.g., Editorial Comment, Secretary Knox and International Unity, 4 AM. J.
INT'L L. 180 (1910); Snow, The Law of Nations, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 890 (1912).
60. The great powers of Europe formally admitted Turkey to the European public
international law system by the Treaty of Paris of 1856. See Evans, The Primary Sources of
International Obligations, 5 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 257, 265-67 (1911).
61. Although not formally admitted like Turkey, Japan was generally considered "one
of the Great Powers that lead the Family of Nations" by virtue of its military victory over
China in 1895. See L. OPPENHEIM, I INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 34 (R. Roxburgh 3d ed.
1920).
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tional relations intended to build upon this solid foundation of
cooperation, shared experiences, cultural similarities and interde-
pendent national interests to create an even more stable and secure
world order for the twentieth century and the dawn of mankind's
next millenium. It was not a pipedream but a practical program
that could successfully be implemented in the near future through
vigorous American leadership that would bring forth a reasonable
degree of enlightened self-interest on the part of the great powers of
Europe.
1. A system for the obligatory arbitration of
international disputes
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries many
men of great practical experience in world politics genuinely be-
lieved that the institution of an effective system for the obligatory
arbitration of international disputes could constitute a viable substi-
tute for recourse to war by states. However, the problem of creating
a workable "sanction" for international arbitration still existed.
Such a sanction would have to be something more than just the
same world public opinion which buttressed obedience to interna-
tional law in general. Yet in regard to international arbitration,
considerations of national self-interest and security had invariably
led to the submission of disputes to arbitration in the first place.
Consequently, the record of compliance with arbitral decisions ex-
pectedly was, and still is, quite good. 62 In the unlikely event of non-
compliance it was incumbent on neutral third parties to undertake
diplomatic, political or economic measures short of war or the use of
force against the recalcitrant state sufficient to induce obedience to
an arbitral award.63 The period of international relations from 1898
to 1917 was the zenith of the modem international arbitration
movement. There proved to be no need for serious concern with the
problem of enforcing arbitral awards since states which resorted to
arbitration dutifully complied with awards for reasons of enlight-
ened and rational self-interest.
a. the First Hague Peace Conference
Tsar Nicholas II of Russia initiated the First Hague Peace Con-
62. See, e.g., Penfield, InternationalArbitration, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 330, 340 (1907). But
cf. Chadwick, The Anglo-German Tension and a Solution, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 601 (1912).
63. See Dumas, Sanctions of InternationalArbitration, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 934 (1911).
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J.
ference. 64 The United States accepted the Russian Tsar's invitation
of August 24, 1898, to attend this international peace conference to
consider the reduction of armaments and the maintenance of gen-
eral peace. Although America was then still technically at war with
Spain,65 the invitation was accepted on the basis of an explicit Rus-
sian assurance that the war would not be discussed at the confer-
ence.66 Article 7 of the Russian Foreign Minister's circular note of
December 30, 1898, setting forth a proposed program for the confer-
ence, called for the "acceptance in principle" of the usage of good
offices, mediation and "optional arbitration for such cases as lend
themselves to it, with a view of preventing armed conflicts between
nations." 6
7
Despite the rejection of the Olney-Pauncefote Treaty of Arbi-
tration with Great Britain of 1897 by the United States Senate,
68
Secretary of State John Hay enthusiastically endorsed this proposi-
tion and instructed the American delegation to the First Hague
Peace Conference to propose a plan for the foundation of a perma-
nent international tribunal organized along the lines of the United
States Supreme Court.69 According to this plan, each signatory state
would have one representative on a permanent tribunal that would
always be open for the filing of cases by signatories or other states
wishing to have recourse to it.70 The contracting nations were to
submit to the tribunal all questions of disagreement between them,
except those questions which related to or involved their political
independence or territorial integrity.
While at the conference, however, the American delegation
64. Telegram from Ethan Hitchcock to William Day (Aug. 25, 1898), reprinted in U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1898 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES 540, 541 [hereinafter cited as FOREIGN REL. U.S.]. See C. DAVIS, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 36-53 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as DAVIS, HAGUE I].
65. See Basis for Establishment of Peace, Aug. 12, 1898, United States-Spain, 30 Stat.
1742, T.S. No. 343 1/2.
66. Telegram from Ethan Hitchcock to William Day (Sept. 3, 1898), 1898 FOREIGN
REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 542-43.
67. Telegram from Ethan Hitchcock to John Hay (Jan. 14, 1899), 1898 FOREIGN REL.
U.S., supra note 64, at 551, 553 (emphasis added).
68. Arbitration Treaty, Jan. 11, 1897, United States-Great Britain, in 3 Unperfected
Treaties of the United States of America 253 (C. Wiktor ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Un-
perfected Treaties)]. See Blake, The Olney-Pauncefote Treaty of 1897, 50 AM. HIST. REV.
228 (1945).
69. Address by John Hay to Hague Delegation (Apr. 18, 1899), 1899 FOREIGN REL.
U.S., supra note 64, at 511, 513.
70. See 2 SCOTT, supra note 53, at 15.
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concluded that a provision calling for the obligatory arbitration of
disputes, even with these exemptions, would prove unlikely to se-
cure the assent of the other participants. Consequently, they re-
quested and received permission from the State Department to
delete the obligatory nature of the proposed tribunal's jurisdiction.
71
The American plan that was eventually presented to the conference
provided that all differences between signatories could be submitted
by the common consent of interested nations to the judgment of the
international tribunal, whose award must then be accepted by the
parties. 72 In spite of this change, the First Hague Peace Conference
preferred a British plan calling for the selection of a panel of judges
who would be in session only when actually required for litigation.7
3
This British proposal formed the basis for the subsequently adopted
plan for the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). Never-
theless, several elements of the American plan found their way into
the PCA,74 and eventually the American scheme for a permanent
and standing international tribunal for the peaceful settlement of
interstate disputes would be revived and later adopted in principle
at the Second Hague Peace Conference.
At the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899, there was no sup-
port for a general multilateral pact calling for the obligatory arbitra-
tion of all disputes, or even politically significant disputes, between
states. 75 Germany adamantly opposed the conclusion of a general
multilateral pact calling for the obligatory arbitration of certain cat-
egories of disputes possessed of relatively inconsequential political
significance. 76 Even the United States insisted upon the omission
from a Russian list"7 of proposed subjects suitable for obligatory ar-
bitration international conventions relating to rivers, to interoceanic
71. See DAVIS, HAGUE I, supra note 64, at 137-38.
72. See I THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES: TRANSLATIONS
OF THE OFFICIAL TEXTS at 833, Annex 7 (J. Scott ed. 1920) [hereinafter cited as HAGUE I
PROCEEDINGS].
73. Id at 813, Annex 2, B.
74. White, Low & Holls, Report to the American Commission to the International
Conference at The Hague Regarding the Work of the Third Committee of the Conference
(July 31, 1899), reprinted in 2 SCOTT, supra note 53, at 52.
75. See General Report of the Commission of the United States of America to the
International Conference at The Hague (July 31, 1899), reprinted in 2 SCOTT, supra note 53,
at 17, 24.
76. See HAGUE I PROCEEDINGS, supra note 72, at 767-72; DAVIS, HAGUE I, supra note
64, at 158-64; HULL, supra note 24, at 297-311; 1 SCOTT, supra note 53, at 319-30.
77. See HAGUE I PROCEEDINGS, supra note 72, at 799, Annex I, A, art. 10.
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canals and to monetary matters.78 In deference to the principle of
the sovereign equality of states, the Hague Peace Conferences oper-
ated upon the basis of unanimity. German opposition to the princi-
ple of obligatory arbitration of disputes thus proved determinative.
Consequently, the First Hague Peace Conference had to content it-
self with the establishment of the purely voluntary system of arbitra-
tion known as the Permanent Court of Arbitration which, among
other procedures, was instituted by its 1899 Convention for the Pa-
cific Settlement of International Disputes.
79
The Permanent Court was, and still is, not a real "court" of
arbitration. Rather it consisted of a list of distinguished jurists ap-
pointed by the contracting powers to the Convention. From this list,
parties to a dispute could, if they so desired, choose an arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators to settle the dispute in accordance with a fixed
set of procedural rules 0 established by the Convention. 8' This list
was comprised of four persons selected by each contracting power
for a term of six years.
82
In the event the parties could not agree upon the composition
of the arbitration tribunal, each party was to appoint two arbitra-
tors,83 who together would choose an umpire.84 If the votes were
equal, the choice of the umpire was entrusted to a third power se-
lected by common agreement of the parties. If such an agreement
was not reached, each party selected a different power and the
78. International Conference at The Hague: Report of the Commission of the United
States of America (July 31, 1899), 1899 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 513, 518.
79. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, 32
Stat. 1779, 1788, T.S. No. 392, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 107, 113 (Supp. 1907). See
Myers, The Origin of the Hague Arbitral Courts, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 769 (1914).
80. The PCA's rules of procedure were revised and expanded in 1907. See Report of
the Delegates of the United States to the Second International Peace Conference at The
Hague (Oct. 18, 1907), reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. at 115 (Supp. 1907). See generally
Ralston, Some Suggestions as to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, I AM. J. INT'L L. 321
(1907).
81. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 20, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. at 1789, reprinted in, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. at 115. See generally Ralston, Some
Suggestions as to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 321 (1907).
82. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 23, 32 Stat. at
1790, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. at 116 (Supp. 1907).
83. This provision was carried over into article 45 of the 1907 Convention for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and amended to provide that only one of these
appointed arbitrators could be the party's national or chosen from among the persons se-
lected by it as members of the PCA. See HULL, supra note 24, at 387-89.
84. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 24, 32 Stat. at
1790-91, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. at 117 (Supp. 1907).
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choice of the umpire was made in concert by such powers.85 This
arbitration tribunal then assembled on the date fixed by the parties
and ordinarily met at The Hague.
86
Pursuant to article 31, resort to the Permanent Court required
the parties in dispute to conclude a separate agreement, i.e., the com-
promis, in which the subject matter of their difference, as well as the
extent of the arbitrators' powers, would be clearly defined. Article
15 stated that arbitration was to be "on the basis of respect for law"
and article 48 authorized an arbitral tribunal to declare its compe-
tence in interpreting the compromis as well as other treaties invoked
in the case "and in applying the principles of international law."
The applicable law could also be specified by the parties themselves
in the compromis. 87
Under article 16, the contracting powers recognized that in
questions of a legal nature, especially interpretation or application
of international conventions, arbitration was the most effective and
the most equitable means of settling disputes which diplomacy had
failed to settle. Under article 17, the arbitration convention was ap-
plicable to disputes already in existence as well as disputes that
might arise in the future. The Permanent Court was competent to
arbitrate all such cases unless parties agreed to institute a special
tribunal.8 8 The jurisdiction of the Permanent Court could also be
extended to include disputes between noncontracting powers or be-
tween contracting and noncontracting powers if they so agreed. 89
Parties to an arbitration bound themselves "to submit loyally"
to any arbitral award.90 Conversely, the award itself bound only
85. This provision was carried forward into article 45 of the 1907 Convention, which
in addition provided that if within two months time these two powers could not come to an
agreement, each of them would present two candidates taken from the list of PCA members,
exclusive of members selected by the parties and not being nationals of either of them. The
umpire would be determined by the drawing of lots among the candidates. Thus under the
procedure of article 45, the umpire would probably, though not necessarily, be a national
from a third state. So under the 1907 Convention it was probable that three out of five
members of the arbitration panel would be non-nationals of the parties in dispute, which
was not the case under the 1899 Convention. This development was said to represent a
distinct advance because such a composition would guarantee impartiality in the rendering
of the award. See HULL., supra note 24, at 389-90; 1 ScoTT, supra note 53, at 282-84.
86. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes arts. 24-25, 32
Stat. at 1790-91, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. at 117-18 (Supp. 1907).
87. See I Scorr, supra note 53, at 298.
88. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 21, 32 Stat. at
1789, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. at 115 (Supp. 1907).
89. Id art. 26, 32 Stat. at 1791, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. at 118 (Supp. 1907).
90. Id art. 18, 32 Stat. at 1788, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. at 114 (Supp. 1907).
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those parties which concluded the compromis unless a third state
formally invoked its right of intervention recognized by article 56
when a question of interpreting a convention to which it was a party
was involved. The award was to be given by a majority of votes,
accompanied by a statement of reasons, and signed by each member
of the tribunal. 9' The award put a definite end to the dispute, with-
out appeal, unless the parties reserved in the compromis the right to
demand the revision of the award.92 This right of revision was in-
sisted upon by the United States delegation at the First Hague Peace
Conference, and was later successfully defended from assault by the
United States delegation at the Second Hague Peace Conference. 93
The 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes established an International Bureau at The Hague to
serve as the record office for the Permanent Court. 94 The Bureau
was under the direction and control of a Permanent Administrative
Council composed of the diplomatic representatives of the con-
tracting powers accredited to The Hague and the Netherlands Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs.95 The expenses of the Bureau were to be
borne by the contracting powers in the portion fixed for the Interna-
tional Bureau of the Universal Postal Union. 96 Each party to an
arbitration paid its own expenses and an equal share of those of the
tribunal.97
According to article 27, in the event a serious dispute
threatened to break out between contracting powers, other con-
tracting powers considered it their duty to remind the former that
the Permanent Court was available to them. Moreover, such a re-
minder could not be considered as an unfriendly act of interven-
tion.98 In regard to this provision, the American delegation felt it
necessary to make a declaration at the First Hague Peace Confer-
ence that nothing in the Convention should be construed to require
the United States to depart from its traditional policy of non-entan-
91. Id. art. 52, 32 Stat. at 1797, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. at 125-26 (Supp. 1907).
92. Id arts. 54-55, 32 Stat. at 1797-98, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. at 126 (Supp.
1907).
93. 1 Scorr, supra note 53, at 300-01 & n.l.
94. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 22, 32 Stat. at
1789-90, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. 115-16 (Supp. 1907).
95. id art. 28, 32 Stat. at 1792, reprinted in l AM. J. INT'L L. at 119-20 (Supp. 1907).
96. Id art. 29, 32 Stat. at 1793, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. at 120 (Supp. 1907).
97. Id art. 57, 32 Stat. at 1798, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. at 127 (Supp. 1907).
98. Id. art. 27, 32 Stat. at 1791-92, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. at 118-19 (Supp.
1907). See HULL, supra note 24, at 304-1i.
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glement in the affairs of another state, i.e., Washington's Farewell
Address, nor to relinquish its "traditional attitude toward purely
American questions" namely, the Monroe Doctrine.99 In the Sec-
ond Hague Peace Conference's revisions of the 1899 Convention for
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, the text of article 27
was carried over into a new article 48. The language was supple-
mented by a provision providing that in the event of a dispute be-
tween two contracting powers, one of them could address a note to
the International Bureau at The Hague which contained a declara-
tion of its willingness to submit the dispute to arbitration. The Bu-
reau was required immediately to inform the other power of the
declaration.'00 The American delegation to the Second Hague
Peace Conference renewed the reservation made in regard to article
27 of the 1899 Convention by applying it to article 48 of the 1907
Convention. 10 Nevertheless, this change in article 48 prompted one
influential American international lawyer to predict the progressive
creation of an International Bureau of Good Offices and Mediation
in the not-too-distant future. 0 2
b. the Hay Arbitration Conventions
Despite defeat of the proposal at the First Hague Peace Confer-
ence for a general pact for the obligatory arbitration of some dis-
putes, article 19 of the 1899 Convention sought to encourage
obligatory arbitration by reserving the right of contracting powers to
conclude general or special treaties of obligatory arbitration among
themselves. Although article 19 was not considered significant at
the time of its adoption, between the First Hague Peace Conference
of 1899 and 1908, some seventy-seven arbitration treaties were con-
cluded by the various countries of the world. All but twelve of these
arbitration treaties provided for some sort of reference to the Perma-
nent Court. 0 3 Such references were generally subject to reserva-
tions concerning certain categories of disputes, typically excluding
from arbitration matters involving a state's independence, vital in-
99. See Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) at civ.
100. Compare Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, art. 27,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 1791, T.S. No. 392 with Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, art. 48, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, 2224, T.S. No. 536. See HULL,
supra note 24, at 320-22, 325-26.
101. See Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) at cvi.
102. See I ScoT-r, supra note 53, at 286 n.l.
103. See Editorial Comment, Treaties ofArbitration Since the First Hague Conference, 2
AM. J. INT'L L. 823, 824-26 (1908).
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terests, honor, sovereignty or the rights of noncontracting parties. 104
One treaty between Norway and Sweden uniquely provided that the
Permanent Court itself was to resolve the question of whether a dis-
pute involved the parties' vital interests. 10 5
Pursuant to article 19 of the 1899 Convention, between Novem-
ber 1904 and February 1905, Secretary of State John Hay signed a
series of arbitration treaties on behalf of the United States with
eleven foreign governments (including France, Germany and Great
Britain) calling for the reference of differences "which may arise of
a legal nature, or relating to the interpretation of treaties existing
between the two contracting parties" to the Permanent Court of Ar-
bitration, subject to the usual exemptions from obligatory arbitra-
tion.106 The substantive provisions of the Hay arbitration treaties
were modelled upon the arbitration treaty concluded between Great
Britain and France on October 14, 1903, the first to be negotiated
with reference to article 19 of the 1899 Convention. 0 7 However, the
Hay arbitration treaties referred to the compromis required by arti-
cle 31 of the 1899 Convention by use of the word "agreement."' 10 8
This terminology could have permitted the President and Secretary
of State to conclude an arbitral compromis with the foreign govern-
ment by the simple exchange of diplomatic notes, without having to
obtain further advice and consent from the United States Senate. 10 9
In order to protect its constitutional prerogatives in the area of inter-
national agreements, the Senate, in giving its advice and consent to
the ratification of ten of the Hay arbitration treaties, formally
amended them by substituting the word "treaty" for "agreement."
The Senate thereby explicitly required any arbitral compromis to be
104. See Wehberg, Restrictive Clauses in International Arbitration Treaties, 7 AM. J.
INT'L L. 301 (1913). But see Cavalcanti, Restrictive Clauses in Arbitration Treaties, 8 AM. J.
INT'L L. 723 (1914).
105. Editorial Comment, Treaties ofArbitration Since the First Hague Conference, 2
AM. J. INT'L L. 823, 827 (1908).
106. See, e.g., Arbitration Convention, Nov. 23, 1904, United States-Portugal, art. 1, in
3 Unperfected Treaties, supra note 68, at 487, 488.
107. See C. DAvis, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFER-
ENCE 97-103 (1975) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS, HAGUE II]; J. MOORE, 7 A DIGEST OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 99-103 (1906).
108. This provision was typically found in article 2 of the treaties. See, e.g., Arbitration
Convention, Nov. 23, 1904, United States-Portugal, art. 2, in 3 Unperfected Treaties, supra
note 68, at 489.
109. See Editorial Comment, A New General Arbitration Treaty with Great Britain, 5
AM. J. INT'L L. 451, 455-56 (1911). See also Editorial Comment, The American Theory of
InternationalArbitration, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 387, 389 (1908).
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submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent." 0 In this form
the Hay arbitration treaties were deemed unacceptable for ratifica-
tion by President Theodore Roosevelt, who considered the Senate
amendment to be tantamount to their rejection."'I From the per-
spective of the foreign contracting state, a treaty calling for the obli-
gatory arbitration of disputes possessed little more than symbolic
value if the arbitral process could not even commence unless and
until the Senate had given its advice and consent to the compromis.
The new Senate amendment had effectively eviscerated the Hay ar-
bitration treaties by reducing the American obligation of arbitration
to the level of a mere agreement to agree. In addition, Roosevelt
considered the Senate amendment to constitute an infringement
upon the President's freedom to negotiate and conclude interna-
tional agreements relating to arbitration." 12
c. the Second Hague Peace Conference
Despite this second major setback in the United States Senate
for the principle of obligatory arbitration, the United States went to
the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 prepared to support
the conclusion of yet another general treaty for the obligatory arbi-
tration of disputes along the lines of the unratified Hay arbitration
treaties as amended by the Senate." 3 By this time, Germany had
dropped its objection to the principle of obligatory arbitration, but
now insisted that the proper approach should be the negotiation of a
series of bilateral arbitration treaties between interested states in-
stead of the conclusion of a general multilateral pact." 14 Germany
stridently opposed the adoption of an Anglo-American project
which called for the conclusion of a general pact of obligatory arbi-
tration applicable to differences "of a legal nature and, primarily,
those relating to the interpretation of treaties existing between two
or more of the contracting nations" and to a specified list of subjects
110. See 3 Unperfected Treaties, supra note 68, at 487-88.
11l. See DAVIS, HAGUE II, supra note 107, at 116-18.
112. Id. at 116-18.
113. See Editorial Comment, The Second Peace Conference of The Hague, I Am. J.
INT'L L. 944, 951 (1907); Editorial Comment, A New General Arbitration Treaty with Great
Britain, supra note 109, at 457. For Root's Instructions to the American delegates, see 2
SCOTT, supra note 53, at 181, 189-90.
114. See 2 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES: TRANSLATIONS
OF THE OFFICIAL TEXTS at 47-52 (J. Scott ed. 1921) [hereinafter cited as HAGUE 11 PRO-
CEEDINGS]; DAVIS, HAGUE II, supra note 107, at 256, 258, 277-84; HULL, supra note 24, at
311-26; 1 SCOTT, supra note 53, at 330-79; Hull, Obligatory Arbitration and the Hague Confer-
ences, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 731, 738 (1908).
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without the typical reservations. ' 5 Consequently, the Second
Hague Peace Conference had to content itself with the adoption of
an unanimous declaration merely accepting the principle of obliga-
tory arbitration and declaring that differences "relating to the inter-
pretation and application of international conventional stipulations,
are susceptible of being submitted to obligatory arbitration without
any restriction."' 16 Thus, in regard to the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration, the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes was not materially altered by its 1907 revision." 
7
d the Root Arbitration Conventions
The wording of this 1907 declaration on obligatory arbitration
was chosen specifically to enable those nations favoring compulsory
arbitration to conclude special treaties on the subject among them-
selves outside the framework of the Hague Conferences.' ,8 Pursu-
ant to this recommendation, Secretary of State Elihu Root promptly
negotiated a series of twenty-five general arbitration treaties on be-
half of the United States. These treaties followed the model of the
unratified Hay arbitration treaties as amended by the Senate. How-
ever, common article 2 of the Root arbitration treaties specifically
provided: "It is understood that on the part of the United States
such special agreements [i.e., the compromis] will be made by the
President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate.""19 Although the addition of this compromise lan-
guage affirmed the independent role of the President in the negotia-
tion and conclusion of arbitration agreements, it nevertheless
represented a return to the Senate position on the need for its advice
and consent to the compromis.' 20 Consequently, all of the Root ar-
bitration treaties were ratified by the Senate,' 2' and twenty-two
115. See I ScoTT, supra note 53, at 352-74.
116. Final Act and Conventions of the Second Peace Conference, Oct. 18, 1907, 2 AM.
J. INT'L L. 1, 25-26 (Supp. 1908).
117. See Report of the Delegates of the United States to the Second International
Peace Conference at The Hague, in 2 Scorr, supra note 53, at 198, 205-06.
118. Lammasch, Compulsory Arbitration at the Second Hague Conference, 4 AM. J.
INT'L L. 83, 94 & n.3 (1910).
119. See, e.g., Arbitration Convention, Feb. 10, 1908, United States-France, art. 2, 35
Stat. 1925, 1926, T.S. No. 490.
120. Editorial Comment, Arbitration Treaty with Austria-Hungary, 3 AM. J. INT'L L.
624 (1909).
121. See List of Arbitration Treaties and Conventions Submitted to and Acted upon by
the Senate, S. Doc. No. 373, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 2605, 2606 (1912). See also Dennis, The
Arbitration Treaties and the Senate Amendments, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 614 (1912); Editorial
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eventually entered into force. 122
After Roosevelt refused to ratify the amended version of the
Hay arbitration treaties, Root persuaded the President that there
was indeed some political and legal merit to be gained for the
United States by becoming a party to arbitration treaties of this na-
ture. 23 Once ratified, the Root treaties could not be treated as illu-
sory by the United States Senate because, having already given its
advice and consent to arbitration treaties, the Senate had formally
committed itself in advance to ratify some form of arbitral compro-
mis that was acceptable to a foreign contracting party in the event of
a dispute. 124 Furthermore, since the United States had pledged to
arbitrate, the power of both domestic and international public opin-
ion would be sufficient to compel the Senate into giving its advice
and consent to a compromis.
From the perspective of the foreign state, the language of the
Root arbitration treaties referred to the compromis as an "under-
standing" instead of a formal "amendment" or "reservation" on the
part of the United States to the convention. Consequently, a foreign
contracting party was entitled to construe this "understanding" as
an obligation by the United States to arbitrate under the terms of
the arbitration convention in accordance with the fundamental prin-
ciple of international law decreeingpacta sunt servanda. 12 5 As far as
the foreign state was concerned, obtaining the advice and consent of
the Senate to the arbitral compromis was a purely internal matter
occasioned by the peculiarities of the United States Constitution
that was devoid of any international legal significance. The United
States was bound to arbitrate disputes irrespective of any domestic
constitutional difficulties that might be created by Senate obstinacy
over the compromis. Hence, an interpretation of the Root arbitra-
tion treaties to be international legal nullities was mistaken. These
treaties represented a set of definite agreements to arbitrate, not chi-
Comment, Senator Root and the Nobel Peace Prize, 8 AM. 1. INT'L L. 133 (1944); Editorial
Comment, The Pending Treaty ofArbitration Between the United States and Great Britain, 6
AM. J. INT'L L. 167 (1912); Editorial Comment, The Treaties ofArbitration with Great Britain
and France, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 460 (1912).
122. 3 Unperfected Treaties, supra note 68, at 487.
123. See P. JESSUP, 2 ELIHU ROOT 79-82 (1938); R. LEOPOLD, ELIHU ROOT AND THE
CONSERVATIVE TRADITION 56-59 (1954).
124. Cf. Editorial Comment, ,4 New GeneralArbitration Treaty with Great Britain, supra
note 109, at 457 (comment on Hay conventions).
125. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 124 comment c with § 147 comment d(e).
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merical agreements to agree. Public international law imposed a
perfect equality of fixed obligations in this regard on both con-
tracting parties. To conclude otherwise would depart from the ele-
mentary doctrine of international law and politics which proclaimed
the sovereign equality of states.
e. the abortive plan for a compulsory compromis
One innovative feature of the 1907 Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes was the inclusion of a provi-
sion calling for the compulsory conclusion of a compromis by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in the event the parties in dispute
could not agree upon the terms of reference. This procedure for a
compulsory compromis applied under severely restrictive conditions.
However, despite its opposition to a general treaty of obligatory ar-
bitration, even Germany favored the device of a compulsory com-
promis to overcome the alleged constitutional prerogatives of the
United States Senate, which, in Germany's opinion, constituted a
derogation from the fundamental principle recognizing the sover-
eign equality of states. 126 Article 53 of the 1907 Convention gave
the PCA the competence to settle the compromis envisioned by the
new article 52 if the parties agreed to have recourse to it for this
purpose. Furthermore, the PCA was empowered to draw up the
compromis upon the request of only one of the parties if all attempts
to reach a diplomatic settlement had failed and if an extant general
arbitration treaty provided for a compromis in all disputes and did
not explicitly or implicitly exclude the settlement of the compromis
from the competence of the PCA. However, the PCA was without
power to set forth a compromis if the other party declared that in its
opinion the dispute did not belong to the category of disputes which
could be submitted to compulsory arbitration, unless the treaty of
arbitration conferred upon the arbitration tribunal the power of de-
ciding this preliminary question. The same was true in the case of a
dispute arising from contract debts claimed of one power by another
power as due its nationals, for the settlement of which the offer of
arbitration had been accepted, unless such acceptance was condi-
tioned on the conclusion of the compromis in some other way. Nev-
ertheless, despite this slight advance for the principle of the
obligatory arbitration of disputes, the United States, in ratifying the
1907 Convention, excluded from the competence of the Permanent
126. See 2 HAGUE II PROCEEDING, supra note 114, at 47, 52-53.
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Court the power to formulate a compromis under all circumstances
unless expressly provided otherwise by treaty. 27
f the golden age of international arbitration
Prior to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, an entire
series of precedential or serious international disputes were submit-
ted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague: Pious
Fund Case (Mex. v. U S.), "128 Venezuela Preferential Case (Ger., Gr.
Brit. and Italy v. Venez.), "129 Casablanca Case (Fr. v. Ger.), 130 Gris-
badarna Case (Nor. v. Swed), 13 1 North Atlantic Fisheries Case (Gr.
Brit. v. U S,); 13 2  Orinoco Steamship Company Case (U.S. v.
Venez.); 133 and the Savakar Case (Fr. v. Brit.). 134 During this pe-
127. See Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) at cvii.
128. Pious Fund Case (Mex. v. U.S.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) I (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1902).
The United States thus bore the distinction of bringing the first case before the Hague Tribu-
nal. See DAvis, HAGUE II, supra note 107, at 51-61.
129. Venezuela Preferential Case (Ger., Gr. Brit. & Italy v. Venez.), Hague Ct. Rep.
(Scott) 55 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1904).
130. Casablanca Case (Fr. v. Ger.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 110 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1909).
See Editorial Comment, The Casablanca Arbitration, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 946 (1909); Editorial
Comment, The Casablanca Arbitration Award, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 698 (1909); Editorial Com-
ment, The Casablanca Incident and Its Reference to Arbitration at The Hague, 3 Am. J. INT'L
L. 176 (1909).
131. Grisbadarna Case (Nor. v. Swed.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 121 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1909). See Editorial Comment, The Norway-Sweden Boundary Arbitration, 4 AM. J. INT'L L.
186 (1910).
132. North Atlantic Fisheries Case (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 141
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910). See Editorial Comment, Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 688 (1910); Editorial Comment, Settlement of the Canadian
Questions, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 630 (1908); Editorial Comment, The Boundary-Fisheries Treaty,
2 AM. J. INT'L L. 637 (1908); Editorial Comment, The Final Outcome ofthe Fisheries Arbitra-
tion, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1913); Editorial Comment, The Northeastern Fisheries Question, I
AM. J. INT'L L. 963 (1907); Editorial Comment, Was theAward in the North Atlantic Fisheries
Case a Compromise?, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 178 (1912); Editorial Comment, The Newfoundland
Fisheries Question, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (1909); Lansing, The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries
Arbitration, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. I (1911); Editorial Comment, The North Atlantic Coast Fisher-
ies, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 903 (1910); Editorial Comment, Anglo-American Relations, I AM. J.
INT'L L. 480 (1907); Editorial Comment, Renewal of Modus Vivendi Concerning Newfound-
land Fisheries, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 953 (1909); Editorial Comment, Statement by the President
of the Tribunal that the North Atlantic Fisheries Award was a Compromise, 5 AM. J. INT'L L.
725 (1911); Editorial Comment, The United States at the Hague Court of Arbitration, 4 AM.
J. INT'L L. 675 (1910). See also Editorial Comment, Our Northern Boundary, 2 AM. J. INT'L
L. 634 (1980) (U.S.-Can. arbitral tribunal).
133. Orinoco Steamship Company Case (U.S. v. Venez.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 226
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910). See Dennis, The Orinoco Steamship Company Case Before the Hague
Tribunal, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 35 (1911); Editorial Comment, Address of Dr. H. Lammasch on
Opening the Arbitration Between the United States and Venezuela in the Matter of the Orinoco
Steamship Company's Claim, September 28, 1910, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 32 (1911); Editorial
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riod, the United States played the role of mid-wife in bringing the
Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration to life.
From the perspective of maintaining international peace and
security, the most significant of the Hague Court's arbitrations
proved to be the Venezuela Preferential Case and the Casablanca
Case. Pressure by President Roosevelt to refer the controversy
which involved a Venezuelan default on its public debts to arbitra-
tion contributed to the successful termination of ongoing military
hostilities conducted by Germany, Italy and Great Britain in an ef-
fort to forcefully collect their respective nationals' claims against the
Venezuelan government. 135  The actions by these countries
threatened to draw the United States into the conflict in order to
protect Venezuela from this anticipatory breach of the Monroe Doc-
trine. In view of the militaristic tenor of the times, the Casablanca
incident of 1908 was universally considered to have concerned the
honor of France and Germany. Consequently, its nonresolution by
means of The Hague Court might have easily resulted in hostilities
between the parties,136 and subsequent escalation into a general sys-
temic war in Europe due to their respective memberships in compet-
ing alliance systems. 137 Thus, despite its congenital defects, The
Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration contributed to the termina-
tion of one concerted military operation and to the prevention of
one war. As a result, history must judge it to have been a phenome-
nal success for the role played by international law and organiza-
tions in the amelioration of the generally violent conditions of world
politics prior to the First World War.138
Comment, Address of Dr. H Lammasch on Closing the Arbitration Between the United States
and Venezuela in the Matter of the Orinoco Steamship Company's Claim, October 25, 1910, 5
AM. J. INT'L L. 65 (1911).
134. Savarkar Case (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 275 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1911).
See Editorial Comment, The Savarkar Case, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 208 (1911).
135. See DAVIS, HAGUE II, supra note 107, at 73-90.
136. See W. SCHUCKING, THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCES
28 (C. Fenwick trans. 1918) (comment by Wehberg); Editorial Comment, The Casablanca
Arbitration Award, supra note 130, at 701.
137. For a succinct recapitulation of the history of the Triple Alliance and Triple En-
tente, see THE NEW COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2787, cols. 1-3 (W. Harris & J. Levey eds.
1975).
138. See Editorial Comment, The ArbitralA ward in the Peru-Bolivia Boundary Contro-
versy, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 949 (1909) (Argentina as sole arbitrator). But see Editorial Com-
ment, The Dispute Between the Argentine Republic and Uruguay as to their Jurisdiction in the
Rio De La Plata, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 984 (1907) (Argentina opposed arbitration); Editorial
Comment, The Jurisdiction of the Rio De La Plata, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 430 (1910).
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2. The foundation of an international court of justice
a. the theoretical basis
At the time of the decisions in the Casablanca Case and the
North Atlantic Fisheries Case by the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion, heated public controversies arose over the propriety of the al-
legedly "compromise" nature of these arbitral awards. 139 On such
grounds, American international lawyers argued that the main
shortcoming of international arbitration was its tendency to assume
the form of an essentially political process of negotiation and com-
promise on the basis of expedience rather than the judicial proce-
dure of impartial adjudication of rights and duties in strict
accordance with the rules of law. 14° It was felt that the states of the
international community genuinely preferred the clearcut decision
and strict impartiality in determination of their rights and duties
that supposedly could be afforded by some international court of
justice over all nations instead of the essentially political process of
partiality and compromise practiced by an international arbitration
tribunal whose members were chosen by the parties in dispute them-
selves.' 4 1 This international court of justice would operate in a
manner functionally analogous to the Supreme Court of the United
States when deciding questions arising between citizens of the differ-
ent states, or between foreign citizens and citizens of the United
States. 142
The procedure for the Permanent Court of Arbitration was also
analogized to article 9 of the American Articles of Confederation of
1781, which created a process of arbitration for the solution of dis-
putes among the states. 143 The Articles of Confederation was super-
139. See Editorial Comment, The Casablanca Arbitration Award, supra note 130, at
701; Editorial Comment, Statement by the President ofthe Tribunal That the North Atlantic
Fisheries Award Was a Compromise, 5 Am. J. INT'L L. 725 (1911); Editorial Comment, Was
theAward in the North Atlantic Fisheries Case a Compromise?, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 178 (1912).
140. See, e.g., Editorial Comment, The Annual Meeting of the Society of International
Law, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 191 (1909); Scott, The Evolution ofa Permanent International Judici-
ary, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 316 (1912).
141. See e.g., Editorial Comment, Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Society for
Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 129 (1914); Editorial Com-
ment, The American Societyfor the Judicial Settlement ofInternational Disputes, 4 AM. J.
INT'L L. 930 (1910).
142. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See Secretary of State Elihu Root, Instructions to t'e
American Delegates to the Hague Conference (May 31, 1907), reprinted in 2 ScoTT, supra
note 53, at 181, 191.
143. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX. See I ScoTT, supra note 53, at 460-64;
Scott, The Proposed Court of Arbitral Justice, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 772 (1908).
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seded by the United States Constitution which replaced in 1789 this
arbitral procedure by extending the federal judicial power to contro-
versies between two or more states and by vesting original jurisdic-
tion in the Supreme Court to adjudicate such controversies.144 This
successful evolution of dispute settlement techniques for semi-sover-
eign political entities provided a useful precedent for the develop-
ment of international dispute settlement tribunals. 45 As in the
American judicial system, the existence of an international court of
justice would permit the development of binding precedential deci-
sions that could guide the future deliberations of the court and cre-
ate a stable framework of legal expectations among states conducive
to the peaceful settlement of their disputes. Because of their ad hoc
nature, arbitral awards were not intended to possess precedential
significance. Therefore, only by means of an actual world court
could a systematic jurisprudence of international legal decisions ef-
fectively evolve.
b. arbitration versus adjudication
American international lawyers considered international arbi-
tration inferior to international adjudication. In doing so, however,
these lawyers failed to understand that the remarkable success of
arbitration in the peaceful resolution of international disputes
before the First World War was due to the arbitration's political
dimension. For example, in a dispute between two private parties
brought before a municipal court of law, there is usually one clear-
cut winner and one clearcut loser. By contrast, an international
panel of arbitration could oftentimes creatively fashion its award
upon a purposefully flexible compromis so that two sovereign states
in dispute could each believe they had prevailed. During the course
of an international conflict, for reasons of both domestic and inter-
national public opinion, a government might prefer arbitration over
adjudication for a number of reasons. One such reason is based on
a subjective cost-benefit analysis that it is preferable to sustain a
high probability of not losing everything and only winning some-
thing by means of arbitration than it is to run a substantially greater
risk of losing everything even though there is the possibility of win-
ning everything by means of adjudication. According to the litera-
144. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
145. See, e.g., Editorial Comment, The Growth of International Law Under a Permanent
Court of Arbitration, I AM. J. INT'L L. 730 (1907). See also Scott, The Judicial Settlement of
Disputes Between States of the American Union, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 326 (1923).
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ture of contemporary international political science, in the analysis
of international conflict as a zero-sum game, rational government
decision makers will tend to pursue a strategy that minimize risks
over one that maximizes gains. 14 6 Hence, states would prefer arbi-
tration over adjudication.
The more settled the rules of international law are, the more
likely the party in a dispute with the stronger legal position will pre-
fer and insist upon adjudication instead of arbitration. Therefore,
the Golden Age of modern international arbitration quite ex-
pectedly occurred in the pre-World War I era of international rela-
tions when the European system of public international law was
essentially customary instead of conventional, and when an actual
world court did not yet exist. Conversely, in the aftermath of the
war, with the establishment of the Permanent Court of International
Justice in 1921 and the acceleration of the movement for the pro-
gressive codification of international law in the 1920's and early
1930's, 47 international arbitration as a technique for the peaceful
settlement of serious disputes predictably declined in material sig-
nificance as a means of securing international peace and security.
This was precisely the result intended by the United States when it
sponsored a plan for the foundation of an international court of jus-
tice at the Second Hague Peace Conference. Consequently, it would
not be proper to criticize The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion for undergoing an eclipse in its effectiveness as an institution
for the peaceful settlement of international disputes after the First
World War.
c. the plan for a court of arbitral justice
Following in the footsteps of the unsuccessful American plan
for a world court originally introduced at the First Hague Peace
Conference, the United States delegation to the Second Hague
Peace Conference was instructed by Secretary of State Elihu Root to
propose the formation of an actual international court of justice.
Such a court was intended to be judicial in nature and function in
contrast to the arbitral proceedings of the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration. However, it was envisioned that the present PCA could, as
146. Cf. T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 48-49 (1963) (minimax theory).
147. See, e.g., Scott, The Gradual and Progressive Codification of International Law, 21
AM. J. INT'L L. 417 (1927); Reeves, The Hague Conference on the Codoication of International
Law, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 52 (1930).
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far as possible, constitute the basis of the court. 148 When it finally
emerged from the proceedings of the Second Hague Peace Confer-
ence, the American plan for an international court of justice called
for the institution of a Court of Arbitral Justice (CAJ) consisting of
an as yet unspecified number of judges appointed in an unspecified
manner for a term of twelve years. 149 The CAJ was not designed to
replace but rather to coexist with the PCA 150 so that states would
remain free to choose between the two institutions. However, the
Americans believed that states would prefer adjudication over arbi-
tration since the former institution more nearly coincided with the
states' vital national security interests in creating a more effective
system for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.
CAJ judges and alternates were to be appointed by the con-
tracting parties from among persons enjoying the highest moral rep-
utation in their respective countries. Such individuals must fulfill
the conditions required for appointment to high judicial officers or
be jurists of well-known competency in matters relative to interna-
tional law. Often, CAJ judges were to be selected from among the
members of the PCA.' 1 A CAJ judge could not exercise judicial
functions in any case in which he had taken any part in rendering a
decision of a court of his nation, a court of arbitration or a commis-
sion of inquiry, or where he had acted in the hearing of a case as
counsel or attorney for one of the parties. 152 No judge could appear
as agent or counsel before the CAJ, the PCA, a special tribunal of
arbitration or commission of inquiry, or act for any of the parties in
any capacity during his term of office. 53
Against the objections of the United States delegation, 54 there
was no prohibition on a CAJ judge sitting in a case that involved his
state of nationality. However, a member of a CAJ special delega-
tion could not exercise his duties when the power which appointed
him, or of which he was a national, was one of the parties in dis-
148. See 2 HAGUE II PROCEEDINGS, supra note 114, at 1016, Annex 76, art. VI.
149. Final Act and Conventions of The Hague Peace Conference, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex
to the First Recommendation Uttered by the Second Peace Conference, Draft of a Conven-
tion Relative to the Institution of a Court of Arbitral Justice, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,
29 (Supp. 1908) [hereinafter cited as Court of Arbitral Justice Draft Convention]. See My-
ers, The Origin of The Hague Arbitral Courts, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 270 (1916).
150. Court of Arbitral Justice Draft Convention, supra note 149, art. 1, reprinted in 2
AM. J. INT'L L. at 29 (Supp. 1908).
151. Id art. 2.
152. Id art. 7.
153. Id
154. See DAVIS, HAGUE II, supra note 107, at 264-70.
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pute. 55 Every year the CAJ was to elect a special delegation of
three judges with the competence to hear arbitration cases coming
under article 17 if the parties agreed upon applying the summary
procedure described in Title IV, Chapter 4 of the 1907 Convention
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. 156 This special
delegation also had the competence to constitute itself as an interna-
tional commission of inquiry in accordance with Title III of that
Convention if authorized by common agreement of the parties in
dispute.
CAJ judges were to receive a fixed annual salary, a per diem
allotment and travelling expenses. 157 These sums were to be paid by
the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at
The Hague,158 with the contracting powers paying the CAJ's ex-
penses at the request of the PCA's Administrative Council. Judges
were prohibited from receiving any compensation for performance
of their duties from their own government or that of another
power. 59 The International Bureau was to serve as the record office
for the CAJ, 160 and the Administrative Council was to perform the
same functions toward the CAJ as it did toward the PCA.'
6 1
The CAJ was to assemble in session every year beginning in
June and lasting until the end of the year, though provision was
made for the calling of an extraordinary session. 62 Unlike the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration, only the contracting powers were
given access to the Court of Arbitral Justice 163 since they alone were
to bear its general expenses. 64 All decisions of the CAJ were to be
arrived at by a majority vote of the judges present. 165 The judgment
of the CAJ had to give the reasons on which it was based, the names
of the judges taking part in it and had to be signed by the president
and the registrar of the court. 166 Each party had to pay its own costs
155. Court of Arbitral Justice Draft Convention, supra note 149, art. 6, reprinted in 2
AM. J. INT'L L. at 29 (Supp. 1908).
156. Id. art. 18.
157. Id art. 9.
158. Id.
159. Id. art. 10.
160. Id. art. 13.
161. Id. art. 12.
162. Id art. 14.
163. Id art. 21.
164. Id art. 31.
165. Id art. 27.
166. Id. art. 28.
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and an equal share of the costs of the trial. 167
Title II of the Draft Convention spelled out the jurisdiction and
procedure of the Court of Arbitral Justice. Article 17 gave the CAJ
jurisdiction in all cases brought before it by virtue of a general or
special arbitration agreement. 68 There was no provision similar to
the so-called "Optional Clause" to the Protocol of Signature Relat-
ing to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) of De-
cember 16, 1920. Under the Protocol of Signature of the PCIJ,
states could accept beforehand, ipso facto and without a special con-
vention, the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ in certain classes of
legal disputes between signatories in conformity with article 36(2) of
the PCIJ Statute. 69 Thus, by comparison, in the absence of a sepa-
rate agreement, the CAJ was designed to possess no general form of
compulsory jurisdiction over legal disputes between parties to its
convention.
However, like article 53 of the 1907 Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes concerning the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, article 19 of the CAJ Draft Convention pro-
vided the "special delegation" with the competence to draw up the
compromis envisioned by article 52 of the former 1907 Convention
if the parties agreed to remit the case to the CAJ. Furthermore, the
special delegation was empowered to draw up the compromis when
application was made by only one of the parties if: (1) the party had
unsuccessfully attempted to secure an agreement through diplo-
matic means, (2) the dispute arose under an extant general arbitra-
tion treaty providing for a compromis for every dispute, (3) the
arbitration treaty did not explicitly or implicitly exclude the exercise
of such competence by the special delegation, and (4) the other
party did not declare that in its opinion the dispute did not belong to
the category of questions to be submitted to obligatory arbitration.
This fourth requirement, however, did not apply if the arbitration
treaty conferred upon the arbitral tribunal the power to pass upon
the subject matter criterion. The special delegation was likewise
empowered, subject to the same conditions, to draw up a compromis
in the case of a dispute arising from contractual debts claimed of
one power by another as due to persons subject to its jurisdiction,
167. Id art. 29.
168. Id. art. 17.
169. See Protocol of Signature Relating to the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice, Dec. 16, 1920, 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 14 (1921), reprinted in 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 55
(Supp. 1923).
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for the settlement of which the proposal of arbitration had been ac-
cepted, unless such acceptance was conditioned on the conclusion of
the compromis in some manner. Germany had advocated this pro-
cedure for compulsory conclusion of a compromis by the CAJ spe-
cial delegation as an alternative to the adoption of a general treaty
for the obligatory arbitration of disputes at the Second Hague Peace
Conference. 70
The CAJ Draft Convention did not contain a provision similar
to article 38 of the later PCIJ Statute, which directed the PCIJ to
apply three primary sources (conventions, custom and "general
principles of law") and two subsidiary means (judicial decisions,
though without entitlement to the principle of stare decisis except
between the parties in regard to that particular case, and the teach-
ings of publicists) for the determination of rules of international law
in a case.' 71 Hence there was no recognition of the doctrine of stare
decisis in the CAJ Draft Convention. Nevertheless, the Court of
Arbitial Justice was ordered to apply the rules of procedure laid
down in the 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes, except as otherwise modified by the CAJ Draft
Convention.172 This directive would have incorporated article 73 of
the former 1907 Convention authorizing the PCA to declare its com-
petence in interpreting the compromis as well as other papers and
documents, e.g., treaties, which may be invoked and in applying
"the principles of law." However, article 48 of the 1899 Convention,
the precursor of article 73, had specifically referred to "the princi-
ples of international law."
In the final analysis, despite the initial promotion of the idea by
the United States at the Second Hague Peace Conference to create
an actual world court whose judicial nature was supposed to be fun-
damentally different from and superior to the political nature of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, the jurisdiction and procedures of
the proposed CAJ were almost identical to those of the PCA in all
170. See 2 HAGUE II PROCEEDINGS, supra note 114, at 641. But the competence of the
court or its delegation to frame the compromis, upon the request of one litigant when a treaty
of arbitration exists between the litigants binding them to arbitration, seems to be a long step
toward introducing into the law of nations the procedure of a common law court by which a
defendant may be brought into court at the insistence of a plaintiff. 1 SCOTT, supra note 53,
at 453.
171. P.C.I.J. STAT. art. 38 in 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 391 (1921), 17 AM. J. INT'L L.
57 (Supp. 1923).
172. Court of Arbitral Justice Draft Convention, supra note 149, art. 22, reprinted in 2
AM. J. INT'L L. at 29 (Supp. 1908).
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material respects. In theory the primary distinction drawn between
the two institutions was the notion that states would choose to sub-
mit disputes they believed to be essentially "legal" or "justicia-
ble"'' 7 3 in character to the CAJ, while those they perceived to be
"political" would continue to be submitted to the PCA. Yet if it had
ever come to fruition the CAJ would have emerged as an institution
not operationally different from a permanent and standing interna-
tional tribunal of arbitration. Even its name-Court of Arbitral
Justice-indicated the purposefully hybrid nature of an interna-
tional tribunal designed to blend characteristics of both the arbitral
and adjudicative processes.
74
The Second Hague Peace Conference recommended the adop-
tion of the Draft Convention Relative to the Institution of a Court
of Arbitral Justice. The Draft set forth an institutional plan that
ultimately represented a crucial intermediate stage in the evolution
of international dispute settlement tribunals. This intermediate
stage was between the relatively primitive 1899 Permanent Court of
Arbitration and the far more sophisticated 1921 Permanent Court of
International Justice. Indeed, in the opinion of James Brown Scott,
an American international legal scholar who was intimately in-
volved in the preparation of both the 1907 CAJ Draft Convention
and the 1921 PCIJ Statute, the Permanent International Court of
Justice "was to most intents and purposes similar to, if not identical
with, the draft of 1907."'175
d the stalemate over the selection ofjudgesfor a world court
The primary obstacle to the actual establishment of the Court
of Arbitral Justice at the Second Hague Peace Conference proved to
be an unbreakable deadlock over the manner for selection of judges
to the court. Specifically, the smaller states, and especially the Latin
American nations, opposed the institution of a system for the selec-
tion of CAJ judges among themselves on a rotational basis, while
the great powers would each be accorded the right to always have
one of their respective appointees sitting on the CAJ. 176 Such an
173. See Reinsch, The Concept of Legality in InternationalArbitration, 5 AM. J. INT'L L.
604 (1911).
174. Court of Arbitral Justice Draft Convention, supra note 149, art. 1, reprinted in 2
AM. J. INT'L L. at 29 (Supp. 1908).
175. Scott, The Election of Judgesfor the Permanent Court of International Justice, 15
AM. J. INT'L L. 556 (1921).
176. See Hicks, The Equality of States and the Hague Conference, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 530,
538-39 (1908).
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arrangement would have been similar to the system for appointment
of judges to the proposed International Court of Prize. 7 7 For exam-
ple, article 6 of a preliminary draft convention for an international
court of justice, which was presented by the delegations of Ger-
many, the United States and Great Britain, had provided that
judges appointed by Germany, the United States, Austria-Hungary,
France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia "are always sum-
moned to sit." On the other hand, judges appointed by the other
contracting powers would rotate in accordance with a schedule set
out in an annexed table which was based on a mixture of the popu-
lation, industry and commerce of the appointing states. 178 Since it
made sense for those states with the largest naval fleets to insist on
the right always to have an appointee sitting on the International
Prize Court, it similarly made sense to the great powers that one of
their appointees should continuously be represented on any interna-
tional court of justice. By their voluntary agreement to institute an
actual world court, the great powers would be further restricting
their right to use force to settle their international disputes with the
smaller states. The smaller states would obtain greater protection
from the great powers than otherwise would be the case. Further, a
great power would receive no additional protection from other great
powers by means of a world court alone. Therefore, since an inter-
national court of justice would primarily benefit the smaller states,
they should be willing to compromise on the principle of sovereign
equality when it came to the appointment of judges.
Of course this entire rationale was based upon the questionable
premise that the great powers actually possessed some alleged inter-
national legal right to use force to settle their disputes with smaller
states. It is not surprising, therefore, that the foremost opposition to
a rotational system for appointing judges to the Court of Arbitral
Justice came from the Latin American states. It was in these Latin
American states that the Calvo and Drago Doctrines were formu-
lated and generally espoused to protect these states from further im-
perialist encroachments. 79  The Latin American states, together
with representatives from other smaller powers, insisted on recogni-
tion of the principles of the sovereign equality of states in the ap-
pointment of judges to what was supposedly a real international
court of justice for the impartial adjudication of disputes among all
177. See infra text accompanying notes 225-31.
178. See 2 HAGUE 11 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 114, at 1031-32, annex 84.
179. See Hershey, The Calvo and Drago Doctrines, I AM. J. INT'L L. 26 (1907).
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members of the international community. 80 Ironically, it was the
United States that had successfully advocated the admission of
Latin American states to the Second Hague Peace Conference on
the basis of equality despite the fears of a United States controlled
voting bloc by those states that had attended the First Confer-
ence.' 8' It was these same United States proteges that adamantly
refused to compromise on the principle of their sovereign equality
when it came to the appointment of judges to a world court project
that had originally been sponsored by the United States. The net
result was that the Second Hague Peace Conference could only con-
tent itself with a recommendation that the signatory powers adopt
an annexed Draft Convention Relative to the Institution of a Court
of Arbitral Justice "as soon as an agreement shall have been reached
upon the selection of judges and the constitution of the court."' 82
This language was purposefully chosen in the hope that many na-
tions would be willing to ignore the Latin American objections to
the appointment procedure and constitute the Court of Arbitral Jus-
tice among themselves through normal diplomatic channels in the
immediate aftermath of the Second Hague Peace Conference. 83
This would permit definitive results on the foundation of some in-
ternational court to occur well before the convocation of the Third
Peace Conference, which in 1907 was tentatively scheduled to begin
in 1915.184
Pursuant to this intention, the United States suggested to the
great powers present at the London Naval Conference of 1908 (Ger-
many, United States, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Great Brit-
ain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands and Russia) that the proposed
International Prize Court (IPC) be given the jurisdiction and proce-
dures of the Court of Arbitral Justice, and that the 1907 CAJ Draft
Convention be utilized by the IPC when so acting for consenting
states. 85 This could be accomplished by adopting an article addi-
180. See HULL, supra note 24, at 419-20 (Belgium, Mexico, Serbia, Venezuela, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Portugal, Romania and Uruguay). See also 2 HAGUE II PROCEEDINGS, supra note
114, at 1027, 1029 (annex 83 was a Brazilian proposal for absolute equality in appointments
to the court).
181. See I SCOTT, supra note 53, at 95-101.
182. Final Act of the Second Hague Peace Conference, Oct. 18, 1907, reprinted in 2 AM.
J. INT'L L. 1, 27 (Supp. 1908).
183. See Report of the Delegates of the United States to the Second International
Peace Conference at The Hague, in 2 ScoTT, supra note 53, at 198, 244-45.
184. See J. ScoTT, AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 69-70 (1916).
185. See Identic Circular Note of the Secretary of State of the United States Proposing
Alternative Procedures for the International Prize Court and the Investment of the Interna-
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tional to a draft protocol concerning the IPC that was then under
consideration at the London Naval Conference. This article would
permit any signatory of the Prize Court Convention to grant to the
IPC jurisdiction to decide any case arising between signatories of
the proposed article that was submitted to it in accordance with the
procedures of the CAJ Draft Convention of 1907. Article 16 of the
CAJ Draft Convention connected these two dispute settlement insti-
tutions. Article 16 provided that judges and deputy judges of the
CAJ could also exercise the functions of judges and deputy judges
of the IPC. 186 The United States pointed out that it was always eas-
ier to expand the jurisdiction of an existing institution than to call
into being a new one.187 Nevertheless, the delegates to the London
Naval Conference determined that the United States proposal ex-
ceeded their powers; hence, no action on this matter was taken
there. 188
The United States continued to pursue the issue through nor-
mal diplomatic channels. 8 9 This American initiative eventually
culminated in a meeting of representatives from the United States,
Great Britain, Germany and France at Paris in March, 1910, to con-
sider the actual creation of a Court of Arbitral Justice. This court
would serve states willing to accept the rotational system of the IPC
as the basis for judicial appointments to the CAJ, rather than simply
vesting the IPC with the powers and procedures of the CAJ, as was
previously proposed by the United States. 190 The Paris Conference
resulted in the conclusion of a four-power draft convention for con-
tracting states to put into effect the CAJ Draft Convention recom-
mended by the Second Hague Peace Conference, with the necessary
tional Prize Court with the Functions of a Court of Arbitral Justice (Oct. 18, 1909), 1910
FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 597, 602-03, reprinted in 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 102, 109
(Supp. 1910) [hereinafter cited as Identic Circular Note]. See also Editorial Comment, Pro-
posal to Modify the International Prize Court and to Invest It As Modified with the Jurisdiction
and Functions of a Court of Arbitral Justice, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 163 (1910); Editorial Com-
ment, The Sixteenth Annual Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 4 AM. J.
INT'L L. 689 (1910).
186. "[Ilt is not too much to hope that some day, either by the appointment of the same
judges for both courts or by a reorganization, there may be one great international court of
justice with a twofold division into civil and prize chambers." I SCOTT, supra note 53, at
451.
187. Identic Circular Note (Oct. 18, 1909), supra note 185, at 597, 604, reprinted in 4
AM. J. INT'L L. 102, 111 (Supp. 1910).
188. AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 184, at 70.
189. Id. at 70-74.
190. Id at 74.
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additions set out in the former document.' 9'
In this fashion the Court of Arbitral Justice itself could have
been created by a limited number of states. According to the four-
power plan, the CAJ would be composed of fifteen judges, with nine
constituting a quorum. Judges and substitute judges would be ap-
pointed by the contracting powers in accordance with the system of
rotation established by article 15 of the International Prize Court
Convention. This system would have given the eight great naval
powers (Germany, United States, Austria-Hungary, France, Great
Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia) the right of always having an ap-
pointee sitting on the CAJ, whereas the other contracting powers
would have their appointees rotating on the basis of their relative
maritime interests. Provision was also made for a noncontracting
power to bring an action before the Court of Arbitral Justice and its
special delegation upon the former's assumption of an appropriate
share of expenses as determined by the Court or its special delega-
tion. The four-power draft convention was to come into effect as
soon as eighteen powers were ready to ratify and could furnish to
the court nine judges and nine substitute judges capable of actually
sitting. This four-power draft convention was further amended by
the parties at The Hague in July, 1910.192
In the minds of the representatives of the four powers who
wrote the 1910 draft convention, their scheme depended upon the
prior successful institution of the International Prize Court, even
though the document did not expressly state this condition. The
refusal of Great Britain to ratify the Declaration of London and,
consequently, the International Prize Court Convention as well,
spelled defeat for the four-power plan to institute a Court of Arbi-
tral Justice among even a limited number of states in this manner.
Still undaunted, however, Philander C. Knox, Secretary of State to
President Taft, requested James Brown Scott-technical delegate of
the United States to the Second Hague Peace Conference, former
Solicitor for the Department of State, United States representative
to the 1910 Paris Conference, and managing editor of the American
Journal of International Law-to undertake a mission to Europe for
the purpose of initiating negotiations concerning the formation of a
Court of Arbitral Justice that was to be independent of the stalled
International Prize Court Convention. On November 25, 1912,
191. Id at 91.
192. Id. at 94.
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Knox approved and signed a memorandum and an identical circu-
lar note drafted by Scott to that effect, but they were not issued and
the scheme never succeeded.
93
With the advent of the Wilson Administration, Scott addressed
a personal letter, dated January 12, 1914, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Netherlands suggesting that the Dutch government
initiate, through diplomatic channels, negotiations for an agreement
between Germany, the United States, Austria-Hungary, France,
Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia. The agreement was to be for
the creation of a Court of Arbitral Justice among themselves and
with a provision for its use by noncontracting parties. Scott in-
cluded with his letter a proposed draft convention along these lines,
supporting memorandum he had drafted, the earlier memorandum
and circular note to that effect drafted by him and approved by
Knox, together with other supporting documentation. 94 By then,
however, the time was fast approaching for the commencement of
preliminary work for preparation of the proposed Third Peace Con-
ference. Consequently, Scott's personal efforts concerning the inter-
national court were almost immediately overtaken by a formal
diplomatic initiative by the United States to plan for the convoca-
tion of the next conference. 95 All further progress in either direc-
tion was interrupted by the outbreak of the general war in Europe in
the summer of 1914.
e. the Permanent Court of International Justice
These pre-World War I labors by the United States to establish
an international court of justice were realized in article 14 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations. This provision called upon the
League Council to formulate and submit for adoption to the mem-
bers of the League plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court
of International Justice. This court would be competent to hear and
determine any dispute of an international character and to render
an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by
the Council or by the League Assembly. It was James Brown Scott,
now Legal Advisor to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace
at Paris, who had successfully urged the inclusion in the League
Covenant of a provision calling for the establishment of a Perma-
193. Id. at 1, 6, 18.
194. Id
195. See infra text accompanying notes 350-64.
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nent Court of International Justice.196
In February, 1920, the Council of the League voted to form an
Advisory Committee of Jurists to prepare plans for the Permanent
Court of International Justice and to report to the Council. 197 The
Advisory Committee of Jurists proposed to endow the Permanent
Court of International Justice with compulsory jurisdiction over
four specified categories of disputes. In the late Fall of 1920, how-
ever, both the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations
rejected this proposal because of opposition from the great power
members of the League. 198 As a consequence, the Statute of the Per-
manent Court of International Justice would follow the scheme of
the 1907 Draft Convention Relative to the Institution of a Court of
Arbitral Justice recommended for adoption by the Second Hague
Peace Conference, that omitted any provision calling for the obliga-
tory adjudication of disputes in any case. 199 Nevertheless, the so-
called Optional Clause to the Protocol of Signature for the PCIJ
Statute 2° permitted states to accept as compulsory, ipso facto and
without special convention, in relation to another state accepting the
same obligation, the jurisdiction of the PCIJ in all or any classes of
legal disputes concerning: (1) the interpretation of a treaty; (2) any
question of international law; (3) the existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach of an international obliga-
tion; and (4) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for
the breach of an international obligation.20' In the event of a dis-
pute as to whether the PCIJ had jurisdiction, the matter was to be
settled by the decision of the Court itself.20 2
The main problem facing the Committee was the outstanding
196. Finch, James Brown Scot. 1866-1943, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 183, 202 (1944). See
generally Coudert, An Appreciation of James Brown Scott, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 559 (1943)
(Scott was not a positivist but a moralist-naturalist).
197. See Scott, Editorial Comment,A Permanent Court ofInternational Justice, 14 AM.
J. INT'L L. 581 (1920).
198. See M. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 118-20
(1943); Editorial Comment, The Institute of International Law, 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 243, 247-
48 (1922) (due chiefly to the opposition of Great Britain and Japan).
199. See Editorial Comment, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 15 AM. J.
INT'L L. 260 (1921).
200. Protocol of Signature Relating to the Permanent Court of International Justice,
Dec. 16, 1920, 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 14 (1921), reprinted in 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 55
(Supp. 1923).
201. P.C.I.J. STAT. art. 36(2), in 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 14 (1921), 17 AM. J. INT'L
L. 57 (Supp. 1923).
202. Id art. 36(4).
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issue of the selection of judges to a world court in a manner which
would preserve the principle of the sovereign equality of states. The
long-standing deadlock over this matter was broken by a suggestion
of Elihu Root, the American representative on the panel. Rather
than appointment by the contracting powers as proposed by the
CAJ Draft Convention, he recommended that PCIJ judges be se-
lected by the concurrent action of the League Council and the
League Assembly. In addition, he proposed that a joint committee
composed of representatives from both bodies be created to resolve
any disagreements.20 3 Root received his idea of a two-step proce-
dure from James Brown Scott, who derived it from his analysis of
the American system for representation of large and small states in
the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, where
legislation had to be approved independently by both bodies, and a
conference committee would resolve any differences. 204
Article 3 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice provided that the PCIJ should consist of fifteen members:
eleven judges and four deputy judges. According to article 4, the
members of the PCIJ should be selected by the assembly and by the
Council from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, with provision made for mem-
bers of the League not represented in the PCA. No national group
could nominate more than four persons, not more than two of
whom could be of their own nationality. 20 5 In no case could the
number of candidates nominated be more than double the number
of seats to be filled. The Secretary-General of the League would
then prepare a list in alphabetical order of all the persons thus nom-
inated, and submit this list to the Assembly and to the Council.20 6
The Assembly and the Council would then proceed independently
of one another to select the judges first, then the deputy judges.
20 7
Those candidates who obtained an absolute majority of votes in the
Assembly and in the Council would be considered elected.20 8 If, af-
ter the first meeting held for the purpose of the election, one or more
seats still remained unfilled, a second, and, if necessary, a third
203. See Scott, Editorial Comment. A Permanent Court of International Justice, supra
note 197, at 583.
204. See Finch, James Brown Scott.- 1866-1943, supra note 196, at 202-03.
205. P.C.I.J. STAT. art. 5, in 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 14 (1921), 17 AM. J. INT'L L.
57 (Supp. 1923).
206. Id. art. 7.
207. Id. art. 8.
208. Id. art. 10.
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meeting would take place.20 9 If after the third meeting one or more
seats still remained unfilled, a joint conference consisting of six
members, three appointed by the Assembly and three by the Coun-
cil, would be formed. This joint conference could be formed at any
time, at the request of either the Assembly or the Council, for the
purpose of choosing one name for each seat still vacant, to submit to
the Assembly and the Council for their respective acceptance. 210 If
the joint conference was satisfied that it would not succeed in pro-
curing an election, those members of the PCIJ who had already
been appointed would, within a period fixed by the Council, pro-
ceed to fill the vacant seats by selection from among those candi-
dates who had obtained votes either in the Assembly or in the
Council.21'
Article 9 of the PCIJ Statute required that not only should all
the persons appointed as members of the Court possess the required
qualifications, but the whole body should represent the main forms
of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world.212 Yet
the Root-Scott arrangement gave a veto power over the selection of
judges to both the great powers represented on the Council and the
smaller powers represented in the Assembly. Textually, this proce-
dure did not derogate from the principle of the sovereign equality of
states since it did not explicitly guarantee each great power the right
always to have a national sitting on the PCIJ. Functionally, how-
ever, the arrangement could effectively ensure this outcome because
article 4(1) of the Convenant of the League of Nations provided that
the Council was always to consist of representatives of the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers, i.e., United States, United Kingdom,
France, Italy and Japan, together with representatives of four other
members of the League selected by the Assembly. Admittedly this
procedure ultimately accorded preferential treatment to the wishes
of the great powers in the selection of PCIJ judges. But in a defense
of his proposal against this objection before the Advisory Commit-
tee of Jurists at The Hague, Elihu Root persuasively argued that this
slight compromise of the principle of the sovereign equality of states
was a fair price for the smaller nations to pay in return for the pro-
tection an international court of justice would provide against the
209. Id art. I1.
210. Id art. 12.
211. Id.
212. Id. art. 9.
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great powers.213 Similar arguments had already been successfully
advanced to justify permanent representation by the great powers
on the League Council. The experience of the First World War had
exerted a chastening influence upon the tendency of minor powers
to impede in the name of sovereign equality of states the great pow-
ers from implementing organizational approaches to the regulation
of international conflict.
The Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice
was unanimously approved by the Assembly of the League on De-
cember 13, 1920. The Protocol to establish the PCIJ went into effect
on August 20, 1921. Finally, the Court was formally opened at The
Hague on February 15, 1922.214 Judges were elected from all five of
the great powers. Their ranks included John Bassett Moore from
the United States even though his government had neither joined
the League of Nations nor ratified the Protocol of Signature for the
PCIJ Statute.215 Moore's election to the Court was possible because
the nominating bodies were the national groupings of the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, to which the United States
belonged, and each national group had to recommend four names,
of whom only two could be its own nationals.216 Elihu Root had
declined the offer of a PCIJ position because of age. 21 7
The United States never joined the League of Nations and
never became a party to the PCIJ Statute because of strident opposi-
tion to both organizations consistently mounted by isolationist
members of the United States Senate. Even the technical separation
of the Court from the League by the device of adopting a Protocol
of Signature for the PCIJ Statute, which permitted non-League
members to ratify the latter without joining the League, was insuffi-
cient to induce the Senate into giving its advice and consent to the
Protocol on terms acceptable to its contracting parties. 218 By con-
213. See Root, The Constitution ofan International Court o/Justice, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(1921) (remarks made in June, 1920).
214. 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 14 (1921); 3 id at 306 (1922). See Finch, James Brown
Scott: 1866-1943, supra note 196, at 203.
215. See Scott, The Election ofJudgesfor the Permanent Court of International Justice,
15 AM. J. INT'L L. 556 (1921).
216. See Hyde, The Election o/Mr. Hughes to the World Court, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 822
(1928).
217. See Scott, The Election oJudgesfor the Permanent Court of International JLstice,
supra note 215, at 557.
218. For the subsequent history of United States efforts to join the Permanent Court,
see Note, Message ofthe President ofthe United States to the Senate Recommending Partici-
pation of the United States in the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague,
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trast, with regard to the League of Nations, many members of the
American international legal community favored United States par-
ticipation since the League was perceived as the culmination of the
pre-World War I American legalist war prevention program that
they had pioneered from the time of the First Hague Peace Confer-
ence. On the other hand, a minority of American international law-
yers opposed United States membership in the League on the
ground that article 10 of the Covenant guaranteed the existence of
an essentially unjust European status quo in favor of France against
Germany.219 But in regard to the World Court, the overwhelming
majority of the American international legal community was united
in its enthusiastic support for United States participation in the
PCIJ, even if it did not join the League. 220 For example, Moore
accepted the PCIJ judgeship even though he opposed United States
membership in the League. 22'
United States membership in the World Court would occur
only after and as a direct result of the tragic experience of the Sec-
ond World War. Yet, American international lawyers had quite
perceptively envisioned the need for and championed the cause of
such organizational solutions to the avoidance and management of
international conflict since well before the First World War. Had
the habitually obstructionist United States Senate implemented
reprinted in 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 331 (1923); Note, Letter ofthe Secretary ofState to the Presi-
dent ofthe United States Recommending the Participation ofthe United States in the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice at The Hague, reprinted in 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 332 (1923);
Borel, The United States and the Permanent Court ofInternational Justice, 17 AM. J. INT'L L.
429 (1923); Brown, The Rule of Unanimity and the Fifth Reservation to American Adherence to
the Permanent Court, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 599 (1928); Finch, Editorial Comment: The United
States and the Permanent Court ofInternational Justice, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 521 (1923); Hud-
son, The United States Senate and the Permanent Court of International Justice, 20 AM. J.
INT'L L. 330 (1926); Hudson, The American Reservations and the Permanent Court ofInterna-
tional Justice, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 776 (1928); Hudson, The World Court Protocols Before the
United States Senate, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1932); Jessup, The New Protocolfor American
Accession to the Permanent Court of International Justice, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 105 (1930);
Jessup, The Protocolfor American Adherence to the Permanent Court, 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 308
(1931); Wright, The United States and the Permanent Court ofInternational Justice, 21 AM. J.
INT'L L. I (1927); Note, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 150
(1926); Note, Adherence of the United States to the Permanent Court of International Justice,
20 AM. J. INT'L L. 552 (1926). See also HUDSON, supra note 198, at 216-38.
219. See, e.g., Hill, The Permanent Court ofInternational Justice, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 387
(1920). See generally Scott, Interpretation ofArticle X ofthe Covenant ofthe League ofNa-
tions, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 108 (1924).
220. But cf. Hill, The Relation of the United States to the Permanent Court ofInterna-
tional Justice, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 326 (1926).
221. See DAVIS, HAGUE II, supra note 107, at 363.
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those constitutuent elements of the American international legal
community's 1898 to 1917 war prevention program for world poli-
tics, embodied in the League of Nations Covenant, and thereby rati-
fied the Treaty of Versailles and the PCIJ Protocol of signature,
there is a strong possibility that the Second World War might never
have occurred.
3. The codification of customary international law
At the turn of the century it was generally believed by Ameri-
can lawyers that any viable scheme for creation of an international
court of justice required the contemporaneous codification of cus-
tomary international law. The reason for this belief was that states
would be less willing to submit their disputes to judicial resolution
as long as the European system of public international law re-
mained primarily one of customary instead of conventional law.
222
In this regard, the codification of customary international law was
also necessitated by the fact that a majority of judges on any inter-
national court would undoubtedly be trained in the European Con-
tinental tradition, which varied significantly from the Anglo-
American heritage in numerous important aspects. This unavoida-
ble arrangement ran a significant risk that the minority of judges
from Anglo-American common law countries might be consistently
outvoted in court decisions attempting to settle disputed principles
of customary international law. Without pre-existing codifications
for the various subjects of customary international law, the antici-
pated principle of majority rule on any international court might
predetermine the inevitable demise of the distinctively Anglo-Amer-
ican practice. This phenomenon could produce a subtle transforma-
tion in the international status quo which would substantially
benefit the Continental states at the expense of the United States
and Great Britain. The progressive codification of customary inter-
national law was therefore essential to mitigate the consequences of
such an imbalance in the composition of any international court.
Moreover, codification would encourage the evolution of interna-
tional dispute settlement from the relatively primitive stage of arbi-
tration to the supposedly more advanced and effective level of
adjudication.
222. See Nys, The Codification ofInternational Law, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 871 (1911); Root,
The Function of Private Codification in International Law, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 577, 578 (1911);
Editorial Comment, The ThirdAnnual Meeting ofthe American Society of International Law,
3 AM. J. INT'L L. 674, 674-77 (1909).
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Some of these theoretical and practical problems concerning
the codification of international law and its crucial importance for
the promotion of international adjudication are illustrated by refer-
ence to the unfortunate history of the aborted International Prize
Court project commenced at the Second Hague Peace Conference
by Great Britain and Germany with the active support of the United
States. 223 At the time, one of the principal achievements of the Sec-
ond Hague Peace Conference was its adoption of the Convention
Relative to the Creation of an International Prize Court.224 The
Prize Court would adjudicate appeals from decisions by national
prize courts of belligerent captors of neutral and enemy property
involving application of the intricate and, at times, unsettled and
hotly disputed rules of international maritime warfare law. Forma-
tion of the Prize Court was intended to eliminate a chief cause for
serious friction between neutrals and belligerents. This friction
could impel neutrals to enter the war in order to prosecute their
rights against belligerents, as the United States had done against
Great Britain in the War of 1812. The IPC was designed to limit the
scope of an ongoing war through the techniques, principles and in-
stitutions of international law. Alternatively, with the failure of an
American proposal at the Second Hague Peace Conference for the
creation of an actual world court (Court of Arbitral Justice), the
United States viewed the establishment of the Prize Court as an in-
termediate means for the formation of an international court of j us-
tice. As noted above, this would be accomplished by vesting an
extant International Prize Court with the jurisdiction and proce-
dures of the proposed Court of Arbitral Justice, thus enabling it to
adjudicate disputes between consenting states arising during peace-
time. In either event, the implementation of the International Prize
Court would have constituted the first step toward the creation of an
international court of justice and consequently, an advance in the
progressive evolution of international dispute settlement techniques
from the supposedly flawed political stage of arbitration to the pre-
sumably superior legal stage of adjudication.225
223. See J. CHOATE, THE Two HAGUE CONFERENCES 65-74 (1913); DAvIS, HAGUE I,
supra note 107, at 190, 220-27.
224. Convention Relative to the Creation of an International Prize Court, Oct. 18,
1907, in 4 Unperfected Treaties, supra note 68, at 57, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 174
(Supp. 1908). See Scott, The Work of the Second Hague Peace Conference, 2 AM. J. INT'L L.
1, 21-22 (1908).
225. See Root, The Real Significance of the Declaration of London, 6 AM. J. INT'L L.
583, 591-92 (1912).
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The Prize Court was intended to be a permanent standing tri-
bunal consisting of fifteen judges appointed by the contracting pow-
ers for a term of six years. The judges appointed by the eight great
naval powers (Germany, United States, Austria-Hungary, Great
Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Russia) would be "always sum-
moned to sit" on the Court, while the other seven positions would
rotate among judges appointed by the remaining signatories accord-
ing to their maritime interests. However, during wartime each bel-
ligerent would be represented by an appointee.2 26 Pursuant to
article 3 of the Convention, judgments of national prize courts could
be brought before the International Prize Court when they affected
(1) the property of a neutral state or individual, (2) an enemy ship
captured in the territorial waters of a neutral state when not made
the subject of a diplomatic claim by the latter, or (3) enemy property
when the seizure was allegedly in violation of a treaty between the
belligerents of an enactment by the belligerent captor. The appeal
against the national prize court judgment could be based on the
ground that it was erroneous either in fact or in law.227
When the International Prize Court had jurisdiction under arti-
cle 3, the national courts could not deal with a case in more than
two instances. The municipal law of the belligerent captor would
decide whether the case could be brought before the International
Prize Court after judgment had been given in the first instance or
only after an appeal. If the national courts failed to give a final
judgment within two years from the date of capture, the case could
be carried directly to the Court. 228
A belligerent government could not bring suit before the Inter-
national Prize Court. However, pursuant to articles 4 and 5 of the
Convention, an appeal could be brought by a neutral state if the
national prize court judgment injuriously affected its property or
that of its nationals or if the capture of any enemy vessel was alleged
to have occurred within its territorial waters. An appeal could be
brought by a neutral individual if the national prize court judgment
injuriously affected his property, subject to the reservation that his
national government could forbid him to bring the case before the
Court or undertake the proceeding in his place. A subject or citizen
of an enemy state could also appeal to the Court if the national prize
226. Convention Relative to the Creation of an International Prize Court, Oct. 18,
1907, arts. 14-16, 4 Unperfected Treaties, supra note 68, at 57.
227. Id art. 3.
228. Id. art. 6.
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court judgment had injuriously affected his property on board a
neutral ship or if the seizure was allegedly in violation of a treaty
between the belligerents or an enactment of the belligerent captor.
Also entitled to appeal were nationals of neutral or enemy states
who derived their rights from and were entitled to represent individ-
uals who had taken part in the proceedings before the national court
and who themselves were qualified to appeal. Finally, persons who
derived their rights from and were entitled to represent a neutral
power whose property was the subject of the municipal court deci-
sion were also entitled to appeal to the International Prize Court.
229
Article 51 made it clear, however, that an appeal to the Interna-
tional Prize Court could only be brought by a contracting power or
the subject or citizen of a contracting power or when both the owner
and the person entitled to represent him were equally contracting
powers or the subjects or citizens of contracting powers.
230
One novel feature of the Convention, which was proposed by
Germany,2 3 ' was the grant of standing to bring suit in the Interna-
tional Prize Court to both neutral and enemy individuals, albeit
under certain well-defined circumstances. The creation of the right
of individuals to appear before an international tribunal on their
own behalf represented a radical departure from the reigning inter-
national legal positivist doctrine that only states could properly be
considered the subjects of public international law endowed with
international legal personality, while individuals were merely re-
garded as objects of international law.232 At the Second Hague
Peace Conference the inalienable rights of man were accorded a
preliminary foothold in the principles of international law and the
procedures of international tribunals. 233
As far as the United States was concerned, the possibility of
direct appeal to the International Prize Court of a decision by the
United States Supreme Court raised questions as to the constitution-
ality of the Prize Court Convention under article 3 of the United
States Constitution.234 Although debatable, 235 this objection was
229. Id arts. 4-5.
230. Id art. 51.
231. See HULL, supra note 24, at 427-31.
232. See I ScoTT, supra note 53, at 487-88.
233. See Brown, The Individual and International Law, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 532, 533
(1924). See also Brochart, Limitations on Coercive Protection, 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 303 (1927).
234. See Brown, The Proposed International Prize Court, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 476 (1908)
(unconstitutional as creating a court of review higher than the United States Supreme
Court); Scott, The International Court of Prize, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 302 (1911) (constitutional
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disposed of at the suggestion of Elihu Root by the adoption in 1910
of an Additional Protocol to the Convention which provided that in
the event of constitutional difficulties, a contracting party could only
be proceeded against in the IPC by a de novo action for compensa-
tion. Thus, in such instances, the remedy of restitution set forth in
article 8 of the Convention as well as all other vestiges of an appel-
late nature were eliminated.236 In all other matters, the United
States was basically willing to follow the lead of Great Britain, the
greatest naval power in the world at that time, in the ratification of
the Prize Court Convention and the codification of the customary
international law of prize.
Pursuant to article 7 of the Convention, in the absence of a
treaty, the Prize Court was to apply "the rules of international law"
and if no generally recognized rules existed, the Court was ordered
to give judgment in accordance with "the general principles of jus-
tice and equity." 237 Because of the composition of the Court, the
Anglo-American judges would be in a minority and therefore the
United States and Great Britain ran the substantial risk that the
common law viewpoint on certain aspects of the law of prize would
be replaced by the Continental tradition. Hence, Great Britain ada-
mantly insisted that the international law of prize be codified into a
treaty before it ratified the Prize Court Convention. 238
As a result of the failure to the Second Hague Peace Confer-
ence to codify the law of maritime warfare, Great Britain sum-
moned a conference of representatives of the major maritime
powers of the world (Germany, the United States, Austria-Hungary,
Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and
Russia) to meet in London at the end of 1908. The goal of this
conference was to determine the generally recognized principles of
due to a revision in the proposed treaty); White, Constitutionality of the Proposed Interna-
tional Prize Court-Considered from the Standpoint of the United States, 2 AM. J. INT'L L.
490 (1908) (constitutional as a legitimate exercise of treaty power). See also Root, The Rela-
lions Between International Tribunals ofArbitration and the Jurisdiction of National Courts, 3
AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1909).
235. See I Scorr, supra note 53, at 473-84.
236. Additional Protocol to the Convention Relative to the Establishment of an Inter-
national Court of Prize, Sept. 19, 1910, in 4 Unperfected Treaties, supra note 68, at 177,
reprinted in 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (Supp. 1911). See Butte, The "'ProtocoleAdditionnel" to the
International Prize Court Convention, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 799 (1912).
237. Convention Relative to the Creation of an International Prize Court, Oct. 18,
1907, art. 7, 4 Unperfected Treaties, supra note 68, at 57.
238. See J. COOGAN, THE END OF NEUTRALITY 94-100 (1981); Gregory, The Proposed
International Prize Court and Some of Its Dkiculties, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 458 (1908).
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international law referred to in article 7 of the Prize Court Conven-
tion.239 This meeting resulted in the 1909 Declaration of London
Concerning the Laws of Naval War.240 The Declaration of London
built upon the foundations established by an informal compromise
on the codification of maritime warfare that had been worked out,
but not adopted, at the Second Hague Peace Conference. This com-
promise dealt with the rules concerning contraband, continuous
voyage and blockade. 241
The Prize Court Convention, its Additional Protocol, and the
Declaration of London all received the advice and consent of the
United States Senate. 242 This approval was readily obtained be-
cause a functioning International Prize Court would greatly benefit
a state such as the United States, which anticipated being neutral in
the event of another general war in Europe. But the American Gov-
ernment was unwilling to deposit its instrument of ratification with-
out the cooperation of Great Britain. This was never forthcoming,
however, because the British preferred to consider certain provisions
in the Declaration with reference to their potential bearing on a fu-
ture naval war with Germany instead of on their merits.243 Of spe-
cial concern to the British was the failure of the Declaration of
London to consider the question of whether merchant ships could
lawfully be converted into warships on the high seas, an issue previ-
ously dodged in the Second Hague Peace Conference's Convention
Relative to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War Ships.244
The British stridently refused to recognize an unrestricted right to
convert merchant vessels into ships of war on the high seas for rea-
239. See Scott, Proposed Conferencefor the Settlement of Certain Questions of Maritime
Law, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 830 (1908).
240. Declaration of London, Feb. 26, 1909, in 4 Unperfected Treaties, supra note 68, at
129. See Stockton, The International Naval Conference of London, 1908-1909, 3 AM. J. INT'L
L. 596 (1909).
241. See COOGAN, supra note 238, at 114-17; 1 SCOTT, supra note 53, at 698-730.
242. See Editorial Comment, Approval of the Declaration of London by the United
States Senate on April 24, 1912, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 723 (1912).
243. See Editorial Comment, Naval Prize Bill and the Declaration of London, 6 AM. J.
INT'L L. 180 (1912).
244. Convention Relative to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War Ships, Oct.
18, 1907, in 4 Unperfected Treaties, supra note 68, at 51, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 133
(Supp. 1908). See Report of the British Delegates (Mar. 1, 1909), in THE DECLARATION OF
LONDON, 1909, OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, 235, 251-52 (J. Scott ed. 1919) [hereinafter cited as
DECLARATION OF LONDON DOCUMENTS]; WILSON, Conversion of Merchant Ships into War
Ships, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 271 (1908).
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sons of military expediency. 245 Even more objectionable to the Brit-
ish public was article 24 of the Declaration, which classified
foodstuffs as conditional contraband, and therefore, made liable to
capture under article 33 if shown to be destined for the use of the
armed forces or a government department of an enemy state.246 The
Declaration's failure to classify foodstuffs as freegoods not subject to
confiscation under article 28 threatened to jeopardize the vital flow
of foreign foodstuffs to the non-self-sufficient and isolated British
Isles during wartime. Opponents of the Declaration successfully ex-
ploited the specter of mass starvation to defeat its ratification by
Great Britain.
The Naval Prize Bill of 1911, purporting to amend English law
relative to naval prizes of war so as to enable British participation in
the International Prize Court Convention, passed in the British
House of Commons, but failed in the House of Lords because of
public opposition.247 Since there was no point in proceeding with
either the International Prize Court or the Declaration of London
without the world's greatest naval power, neither project subse-
quently came into effect of its own accord. This defeat also doomed
the American proposal to vest the International Prize Court with the
powers and functions of the proposed Court of Arbitral Justice as
well as the four-power proposal to create the CAJ among a limited
number of states on the basis of the IPC's rotational system for the
appointment of judges.
Nevertheless, a preliminary provision to the Declaration of
London stated that the signatory powers agreed that the rules set
forth therein "correspond in substance with the generally recognized
principles of international law. '248 This provision created the po-
tential for belligerents in some future naval war to apply the rules
enunciated in the Declaration by virtue of their generally recognized
status as declaratory of customary international law on the conduct
of maritime warfare. Hence, the provisions of the Declaration of
London were voluntarily applied by Italy and Turkey to naval oper-
ations during their war of 1911. An Italian royal decree required
245. See Instructions Addressed to the British Delegates by Sir Edward Grey (Dec. 1,
1908), in DECLARATION OF LONDON DOCUMENTS, supra note 244, at 210, 230-31.
246. See COOGAN, supra note 238, at 128-36.
247. Naval Prize Bill, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, 7 Sessional Papers, H.L. 643, see Scott, The
Declaration of London of February 26, 1909, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 274 (1914).
248. Declaration of London, Feb. 26, 1909, in 4 Unperfected Treaties, supra note 68, at
132. See also Myers, The Legal Basis of the Rules of Blockade in the Declaration of London,
4 AM. J. INT'L L. 571 (1910).
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observance of the Declaration so far as consistent with Italian law.
Turkey, under pressure from Russia, stated that it intended to com-
ply with the Declaration's provisions. 249 This occured even though
Italy was a signatory which had not ratified the Declaration and
Turkey was neither a signatory nor an adherent to it.
In a similar vein, the United States revised its naval war code in
1912 to correspond with the Declaration of London.250 Likewise, in
1913, the British Admiralty espoused the Declaration of London as
the heart of its new naval prize manual. 25' With such weighty im-
primaturs it was not surprising that at the beginning of the First
World War the Declaration of London was generally considered to
be the most authoritative enunciation of the laws of war at sea.
252
Thus, shortly after the outbreak of the War, the United States for-
mally suggested to the belligerents that they agree to apply the laws
of naval warfare set out in the Declaration of London upon condi-
tion of reciprocity. This was necessary to "prevent grave misunder-
standings which may arise as to the relations between neutral
powers and the belligerents. ' 253 In response, Germany and Austria-
Hungary agreed to promulgate the Declaration of London and to be
bound by its provisions upon condition of reciprocity by the other
belligerents.254 On the other hand, Great Britain, and following its
lead, Russia and France, agreed to promulgate the Declaration of
London "subject to certain modifications and additions which they
judge[d] indispensable to the efficient conduct of their naval opera-
tions. ' 255 The British qualifications to the Declaration of London
249. See Scott, The Declaration of London ofFebruary 26, 1909 Part 11, 8 AM. J. INT'L
L. 520, 553 (1914).
250. See COOGAN, supra note 238, at 126 & n.7.
251. Id at 145.
252. See Scott, Prefatory Note, DECLARATION OF LONDON DOCUMENTS, supra note
244, at v. See also Scott, The Declaration of London ofFebruary 26, 1909, 8 AM. J. INT'L L.
274 (1914). See generaly L. OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 633-34 (7th ed. 1952).
253. Telegram from the Secretary of State [Bryan] to the Ambassador in Great Britain
[Page] (Aug. 6, 1914), reprinted in 1914 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 216, 9 AM. J.
INT'L L. I (Special Supp. 1915).
254. See Telegram from the Ambassador in Austria-Hungary [Penfield] to the Secre-
tary of State [Bryan] (Aug. 13, 1914), reprinted in 1914 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at
217, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. I (Special Supp. 1915); Telegram from the Ambassador in Germany
[Gerard] to the Secretary of State [Bryan] (Aug. 22, 1914), reprinted in 1914 FOREIGN REL.
U.S., supra note 64, at 218, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 2 (Special Supp. 1915).
255. See Telegram from the Ambassador in Great Britain [Page] to the Secretary of
State [Bryan] (Aug. 26, 1914), reprinted in 1914 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 218,
219; Telegram from the Charge d'Affaires in Russia [Wilson] to the Secretary of State
[Bryan] (Aug. 27, 1914), reprinted in 1914 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 220, 9 AM. J.
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were so severe as to prompt the United States to rescind its original
suggestion as to the Declaration's applicability. Instead, the United
States insisted upon American rights and duties under the existing
rules of international law and treaties of the United States, irrespec-
tive of the Declaration of London. 256 Earning special opprobrium
was the British application of the doctrine of continuous voyage to
conditional contraband (at first American foodstuffs, then shortly
thereafter American raw materials) in violation of article 35 of the
Declaration and in contradiction to the longstanding British policy
maintaining that foodstuffs were freegoods. Ironically, British insis-
tence upon the later policy had resulted in the defeat of both the
Declaration of London and the International Prize Court Conven-
tion in the House of Lords.257
The belligerents continued to apply their municipally incorpo-
rated versions of the Declaration of London for almost two years. 258
As the ferocity of the conflict intensified, however, both sets of bel-
ligerents progressively adopted maritime warfare practices that fla-
grantly contradicted even the most elementary principles set forth in
the Declaration of London. These created a vicious cycle of viola-
tions, reprisals and counter-reprisals that spiralled into a gross pat-
tern of illegality under the humanitarian laws of armed conflict and
rights of neutral states.259 Eventually, in July, 1916, pure military
expedience forced the British and French to announce their inten-
tion to withdraw from their earlier adherence to the modified provi-
INT'L L. 5 (Special Supp. 1915); Telegram from the Ambassador in France [Herrick] to the
Secretary of State [Bryan] (Sept. 3, 1914), reprinted in 1914 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note
64, at 222, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 6 (Special Supp. 1915).
256. Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State [Lansing] to the Ambassador in
Great Britain [Page] (Oct. 22, 1914), reprinted in 1914 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at
257 (Supp.), 9 Am. J. INT'L L. 7 (Special Supp. 1915). See Garner, Some Questions of Inter-
national Law in the European War, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 372 (1915); Van Alystyne, The Policy of
the United States Regarding the Declaration of London, at the Outbreak of the Great War, 7 J.
MOD. HIST. 434 (1935).
257. See COOGAN, supra note 238, at 154-68.
258. See, e.g., The Declaration of London Order in Council (Oct. 29, 1914), reprinted in
1914 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 263 (Supp.), 9 Am. J. INT'L L. 14 (Special Supp.
1915). See also Baldwin, An Anglo-American Prize Tribunal, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 297 (1915).
259. See, e.g., Editorial Comment, Seizure and Detention of Neutral Cargoes-Visit and
Search-Continuous Voyage, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 456 (1915); Editorial Comment, The Use of
Neutral Flags on Merchant Vessels of Belligerents, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 471 (1915); Renault, War
and the Law of Nations in the Twentieth Century, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. I (1915); Editorial Com-
ment, The Questions in Dispute Between the United States and Great Britain with Reference to
Interference with Neutral Trade, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 680 (1915); Editorial Comment, The
Seizure of Enemy Subjects upon Neutral Vessels upon the High Seas, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 117
(1916).
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sions of the Declaration of London. They declared their intention
to thereafter exercise their belligerent rights in accordance with ex-
isting international conventions on the law of war and with the "law
of nations." 260 The Declaration of London was alleged to have be-
come a "dead letter" as far as the remainder of the war was
concerned. 26'
This eventual abrogation of the Declaration of London should,
in retrospect, be qualified to apply only in a technical legal positivist
sense. It must be noted that the principles of the Declaration of
London served as a definitional framework of international legal
rules surrounding the conduct of hostilities during the First World
War. These rules of law provided the foundations of legality or ille-
gality and right or wrong, which shaped the perceptions that condi-
tioned the responses to the war by decision makers in neutral
states.2
62
It was generally believed within the United States that the qual-
ity and quantity of violations against its neutral rights, partially set
forth in the rules of the Declaration of London, by the Allied Pow-
ers were of a nature and purpose materially different from, and far
less heinous than, those perpetrated by the Central Powers (i.e., de-
struction of property as opposed to destruction of life and prop-
erty).263 Of decisive impact on American public opinion and
governmental decision making processes was Germany's indiscrimi-
nate destruction of innocent human life through its policy of "un-
restricted" submarine warfare against merchant and passenger
ships. 264 This policy commenced on February 4, 1915, with Ger-
many's imposition of a war zone in the waters surrounding England
260. See, e.g., Telegram from the Ambassador in Great Britain [Page] to the Secretary
of State [Bryan] (July 10, 1916), reprinted in 1916 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 413
(Supp.), 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 5 (Special Supp. 1916) (1916 Maritime Rights Order in Council);
Telegram from the Ambassador to France [Sharp] to the Secretary of State [Bryan] (July I 1,
1916), reprinted in 1916 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 416, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 9
(Special Supp. 1916) (French decree). See also Wilson, The Withdrawal of the Declaration of
London Orders in Council, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 843 (1916).
261. See Editorial Comment, Status of the Declaration of London, 9 AM. J. INT'L L.
199, 202 (1915).
262. For a more complete explanation of the role international law plays in defining
the contours of international crises for governmental decision-makers, see Entebbe, supra
note 15, at 778-79.
263. See E. MAY, THE WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN ISOLATION 1914-1917, at 335-36
(1966); Hershey, Editorial Comment, Some Popular Misconceptions of Neutrality, 10 AM. J.
INT'L L. 118 (1916). See also Hershey, Editorial Comment, The So-Called Inviolability ofthe
Mails, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 580 (1916).
264. See MAY, supra note 263, at 113-301, 387-437.
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and Ireland, including the entire English Channel. Under its initial
policy, Germany did not assert any intention of destroying neutral
ships. However, it did warn of the serious dangers the latter might
encounter by traversing the proscribed seas, especially in light of the
British practice of misusing neutral flags.265 This policy culminated
two years later with the German announcement that from February
1, 1917, all sea traffic, including neutral ships, would be stopped
with every available weapon, and without further notice, in the des-
ignated blockade zones around Great Britain, France, Italy and the
eastern Mediterranean. 266 Such behavior was in express violation of
several provisions of the Declaration of London 267 that were gener-
ally considered not only to state the customary international law of
maritime warfare but also to embody rudimentary norms of human-
itarian conduct. 268
Tactically, German submarine warfare could only partially
compensate for the surface naval supremacy of Great Britain and
her allies, who were then quite successfully imposing an economic
stranglehold on all neutral commerce that could possibly be des-
tined for Germany and her allies. It was extremely dangerous for a
submarine to forego the security afforded by undetected submersion
in order to surface and comply with the rules of the Declaration of
London regarding the interdiction by surface warships of enemy or
265. See Telegram from the Ambassador in Germany [Gerard] to the Secretary of
State [Bryan] (Feb. 4, 1915), reprinted in 1915 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 94
(Supp.), 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (Special Supp. 1915). See also Editorial Comment, Mines,
Submarines and War Zones-the Absence of Blockade, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (1915).
266. See Telegram from the German Ambassador to the United States [Bernstorfl] to
the Secretary of State [Lansing] (Jan. 31, 1917), reprinted in 1917 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra
note 64, at 97, 100, 101 (Supp. 1917).
267. See, e.g., Declaration of London Concerning the Laws of Naval War, Feb. 26,
1909, arts. 48-50, in 4 Unperfected Treaties, supra notes 68, at 12:
CHAPTER IV.-Destruction of neutral prizes.
Article 48. A neutral vessel which has been captured may not be destroyed by the
captor; she must be taken into such port as is proper for the determination there of all
questions concerning the validity of the capture.
Article 49. As an exception, a neutral vessel which has been captured by a belligerent
warship, and which would be liable to condemnation, may be destroyed if the observance of
article 48 would involve danger to the safety of the warship or to the success of the opera-
tions in which she is engaged at the time.
Article 50. Before the vessel is destroyed all persons on board must be placed in
safety, and all the ship's papers and other documents which the parties interested consider
relevant for the purpose of deciding on the validity of the capture must be taken on board
the warship.
268. See Garner, Some Questions of International Law in the European War (parts 3, 8-
9), 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 594, 611-12, 818, 825 (1915), 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 12 (1916).
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neutral merchant vessels suspected of transporting contraband. In-
deed, it had become standard British practice to arm its merchant
vessels with defensive weapons sufficient to destroy a thin-hulled
submarine should it surface, 269 and also to fly neutral flags on Brit-
ish merchant vessels in order to deceive an enemy submarine com-
mander. 270  Under these circumstances, application of the
Declaration of London's rules of maritime warfare to the conduct of
hostilities by submarines would have essentially precluded German
submarine warfare. This would have assured Great Britain and her
allies of a virtually uninterrupted stream of military and commercial
products from neutral states, most particularly from the United
States.
Legally, of course, the German government justified its imposi-
tion of the war zone decree as a legitimate measure of retaliation for
the grievous and repeated British violations of the Declaration of
London and generally recognized rules of international law, both of
which Germany alleged it had been strictly obeying.271 In addition,
Germany complained that the neutral powers, in order to guarantee
their nationals' right to trade with Germany, had been either unable
or unwilling to exert enough pressure upon Great Britain to secure
her compliance with customary and conventional laws of maritime
warfare and neutrality.272 The neutral states' collective failure to
effectively prosecute their rights against Great Britain or, in the al-
ternative, their refusal to at least diminish proportionately their own
merchants' sale of weapons, munitions and supplies to Britain
worked to the substantial military and economic detriment of
Germany.
Notwithstanding the validity of some of the German objec-
tions, as far as American public and government opinion were con-
cerned, if the submarine could not be effectively utilized without
violating international law, then Germany must eliminate the sub-
marine and not the humanitarian laws of maritime warfare.273 Ger-
269. See generally Scott, Editorial Comment, Armed Merchant Ships, 10 AM. J. INT'L L.
113 (1916); Editorial Comment, The Status ofArmed Merchant Vessels, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 188
(1915).
270. See Editorial Comment, The Use of Neutral Flags on Merchant Vessels of Belliger-
ents, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 471 (1915).
271. See Telegram from the German Ambassador to the United States [Bemstorfl] to
the Secretary of State [Bryan] (Feb. 7, 1915), reprinted in 1915 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra
note 64, at 95 (Supp.).
272. Id at 96.
273. See Baty, Naval Warfare: Law and License, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 42 (1916); Editorial
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many's persistent refusal to relent and its consequent sinking of
merchant ships with substantial loss of life directly precipitated the
United States decision to intervene in the war against Germany274
and later against Austria-Hungary 275 which had endorsed the Ger-
man practices. As President Woodrow Wilson phrased it in his
April 2, 1917 request to a joint session of Congress for a declaration
of war against Germany:276 "The present German submarine war-
fare against commerce is a warfare against mankind." 277 America's
decision to abandon its neutrality and enter the war inevitably
spelled defeat for the Central Powers. This proved to be the defini-
tive and most effective "sanction" for Germany's violation of the
Declaration of London.
Prior to the League of Nations, warfare was precisely how the
European system of public international law was intended to oper-
ate. Resort to warfare by one state against another was universally
considered the ultimate sanction for a transgressor's gross and re-
peated violations of a victim's international legal rights. With the
benefit of sufficient historical hindsight, therefore, it can be deter-
mined that the laws of war at sea, as codified by the Second Hague
Peace Conference through the London Naval Conference, were
anything but a "dead letter" as far as the First World War was con-
cerned. The United States ultimately fought in the Great War to
vindicate the customary and conventional international laws of
maritime warfare and neutrality.27
8
Comment, The Controversy Between the United States and Germany over the Use of Subma-
rines Against Merchant Vessels, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 666 (1915); Scott, The Secretary of State on
the Violations of International Law in the European War As They Affect Neutrals, 10 AM. J.
INT'L L. 572, 574 (1916).
274. See Scott, Editorial Comment, The United States at War with the Imperial German
Government, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 617 (1917).
275. See Scott, Editorial Comment, War Between Austria-Hungary and the United
States, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 165 (1918).
276. S.J. Res. 1, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 40 Stat. 1 (1917).
277. Address of the President of the United States Delivered at a Joint Session of the
Two Houses of Congress (Apr. 2, 1917), reprinted in 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 143, 144 (Supp.
1917).
278. See, e.g., Brown, War and Law, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 162, 164 (1918) ("This is truly a
war in defense of law"). See also Brown, Editorial Comment, Economic Warfare, 11 AM. J.
INT'L L. 847 (1917) (the war demonstrates the futility of a system of international law based
upon the balance-of-power, suppression of nationality and denial of self-government).
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4. Arms limitation, disarmament and new procedures for the
peaceful settlement of international disputes
a. arms limitation and disarmament
It was observed somewhat cynically that the real reason for the
Russian Tsar's convocation of the First Hague Peace Conference in
1898 was not to achieve "the most effective means of assuring to all
nations the benefits of a real and lasting peace, and of placing before
all the questions of ending the progressive development of existing
armaments. '279 Rather, it was agreed his real motivation was to re-
lieve his government from the external pressures of foreign affairs
and defense budgets, thus enabling the Tsarist autocracy to consoli-
date its internal position against mounting domestic opposition.
280
The United States decided to attend the conference even though the
war with Spain rendered "impracticable" its present reduction of
armaments. In any event, it contended that its level of armaments
were undoubtedly "far below the measure which principal Euro-
pean powers would be willing to adopt. ' 281 Consequently, Secre-
tary of State John Hay instructed the American delegation to the
First Hague Peace Conference to leave the initiative on arms limita-
tion to the representatives of those states for which it possessed some
relevance. 282 Generally the United States' delegates did not play a
constructive role in the matter of arms limitation at the 1899
conference.
283
The First Hague Peace Conference proved totally incapable of
adopting any substantive measures concerning the overall limitation
or reduction of armaments. 284 Instead, the conference had to con-
279. Telegram from Count Mouravieff to Ethan Hitchcock (Aug. 12 (24), 1898), re-
printed in 1898 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 541.
280. See Clarke, A Permanent Tribunal of International Arbitration: Its Necessity and
Value, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 342 (1907). See also Ford, The Genesis ofthe First Hague Peace
Conference, 51 POL. Sci. Q. 354 (1936); Morrill, Nicholas 11 and the Callfor the First Hague
Conference, 46 J. MOD. HIST. 296 (1974).
281. Telegram from Moore to Ethan Hitchcock (Sept. 6, 1898), reprinted in 1898 FOR-
EIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 543.
282. Address by John Hay to Hague Delegation (Apr. 18, 1899), reprinted in 1898 FOR-
EIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 511, 512.
283. See DAVIS, HAGUE I, supra note 64, at 110-24; Report of Captain Crozier to the
Commission of the United States of America to the International Conference at The Hague
Regarding the Work of the First Committee of the Conference and Its Sub-Committee (July
31, 1899), in 2 ScoTr, supra note 53, at 29; Report of Captain Mahan to the United States
Commission to the International Conference at the Hague, on Disarmament, Etc., with Ref-
erence to Navies (July 31, 1899), in 2 ScoTr, supra note 53, at 36.
284. See DAVIs, HAGUE I, supra note 64, at 110-24.
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tent itself with the adoption of an unanimous resolution in favor of
restricting military budgets, 285 and of two voeux that governments
examine the possibility of an agreement respecting the employment
of new types and calibers of rifles and naval guns,286 an agreement
limiting war budgets and land and sea armed forces.2 87 These mea-
ger results confirmed the conventional wisdom espoused by the ma-
jority of the American international legal community that serious
proposals for arms limitation and disarmament would only succeed
after the relaxation of international tensions by new rules of interna-
tional law and new institutions for the peaceful settlement of inter-
national disputes. 288 To that end, of course, the First Hague
Conference proffered its Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, which instituted the Permanent Court of Ar-
bitration and other novel procedures for this purpose.
The First Hague Peace Conference adopted three declarations
that forbade the use of certain types of weapons, though arms con-
trol and disarmament were not their primary purpose. These decla-
rations prohibited: (1) the launching of projectiles and explosives
from balloons or similar devices; 28 9 (2) the use of bullets which ex-
pand or flatten easily in the human body;290 and (3) the use of pro-
jectiles whose only purpose was the diffusion of asphyxiating or
285. Final Act of the International Peace Conference, July 29, 1899, reprinted in 1 AM.
J. INT'L L. 103, 105 (Supp. 1907).
286. Id. at 106.
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., I ScoTT, supra note 53, at 61:
The means of warfare and the preparation for war will exist until a substitute for
war be proposed which is not only reasonable in itself, but which is so reasonable
that its non-acceptance would be unreasonable. It may be that the inter-relation
and interdependence of States must be accepted in theory and practice, and that
the judicial organization of the world be realized before armies and navies will
cease to be used in foreign affairs, and will be confined to protecting commerce and
policing the seas.
See also General Report of the Commission of the United States of America to the Interna-
tional Conference at The Hague (July 31, 1899), in 2 id. at 17, 21; Hobson, Editorial Com-
ment, Disarmament, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 743 (1908). But see Trueblood, Editorial Comment,
The Case for Limitation ofArmaments, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 758 (1908).
289. Treaty Prohibiting Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2439, T.S. No. 546. See Davis, Editorial Comment, The Launching of Projec-
tiles from Balloons, 2 AM. J. Irr'L L. 528 (1908). An American delegate successfully op-
posed the imposition of a permanent ban on this practice. See Hull, supra note 24, at 76-79.
290. Declaration Respecting the Prohibition of the Use of Expanding Bullets, July 29,
1899, XCI Brit. For. 1017, 187 Parry's T.S. 459, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 155 (Supp.
1907). The American delegation did not sign this Convention. See HULL, supra note 24, at
181-87.
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deleterious gases. 291 These three declarations specifically stated that
they were "inspired by the sentiments which found expression in"
the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868. This document re-
nounced the use in warfare "of any projectile of less weight than
four hundred grams, which is explosive, or is charged with fulminat-
ing or inflammable substances." 292 In essence, the guiding purpose
of the St. Petersburg Declaration was to "reconcile the necessities of
war with the laws of humanity." 293 Therefore, the motivating force
behind the adoption of the three 1899 Hague Declarations was at-
tributable primarily to humanitarian considerations instead of to a
genuine desire to limit or reduce armaments that were viewed as
militarily significant.
Although Russia attempted to exclude the limitation of arma-
ments from the agenda of the Second Hague Peace Conference so as
not to impede its arms buildup in the aftermath of defeat during the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Great Britain and the United
States, among others, insisted that it be considered. 294 Nevertheless,
the Second Hague Peace Conference likewise failed to adopt any
substantive measures concerning the overall limitation of arma-
ments.295 Upon the motion of Great Britain, supported by the
United States, the conference simply confirmed the resolution of the
1899 Conference regarding the limitation of military budgets and
declared that it would be "highly desirable" for governments once
again to examine seriously this question. 296 The 1907 Convention
Relative to the Laying of Submarine Mines297 and the 1907 Decla-
ration Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from
Balloons, 298 the latter being a renewal of the expired 1899 Declara-
tion, were primarily attributable to humanitarian considerations
291. Declaration Respecting the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles Diffusing Asphyx-
iating Gases, July 29, 1899, XCI Brit. For. 1014, 187 Parry's T.S. 453, reprinted in I Am. J.
INT'L L. 157 (Supp. 1907). The American delegation did not sign this Convention. See
HULL, supra note 24, at 87-90.
292. Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War of Explosive Projectiles under
400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, LXIV Parliamentary Papers 689, 138 Parry's T.S. 297,
reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (Supp. 1907).
293. Id.
294. See HULL, supra note 24, at 69-75; 1 ScoTr, supra note 53, at 101-06.
295. See DAvis, HAGUE II, supra note 107, at 140-61, 215-19.
296. Final Act and Conventions of the Second Peace Conference, Oct. 18, 1907, re-
printed in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 26-27 (Supp. 1908). See HULL, upra note 24, at 69-75.
297. Convention Relative to the Laying of Submarine Mines, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2332, T.S. No. 541 (1910), reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 138 (Supp. 1908).
298. Declaration Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Bal-
loons, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439, T.S. No. 546, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 216 (Supp.
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and were not generally perceived as genuine arms control measures.
The international community made no significant progress on arms
limitations until after the First World War. Indeed, the first real
progress on the subject did not occur until November, 1921, when
the United States initiated a conference of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers (Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the
United States) at Washington, D.C.
299
During the First World War, in addition to the submarine, the
other novel instrumentality of modern warfare to make its grisly ap-
pearance and to be employed in explicit violation of international
law was poison gas. Both sets of belligerents, except for the United
States, eventually resorted to the use of poisonous gases regardless
of their ratification without reservation of the 1899 Convention
prohibiting its use.300 The large-scale use of poison gas during the
Great War was not, however, appropriately characterized as a fail-
ure of the principle of arms limitation and disarmament, but rather
as a setback for the development of the humanitarian law of armed
conflict. These two concepts, albeit interrelated, are premised upon
fundamentally different theoretical bases and are intended to serve
distinct purposes. After the world war, the Geneva Protocol of 1925
reaffirmed the 1899 prohibition on the use in war of "asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or
devices." 30' It also extended the ban to include the use of bacterio-
logical methods of warfare. 30 2 Fifteen years later, the Geneva Pro-
tocol was generally observed by all belligerents during the Second
World War.303
1908). By its own terms this Declaration applied "for a period extending to the close of the
Third Peace Conference." See HULL, supra note 24, at 79-82.
299. See Report of the American Delegation to the Conference on the Limitation of
Armaments, S. Doc. No. 124, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922), reprinted in 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 159
(1922).
300. See Editorial Comment, The Use of Poisonous Gases in War, 9 AM. INT'L L. 697
(1915). See generally Editorial Comment, Some Technical Points Regarding the Hague Con-
ventions, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 191 (1915).
301. Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Materials of Warfare, opened/or signature June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S.
65 (entered into force for the United States Apr. 10, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061).
302. Id.
303. Current allegations that the Soviet Union is violating the Geneva Protocol by us-
ing chemical weapons in Afghanistan, even if established to be factually and legally correct,
should properly be interpreted as a setback for the humanitarian laws of armed conflict, not
for the negotiation of arms control and reduction agreements between the two nuclear su-
perpowers. The Reagan Administration seems to be purposely confusing the two issues in
order to justify its obstructionist tactics in the INF and START I negotiations. Cf. Depart-
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b. good offices and mediation
In addition to the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion, the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes established the modern practice of third parties offering
their good offices and mediation to two states in conflict to achieve a
pacific settlement of the dispute. Article 2 provided that in case of
serious disagreement or conflict, before resort to arms, the con-
tracting powers agreed, "as far as circumstances allow," to have re-
course to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly
powers. 3°4 Article 3 established the right of states not parties to the
dispute "on their own initiative, and as far as circumstances may
allow, [to] offer their good offices or mediation to the States at vari-
ance." 305 This right could be exercised by third parties even during
the course of ongoing hostilities, when the tide of battle was turning
against a belligerent. Moreover, the exercise of this right could
never be regarded by one of the states in conflict as an unfriendly
act of intervention. However, article 7 provided that the acceptance
of mediation could not, unless there was an agreement to the con-
trary, have the effect of interrupting, delaying or hindering mobili-
zation or other measures of preparation for war. If mediation
occurred after the commencement of hostilities, it would cause no
interruption to the military operations in progress unless there was
an agreement to the contrary.
Article 8 was the brainchild of Frederick W. Holls, an interna-
tional lawyer who was a member of the United States delegation to
the First Hague Peace Conference. 30 6 The Conference created a
procedure for special mediation modelled after the choice of
"seconds" by individuals about to engage in a private duel. States
at variance would each entrust to a third country the mission of en-
tering into direct communication with the other side's representa-
tive. For the period of this mandate, which could not exceed thirty
days unless otherwise agreed, the states in conflict would cease all
direct communication on the subject of the dispute, leaving all di-
ment of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Yellow Rain: The Arms Control Implications, Cur-
rent Policy No. 458 (Feb. 24, 1983).
304. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, art.
II, 32 Stat. 1779, 1785, T.S. No. 392.
305. "The convention draws no distinction between 'good offices' and 'mediation.'
They are considered as identical expression, denoting, it may be, a greater degree of inten-
sity." 1 ScoTr, supra note 53, at 259.
306. See DAVIS, HAGUE I, supra note 64, at 141.
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rect communication exclusively to the mediating powers. In case of
a definite rupture of pacific relations, the mediating powers were
charged with the joint task of taking advantage of any opportunity
for peace.
These Hague provisions for the peaceful settlement of interna-
tional disputes were to bear fruit when President Theodore
Roosevelt offered his good offices and mediation to Russia and Ja-
pan during their war of 1904-1905.307 Representatives of both bel-
ligerents met in the United States and concluded the Peace of
Portsmouth on September 5, 1905, terminating the war on terms
favorable to Japan, the military victor. 30 8 Roosevelt was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize for the success of this initiative.309
c. international commissions of inquiry
Title III of the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes3l ° created a voluntary procedure for the for-
mation of an international commission of inquiry. The functions of
this commission were to investigate, ascertain and report upon inter-
national differences involving neither honor nor vital interests and
which arose from disputed points of fact that could not be settled by
means of diplomacy. 311 International commissions of inquiry were
to be constituted by a special agreement between the parties in con-
flict. This special agreement would define the facts to be examined
and the extent of the commissioners' powers.312 Unless otherwise
stipulated, the international commissions of inquiry were formed in
the manner fixed by article 32 of the 1899 Convention which speci-
fied the procedure to be used for the constitution of a PCA tribu-
nal.31 3 The parties in dispute were obligated to cooperate with the
commission "as fully as they may think possible." 314 Upon comple-
307. See Hill, The Second Peace Conference at the Hague, I Am. J. INT'L L. 671, 681
(1907).
308. Peace of Portsmouth, Sept. 5, 1905, Japan-Russia, 1 Jap. Tr. 585, 199 Parry's T.S.
144.
309. See Editorial Comment, Mr. Roosevelt's Nobel Address on International Peace, 4
AM. J. INT'L L. 700 (1910). See generally Scott, The Nobel Peace Prize, 12 AM. J. INT'L L.
383 (1918).
310. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, title
III, 32 Stat. 1779, 1787, T.S. No. 392. See HULL, supra note 24, at 277-88.
311. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, art.
9, 32 Stat. 1799, 1787, T.S. No. 392.
312. Id. art. 10, 32 Stat. at 1787.
313. See id. art. 32, 32 Stat. at 1793.
314. Id. art. 12, 32 Stat. at 1787.
Loy. LA. Int'l & Comp. L J[
tion of its investigation, the commission would communicate a re-
port signed by all its members to the parties in dispute. The report
was limited to a statement of the facts and did not possess the char-
acter of an arbitral award. 3' 5 The report left the conflicting parties
free to determine the effect to be given to it.3 16 Nevertheless, the
theory behind the procedure was that once the facts had been im-
partially ascertained, authenticated and communicated to the par-
ties in dispute, a pacific settlement of the conflict on the basis of the
commission's report should be readily forthcoming.
At the suggestion of France, an international commission of in-
quiry was successfully employed to resolve the Dogger Bank contro-
versy between Great Britain and Russia, which arose out of the
Russo-Japanese War.317 Nonresolution of this dispute could have
easily resulted in a very serious conflict between the parties. 31 8 The
successful resolution of the Dogger Bank incident by an interna-
tional commission of inquiry demonstrated to the entire interna-
tional community that even disputes concerning the honor and vital
interests of states could be peacefully settled by an international
commission.319 This experience led the Second Hague Peace Con-
ference to revise the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes to improve and expand upon the operating
procedures for international commissions of inquiry.320 Hence, two
new procedures for the peaceful settlement of international differ-
ences instituted by the First Hague Peace Conference proved useful
315. Id. art. 14, 32 Stat. at 1788.
316. Id.
317. Dogger Bank Case (Gr. Brit. v. Rus.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 403 (1905). See
DAVIS, HAGUE II, supra note 107, at 114; Scott, The Work of the Second Hague Peace Con-
ference, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1908).
318. See HUDSON, supra note 198, at 40.
319. See HULL, supra note 24, at 474.
320. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907,
arts. 15-36, 36 Stat. 2199, 2215-30, T.S. No. 536, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 50-57
(Supp. 1908). See HULL, supra note 24, at 288-98. Revised article 12 of the 1907 Conven-
tion provided that in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary, international com-
missioners of inquiry shall be chosen in accordance with articles 45 and 57 of the 1907
Convention, which pertained to the appointment of arbitrators and the selection of an um-
pire for the Permanent Court of Arbitration. According to article 45 of the 1907 Conven-
tion, only one of the appointed arbitrators could be the party's national or chosen from
among the persons selected by it as members of the PCA. In regard to International Com-
missions of Inquiry, the net result of this incorporation was that after the 1907 revision a
Commission would consist of five members, at least two of whom must be strangers to the
controversy. See Report of the Delegates of the United States to the Second International
Peace Conference at the Hague, in 2 ScoTT, supra note 53, at 198, 208-10.
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during the Russo-Japanese War. In the future, mechanisms for the
creation of international commissions of inquiry constituted the cen-
terpiece of the Bryan Peace Treaties. In addition, such mechanisms
figured prominently in article 15 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, which enabled the Council and the Assembly to discharge
such functions in the event of a dispute which was "likely to lead to
a rupture" between members and which had not been submitted to
arbitration or adjudication.
d Convention on the Opening of Hostilities
Another procedural innovation concerning international dis-
putes instituted by the Second Hague Peace Conference was its 1907
Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities.32' Consistent
with the reigning philosophy of the day that war was not illegal but
only an unfortunate fact of international life, the Convention did
not attempt to regulate the reasons for going to war, but only its
modalities. However, hope was expressed that the Convention
might create an opportunity for third states to offer their good of-
fices or mediation to the parties in dispute, or to convince the latter
to submit the matter for decision by the Permanent Court of
Arbitration.322
The contracting parties agreed that hostilities between them
would not begin without explicit notice either in the form of a rea-
soned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with a conditional dec-
laration of war. The state of war must be made known to neutral
powers without delay. Moreover, it was not to be effective as to
neutral states for purposes of laws of neutrality until they received
notice or if in fact they knew of the state of war. The Convention
was intended to apply to both naval operations and land warfare. 323
Prior to this Convention, a declaration of war or an ultimatum
that preceded the opening of hostilities was the exception, not the
rule, of international belligerent practice. 324 This axiom had been
demonstrated by the Japanese surprise attack on the Russian naval
fleet at Port Arthur in February, 1904, which signalled the state of
321. Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259,
T.S. No. 538, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 85 (Supp. 1908).
322. See HULL, supra note 24, at 263.
323. See Davis, The Amelioration of the Rules of War on Land, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 64
(1908).
324. See Editorial Comment, Historical Extracts Showing When Hostilities Began With-
out Declarations of War, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1908).
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the Russo-Japanese War. That experience indicated that the Con-
vention might disfavor a weak power against a strong state, since
surprise attacks are generally more advantageous to a weaker nation
than to a stronger nation. Consequently, proposals at the Confer-
ence to fix a mandatory interval between delivery of the declaration
or ultimatum and the commencement of hostilities failed.325 The
Convention left each signatory state free to establish whatever inter-
val best suited its interests, even though tactically the interval would
be so short as to take the enemy by surprise. Nevertheless, at the
outset of the First World War, most of the major belligerents duti-
fully complied in good faith with the terms of this 1907
Convention. 326
Indeed, over twenty-five years later, the Japanese government
attempted to comply with the terms of the 1907 Convention on the
Opening of Hostilities before its December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl
Harbor. Japan instructed its diplomatic representatives in Washing-
ton to deliver its declaration of war upon the United States shortly
before the outbreak of hostilities. 327 Delays in the extended trans-
mission process from Tokyo resulted in a late delivery of the decla-
ration.328 So, against its wishes, the Japanese government ultimately
violated the terms of the Convention. According to the bureaucratic
perceptions of the United States, the 1907 Convention on the Open-
ing of Hostilities became a significant part of the definitional frame-
work of international legal rules surrounding the Second World
War. Japan's sneak attack at Pearl Harbor in explicit violation of
international law was to exert a profound impact upon American
public opinion toward Japan throughout the war and upon the Al-
lied governments' formulation of their ultimatum for Japan's un-
conditional surrender or "prompt and utter destruction" enunciated
in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945.329 Hiroshima and Na-
325. See Stowell, Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 50,
53 (1908).
326. See DAVIS, HAGUE II, supra note 107, at 341-43.
327. See Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Japanese Ambassador to the
United States [Nomura] and the Secretary of State [Hull] (Dec. 7, 1941), reprinted in 2 FOR-
EIGN REL. U.S.: JAPAN 1931-1941, supra note 64, at 786; Memorandum Handed by the
Japanese Ambassador to the United States [Nomura] to the Secretary of State [Hull] at 2:20
P.M. on Dec. 7, reprinted in id. at 787.
328. See R. BUTOW, ToJo AND THE COMING OF THE WAR 371-87 (1961).
329. Potsdam Declaration, July 26, 1945, United States-China-United Kingdom, 3
Bevans 1204.
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gasaki became the ultimate "sanction" for Japan's violation of the
1907 Convention.
The most profound contribution to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security made by the 1907 Convention on the
Opening of Hostilities occurred, albeit indirectly, fifty-five years af-
ter its adoption by the Second Hague Peace Conference. At the on-
set of the Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962, a substantial
majority of the members of the United States decision-making team
established to handle the matter (called the Executive Committee)
believed that a "surprise surgical air strike" against Soviet missile
sites in Cuba was the only viable course of conduct to take in re-
sponse to Khrushchev's surreptitious placement of extraordinarily
dangerous and threatening weapons short distances off the coast of
the continental United States.330 Notification of a bombardment to
Khrushchev or Castro prior to its commencement was ruled out "for
military or other reasons." 33'
After hearing general support for launching a surprise attack
during the initial deliberations of the Executive Committee, Attor-
ney General Robert Kennedy passed a note to his brother, President
John Kennedy, which states: "I know how Tojo felt when he was
planning Pearl Harbor." 332 Robert Kennedy adamantly opposed
such a "sneak attack" because it was entirely inconsistent with the
moral values upon which the United States was supposedly founded
and represented around the world:333 "We spent more time on this
moral question during the first five days than on any other single
matter" 334 Primarily for this reason Robert Kennedy decided to
join ranks with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in advocat-
ing the imposition of a naval blockade around Cuba, followed by an
appeal to the Organization of American States (OAS) for its
endorsement. 335
One major advantage a blockade had over a surprise attack was
that a blockade would permit the United States to present a plausi-
ble legal justification for its conduct before the OAS and the United
Nations in a bid to obtain their support for or lack of opposition to
330. See R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS 9 (1971).
331. Id. at 17.
332. Id. at 9.
333. Id. at 15-17.
334. Id. at 17. "We struggled and fought with one another and with our consciences,
for it was a question that deeply troubled us all."
335. Id. at 12, 14, 15.
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United States action. Additionally, a sneak attack would have been
legally indefensible before any international forum. 336 Eventually,
the blockade alternative prevailed over the surprise attack, and the
United States received the unanimous support of the OAS for its
quarantine of Cuba.33 7 In the opinion of Robert Kennedy, "[t]he
strongest argument against the all-out military attack, and one no
one could answer to his satisfaction, was that a surprise attack
would erode if not destroy the moral position of the United States
throughout the world." 338 Solid Western hemispheric support for
the arguably legal United States position before the OAS proved to
be a key factor in convincing Khrushchev to withdraw Soviet mis-
siles and bombers from Cuba.
During the historical interim between the Second Hague Peace
Conference and the Cuban missile crisis, the 1907 Convention on
the Opening of Hostilities successfully performed a complete trans-
position of governmental attitudes toward the acceptability of sneak
attacks and a means of originating hostilities. The Convention had
entered into the definitional framework of international legal rules
from which modern governmental decision makers consciously and
unconsciously derived their conceptions of legality or illegality,
right or wrong, justice or injustice. Thus, the 1907 rule shaped the
perceptions which conditioned the responses by American decision
makers to the Cuban missile crisis fifty years after its creation.
Unanimous and fervid American repugnance to the Japanese
sneak attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 transformed the 1907 Conven-
tion on the Opening of Hostilities thereafter into a phenomenon that
was far more binding and effective than any principle of interna-
tional law ever could be-a moral imperative. As far as the United
States was concerned, a rule of international law that was qualified
and ambiguous at its origin had become, by virtue of time and tragic
experience, an absolute moral obligation that must be obeyed even
in time of a severe international crisis when the very survival of the
state was at stake. As a moral obligation, therefore, the rule of the
1907 Convention was able to head off the initially favored "surprise
surgical air strike" on Soviet missile sites in Cuba. Although the
1907 Convention on the Opening of Hostilities was never originally
intended or designed to deter or forestall the outbreak of war, its
336. Id. at 23.
337. Id. at 26-27, 35.
338. Id. at 27.
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proscription on sneak attacks contributed to the prevention of the
third, and perhaps, last world war in October, 1962. For this reason,
the 1907 Convention on the Opening of Hostilities has proven to be
a monumental contribution by the Second Hague Peace Conference
to the maintenance of international peace and security in the post-
World War II era.
e. the Porter Convention
The final mechanism for the peaceful settlement of interna-
tional disputes instituted by the Second Hague Peace Conference
was the Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment
of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts.339 This treaty is com-
monly referred to as the "Porter Convention" in honor of General
Horace Porter, the United States delegate to the 1907 Conference
who proposed it on behalf of the American government and who
labored so strenuously to obtain its adoption. 340 Pursuant to the
terms of the Convention, the contracting powers agreed not to have
recourse to armed force for the recovery of "contract debts"34'
claimed from the government of one country by the government of
another as being due its nationals. However, this undertaking was
rendered expressly inapplicable when the debtor state (1) refused or
neglected to reply to an offer of arbitration, (2) accepted the offer
but subsequently prevented any compromis from being agreed on,
or (3) failed to submit to the award after the arbitration. 342 Such
arbitration was to be determined by Part IV, Chapter III of the 1907
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
which pertained to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Except as
otherwise agreed by the parties, the award by the PCA would deter-
mine the validity of the claim, the amount of the debt, and the time
and mode of payment. 343
Most significantly, however, the Convention did not contain the
339. Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recov-
ery of Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, T.S. No. 537, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L
L. 81 (Supp. 1908).
340. See DAVIS, HAGUE II, supra note 107, at 255-58, 284-85; HULL, supra note 24, at
349-70.
341. This term was purposefully left undefined. See I Sco'rr, supra note 53, at 416-18.
Yet it was considered to include public debts. See HULL, supra note 24, at 360-63.
342. Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recov-
ery of Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, art. I, 36 Stat. 2241, T.S. No. 537, reprinted in 2 AM. J.
INT'L L. 81 (Supp. 1908).
343. Id. art. 2.
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usual reservations of vital interests, honor, independence and the
interests of third parties for such arbitrations. With the entry into
force of the Porter Convention, creditor states had to be willing to
submit their nationals' contract claims against debtor states to inter-
national arbitration. This requirement created a means whereby
fraudulent, spurious or inflated claims could be identified, denied or
reduced in an impartial manner. Thus, many undeniable abuses
that had previously been perpetrated by the nationals of powerful
creditor states would be deterred. Conversely, the Porter Conven-
tion established the right of a debtor state to insist upon interna-
tional arbitration of contractual claims against it by citizens of
foreign states.344 Nevertheless, the implication was clear: should
the debtor state be unwilling to adhere to the terms of the PCA arbi-
tral procedure, the creditor state would retain whatever freedom of
action it allegedly possessed under customary international law to
forcefully collect the debts.
Despite this loophole, subsequent history has proven the Porter
Convention a phenomenal success. It virtually put an end to the
generally tolerated practice of stronger (invariably European) credi-
tor states threatening, or actually using, military force to collect con-
tract debts owed to their nationals by weaker (typically Latin
American or Caribbean) debtor states. Thereafter, the only histori-
cally significant use of force for the purpose of recovering govern-
mental debts was the 1923 French and Belgan occupation of the
Ruhr after Germany had defaulted. These states justified this action
on the grounds that it was permitted by the Treaty of Versailles. 345
The impetus behind United States' sponsorship of the Porter
Convention at the Second Hague Peace Conference came from a
1902 controversy surrounding Venezuela's default on its public
debts. Great Britain, Italy and Germany attempted to collect their
nationals' claims through the use of military force, which included
the blockade of Venezuela's coastline, the capture of its fleet and the
bombardment of some forts. 346 On December 29, 1902, Luis M.
Drago, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a note to Wash-
344. See Scott, Hague Convention Restricting the Use of Force to Recover on Contract
Claims, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1908).
345. See Finch, Editorial Comment, The Legality of the Occupation of the Ruhr Valley,
17 AM. J. INT'L L. 724 (1923). But see Schuster, The Question As to the Legality ofthe Ruhr
Occupation, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 407 (1924).
346. See DAVIS, HAGUE II, supra note 107, at 73-90; Livermore, Theodore Roosevelt, the
American Navy, and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-1903, 51 AM. HIST. REV. 452 (1946); Par-
sons, The German-American Crisis of 1902-1903, 33 HISTORIAN 436 (1971). But cf. Platt, The
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ington in which he argued that the United States should insist upon
the principle that the public debt of an American state could not
serve as a pretext for armed intervention or military occupation of
its territory by a European power. 347 This note was the genesis for
the Drago Doctrine. The doctrine states that physical force cannot
be used to compel the collection of public debt under any circum-
stances. The doctrine was premised on the theory that noninterven-
tion is a necessary corollary to the freedom, independence and
equality of all states in a modern system of public international law.
Recognition of such a right to intervene would create a pretext for
strong states to intervene against militarily weaker states in order to
establish spheres of influence or to advance other imperialist enter-
prises. Drago also pointed out that for the United States to follow a
contrary rule would be tantamount to sanctioning a violation of the
Monroe Doctrine.
President Roosevelt was acutely concerned with the potential
violation of the Monroe Doctrine arising from European interven-
tion in Venezuela. Unless the United States somehow rectified the
situation, an unfortunate precedent for European creditor states' fu-
ture intervention into the turbulent political and economic affairs of
Latin American and Caribbean debtor states could easily be estab-
lished. Roosevelt, therefore, decided to intervene diplomatically
into the Venezuelan dispute. He convinced the creditor states to al-
low the claims to be settled by a series of mixed commissions. The
blockading powers' demand for preferential treatment in the pay-
ment of debts was arbitrated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration
at The Hague.348 This peaceful resolution of the Venezuelan debt
controversy created a precedent which was eventually enshrined in
the Porter Convention of the Second Hague Peace Conference. Of
Allied Coercion of Venezuela, 1902-1903-A Reassessment, INTERAMERICAN ECON. AFF.,
Spring, 1962, at 3 (Britain did not intervene to protect bondholders).
347. Instructions of the Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations [Drago] to the Argen-
tine Minister to the United States [Garcia Merou] (Dec. 29, 1902), reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L
L. I (Supp. 1907). See Hershey, The Calvo and Drago Doctrines, I AM. J. INT'L L. 26 (1907);
Woolsey, Drago and the Drago Doctrine, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 558 (1921).
348. See DAVIS, HAGUE II, supra note 107, at 73-90. The Hague Tribunal upheld the
demand by the blockading powers for priority of payment on their claims over those of
creditor powers that had not resorted to the use of force. Venezuela Preferential Case (Ger.,
Gr. Brit. and Italy v. Venez.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 55 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1904). See I ScoTT,
supra note 53, at 316:
This decision awarding a preference to the blockading powers in the customs of
Venezuela has been criticised as a premium on force and war; but if war is legal,
and if Venezuela consented to the preferential treatment although under pressure
of war, the decision seems good in law, however questionable it may be in morals.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J
course, the Porter Convention did not go as far as the Drago Doc-
trine. This was illustrated by the former's failure to, under all cir-
cumstances, prohibit the use of force to collect on public debts.
Nevertheless, the Porter Convention was claimed to have been a
victory for United States foreign policy, in that the conclusion of a
multilateral pact essentially designed to protect Latin American
states from European intervention was interpreted as an implicit
recognition by all signatories of the validity of the Monroe
Doctrine.
34 9
5. The Third Hague Peace Conference
The fifth and final element of the American legalist war pre-
vention program for world politics during the 1898-1917 period was
the institution of some mechanism for the periodic convocation of
peace conferences among the nations of the international commu-
nity. The purpose of these periodic conferences was to complete,
perfect and advance the work of the First and Second Hague Peace
Conferences. The First Hague Peace Conference was assembled
upon the initiative of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia. Several provisions
of its Final Act contemplated the convening of a subsequent confer-
ence to deal with a variety of unresolved issues. However, the right
to initiate its convocation or the time of such convocation was left
open. The outbreak of the war between Japan and Russia over
Manchuria in 1904 rendered it awkward, if not politically unfeasi-
ble, for the Tsar to assume the initiative in calling for the convoca-
tion of a second conference. This raised the general question
whether some other state possessed the legal right and should un-
dertake the political obligation to summon another Hague peace
conference in default of a Russian diplomatic initiative. In Septem-
ber, 1904, the Interparliamentary Union held its meeting in St.
Louis, and adopted a resolution requesting the President of the
United States to sound out the states of the world concerning their
willingness to attend a second peace conference. 350 Shortly thereaf-
ter, President Theodore Roosevelt undertook the initiative by issu-
ing a circular note to that effect to the signatories of the First Hague
349. "Through Dr. Drago, the Monroe Doctrine has made its formal entry into public
law as distinct from national policy." I ScoTT, supra note 53, at 420-21. See also Scott, The
Work of the Second Hague Peace Conference, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1908).
350. See Scott, Recommendationfor a Third Peace Conference at The Hague, 2 AM. J.
INT'L L. 815 (1908); Editorial Comment, William Randal Cremer, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 858, 861
(1908).
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Conference Acts.35' The note pointed out that at the time the Tsar
issued his invitation in 1898 the United States and Spain had not
concluded a peace treaty ending their war, and yet the First Hague
Conference did not attempt to intervene in the determination of
peace terms between them. It was argued that the Russo-Japanese
War should likewise not interrupt the world's progress toward the
realization of universal peace and that a subsequent conference
would also not seek to interfere with the Russo-Japanese War. With
the conclusion of that conflict, however, Tsar Nicholas requested
Roosevelt to surrender the initiative for the convocation of the sec-
ond conference to him, and Roosevelt readily acquiesced. The Sec-
ond Hague Peace Conference commenced its deliberations on June
15, 1907.352
The Final Act and Conventions of the Second Peace Confer-
ence were signed on October 18, 1907. Among them was a recom-
mendation that the holding of a third peace conference should take
place within a period of time similar to that which had elapsed since
the first conference (eight years, or 1915), on the date to be set by
joint agreement among the powers.353 The Final Act also stated that
about two years before the probable date of the meeting, it would be
desirable for a preliminary committee to be charged by the govern-
ments with the duty of collecting various propositions to be consid-
ered at the conference, to prepare a program, and to determine the
mode of organization and the procedure for the third conference. 354
It was argued that the language of the Second Hague Peace Confer-
ence's Final Act concerning a third conference was specific enough
to indicate that any state represented at the First or Second Hague
Peace Conferences could undertake the initiative to convene the
Third Hague Peace Conference. Thus, any putative claims that
Russia possessed the exclusive right to initiate the third conference
were implicitly repudiated. 355 The United States delegation was in
the vanguard of the movement to terminate the Tsar's proprietary
interest in calling for the convocation of future Hague Peace
35 1. Proposal for a Second Hague Conference (Oct. 21, 1904), reprinted in 1904 FOR-
EIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 10, I AM. J. INT'L L. 432 (1907).
352. See Editorial Comment, The Second Peace Conference of the Hague, I AM. J.
INT'L L. 431 (1907).
353. Final Act of the Second Hague Peace Conference, Oct. 18, 1907, reprinted in 2 AM.
J. INT'L L. 1, 28 (Supp. 1908).
354. Id. at 28-29.
355. See Editorial Comment, The Ffteenth Conference of the Interparliamentary Union,
3 AM. J. INT'L L. 180 (1909).
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Conferences. 356
In preparation for the Third Hague Peace Conference the
American Society of International Law decided to devote the entire
program of its sixth annual meeting in April, 1912 to the program,
organization and procedure of the conference. 357 Some of the topics
discussed were the conclusion of general arbitration treaties, the
codification of the laws of naval warfare, the effects of war on inter-
national conventions and private contracts, the marine belt and ter-
ritorial waters, and, of course, the creation of a permanent court of
international justice. At this time there was a great deal of optimism
expressed by Ameyican international lawyers that a plan for the pro-
posed Court of Arbitral Justice could be placed into operation
before the convocation of the Third Hague Peace Conference. 358
Shortly thereafter, in June, 1912, President Woodrow Wilson
appointed an advisory committee to consider proposals for a pro-
gram for the third peace conference. 359 In 1913, the nineteenth an-
nual Lake Mohonk Conference on international arbitration adopted
a declaration of principles which included a recommendation that
the United States Secretary of State urge the nations of the world to
form immediately the international preparatory committee for the
third conference which was called for by the Final Act of the Sec-
ond Hague Peace Conference. 360 However, certain countries ob-
jected to a meeting of the third conference before Great Britain had
ratified the Declaration of London and the International Prize
Court was established. Both of these projects had been rejected by
the House of Lords in December, 1911.
On January 31, 1914, Secretary of State William Jennings
Bryan dispatched an identical circular note to the United States dip-
lomatic officers in countries which had taken part in the Second
Hague Peace Conference. He suggested that officers entrust the du-
ties of the International Preparatory Committee for a Third Peace
356. See DAVIS, HAGUE II, supra note 107, at 286-88; KUEHL, supra note 25, at 104.
357. See Editorial Comment, Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 197 (1912); Editorial Comment, The Sixth Annual Meeting of
the Society, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 729 (1912).
358. See Dennis, The Necessityfor an International Code ofArbitral Procedure, 7 AM. J.
INT'L L. 285 (1913); Olney, GeneralArbitration Treaties, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 595 (1912).
359. See Scott, Mr. Bryan and the Third Hague Peace Conference, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 330,
335 (1914).
360. See Editorial Comment, The Nineteenth Lake Mohonk Conference on International
Arbitration, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 584 (1913). See also Editorial Comment, The Lake Mohonk
Conference on International Arbitration, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 608 (1914).
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Conference to the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration at The Hague (which consisted of the Netherlands
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic representatives of the
contracting powers accredited to The Hague) and that the Third
Conference be held in 1915.361 In light of the various responses re-
ceived from some of the powers, Bryan issued a follow-up circular
note on June 22 revising his prior proposal. He suggested that the
Third Peace Conference meet at The Hague in June, 1916, and that
the duties of the International Preparatory Committee be entrusted
to a committee to be selected by and from the members of the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration's Administrative Council.362 Shortly
thereafter, on June 26, 1914, the Netherlands invited each of the
contracting powers that had participated in the Second Hague Peace
Conference to name one member of a preparatory committee. It
further suggested that this committee meet in 1915 and consider the
questions to be brought before the Third Peace Conference. 363 Two
days later, Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary and his
wife were assassinated at Sarajevo by a Serbian nationalist, thus
precipitating the First World War.364 This simultaneity of develop-
ments yielded the surprise and suddenness by which the First World
War descended upon the great powers of Europe.365 The 1919 Paris
Peace Conference which ended the Great War had to serve in de-
fault for the never-realized Third Hague Peace Conference. 366 Yet
the longstanding American legalist objective of establishing some
means for the periodic convocation of peace conference was
achieved and, indeed, far exceeded by the creation of the League of
Nations.
III. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
The history of American foreign policy toward international
36 1. Circular Note from William Jennings Bryan to U.S. Diplomatic Officers (Jan. 3 1,
1914), reprinted in 1914 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 4. See Editorial Comment,
Mr. Bryan and the Third Hague Peace Conference, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 330 (1914).
362. Circular Note from William Jennings Bryan to U.S. Diplomatic Officers (June 22,
1914), reprinted in 1914 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 10.
363. See Chronicle of International Events, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 890, 891 (1914). See also
Editorial Comment, Germany and International Peace, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 881 (1914) (Ger-
many also favors Third Hague Conference).
364. See Chronicle of International Events, 8 AM. J. INrr'L L. 890, 892 (1914).
365. See generally B. TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST (1962).
366. See H. NICHOLSON, PEACEMAKING 1919 (1965).
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law and organizations from 1898 to 1917 would be substantially in-
complete, if not materially misleading, if it did not include a brief
analysis of United States attitudes toward Central America and the
Caribbean during this crucial period. The United States pioneered
and promoted a war prevention program in the Western hemisphere
that essentially consisted of the same five legalist elements of its con-
temporaneous foreign policy toward Europe: arbitration, adjudica-
tion, codification, arms limitation and the periodic convocation of
regional conferences. Nevertheless, by the end of the nineteenth
century, a material difference emerged between United States for-
eign policies toward the Old and New Worlds. This difference was
predicated upon the unavoidable historical fact that the United
States, because of its easy victory over Spain in 1898, had become an
active participant and the acknowledged predominant power in the
politics in the Western hemisphere. Thereafter, the United States
quickly acted as if Central America and the Caribbean constituted
its rightful "sphere of influence" akin to those carved out by the
major European imperial powers on the continents of Africa and
Asia. In the Western hemisphere, the United States war prevention
program, based upon considerations of international law and orga-
nizations, was confronted directly by the political realities of United
States imperial power and pretensions. This direct confrontation
between two competing, if not antithetical, ideologies for the con-
duct of international relations created an insoluble set of dilemmas
for the United States foreign policy decision-making establishment.
For the next three decades the United States would try to cope with
the problem of curing political and economic instability in Mexico,
Central America and the Caribbean by the crude techniques of ac-
tual and threatened military intervention and occupation. This in-
terventionist policy expressly contravened the emotional sentiments,
philosophical principles and international legal conventions the
United States had actively promoted within the worldwide system of
international relations as well as within the separate inter-American
system that it was actively seeking to create. The ramifications of
this interventionist policy has chronically plagued and hopelessly
perplexed United States foreign policy decision making toward
Central American and Caribbean countries up to and including the
present time.
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A. International Law and United States Imperial Policy
1. The Monroe Doctrine
The focal point for all United States foreign policy toward Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean during this era was the proper in-
terpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. As originally stated by
President James Monroe in his message to Congress on December 2,
1823, the doctrine proclaimed that the American continents were no
longer considered by the United States to be appropriate subjects
for future colonization by any European powers; that the countries
of Europe must not seek to extend their political systems to the
Western hemisphere; that the United States would not interfere in
the affairs of any current European colony or dependency in the
Western hemisphere; that the United States would remain neutral in
the war between Spain and the newly independent governments of
South America, but not to the point of permitting a reimposition of
Spanish rule; and, finally, that the United States would continue to
obey the dogma of Washington's Farewell Address by preserving its
neutrality in the affairs of Europe provided that its rights were not
seriously jeopardized. 67 The Polk Corollary to the Monroe Doc-
trine subsequently created an additional prohibition, namely, that a
European power could not acquire territory in the Western hemi-
sphere by cession from another European power.368
At the turn of the twentieth century, American international
lawyers quite forthrightly admitted that the Monroe Doctrine had
not been elevated to the level of a customary principle of public
international law. Rather the Doctrine only expressed an official
statement of international political policy by the United States that
was tacitly respected by European states for reasons of political, dip-
lomatic, and military expediency. 369 From a United States perspec-
tive, the main advantage to this interpretation was that recognition
of the Monroe Doctrine, as a matter of policy instead of law, meant
that related questions could not properly become the subject of in-
ternational arbitration pursuant to the various obligatory arbitration
treaties and schemes advocated by the United States government.
370
Despite its commitment to the principle of obligatory arbitration of
367. See I RICHARDSON, supra note 34, at 776.
368. See E. MCCORMAK, JAMES K. POLK: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 690, 698 (1965).
369. Cf. Oppenheim, The Science of International Law. Its Task and Method, 2 AM. J.
INT'L L. 313, 353-54 (1908) (comparing European and American views on the acquisition of
territory).
370. See Editorial Comment, The Monroe Doctrine Again, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 729 (1911).
272 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J [Vol. 6:185
international disputes, the United States firmly avowed its intention
to preserve its ability to unilaterally interpret and act upon the
Monroe Doctrine in whatever manner it saw fit.37 1 This was said to
be essential because the Monroe Doctrine was founded upon the
sovereign right of the United States to self-defense, a prerogative
that was recognized by public international law. In a system of in-
ternational relations where war was not outlawed but simply toler-
ated, the ultimate guarantee for self-defense was not arbitration, but
military power. The same axiom must hold true for the Monroe
Doctrine.
2. The Roosevelt Corollary
From a Latin American perspective, as originally defined, the
Monroe Doctrine was not theoretically objectionable; it was well
understood that the Doctrine was in part responsible for the ability
of Latin American states to achieve and maintain independence
from their European mother countries.372 The real problem arose
from the so-called Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, an-
nounced by the President in his message to Congress on December
6, 1904.373 Although phrased in general terms to apply to any inter-
national delict committed by a Western hemispheric state, the es-
sence of this precept meant that the United States would exercise an
alleged right of pre-emptive intervention into the domestic affairs of
Central American and Caribbean countries delinquent in the pay-
ment of their public debts. It sought to establish in these states a
371. For example, regarding the Monroe Doctrine, the United States made identical
reservations to both the 1899 and the 1907 Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes as follows: "nor shall anything contained in the said Convention be con-
strued to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude
toward purely American questions." See Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) at civ, cvi (1916).
372. See Drago, State Loans in Their Relation to International Policy, I Am. J. INT'L L.
692, 719 (1907). Chandler, The Pan American Origin of the Monroe Doctrine, 8 AM J. INT'L
L. 515 (1914) (tracing efforts made by South American countries to formulate a Pan Ameri-
can policy in which the U.S. would have an active role prior to the enunciation of the
Monroe Doctrine); Robertson, Hispanic American Appreciations of the Monroe Doctrine, 3
HISPANIC AM. HIST. REV. 1 (1920) (while engaged in a dispute with England over title to
land Venezuela invoked the Monroe Doctrine in May, 1887, and requested the U.S. Secre-
tary of State to promote the settlement of the dispute by arbitration).
373. See 9 RICHARDSON, supra note 34, at 7024, 7053:
Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the
ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require interven-
tion by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the
United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluc-
tantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or importence, to the exercise of an
international police power.
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United States supervised regime for the proper administration of
public finances and debts, thereby forestalling intervention by Euro-
pean creditor states. If deemed necessary, this objective would be
accomplished by the forceful seizure and occupation of foreign terri-
tory and customs houses by armed United States troops. In effect,
the success of the Porter Convention, which greatly limited Euro-
pean intervention into the Western hemisphere for economic rea-
sons, was to a great extent predicted upon the promulgation and
enforcement of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. As
the Porter Convention reduced the grounds for European interven-
tion into the domestic affairs of Central American and Caribbean
countries, the Roosevelt Corollary increased the number of ostensi-
ble reasons that purported to justify United States intervention.
From a Latin American perspective, the Roosevelt Corollary
was perceived as a unilateral policy of hegemonial imperialism by
the United States toward the Western hemisphere similar to the bal-
ance of power politics and spheres of influence system pursued by
the great powers of Europe. Drago vigorously argued that the
United States should not assume the function of a public debt col-
lector for Latin American countries as it was then doing in the Do-
minican Republic.37 4 Latin America was not a United States sphere
of influence and the United States had no right to exercise such "in-
ternational police functions" throughout the region. The Roosevelt
Corollary explicity contradicted the Monroe Doctrine's underlying
principles of nonintervention, state equality and sovereign indepen-
dence. It was therefore argued that these principles were so funda-
mental to the Monroe Doctrine that they must be applied to
international relations between all Western hemispheric states, and
especially by the United States in its relationships with Latin Ameri-
can countries. Even former United States Secretaries of State Rich-
ard Olney and Elihu Root-the former to President Cleveland, the
latter to Theodore Roosevelt-eventually joined in these Latin
American protestations and asserted that the true essence of the
Monroe Doctrine did not require the United States to become the
international policeman of the Western hemisphere or a debt collec-
tion agent for the benefit of foreign creditor states and their nation-
als.375 On this point they were in full agreement with the positions
advocated by notable Latin Americans such as Luis Drago and Ale-
374. Drago, supra note 372, at 721-22.
375. See Olney, The Development of International Law, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 423
(1907); Root, The Real Monroe Doctrine, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 427, 433-37 (1914).
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jandro Alvarez. 376
The majority viewpoint among the American international le-
gal community, however, favored Roosevelt's newly decreed in-
terventionist interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.377 With the
creation of a United States "sphere of influence" over the Western
hemisphere by virtue of its victory over Spain, it was generally be-
lieved that the United States must now assume an activist role in
"enforcing" the Monroe Doctrine. This would be accomplished by
intervention into the domestic affairs of Central American and Car-
ibbean countries that became delinquent in the performance of their
international legal responsibilities toward those European states
which might seek redress in a manner inconsistent with the Monroe
Doctrine. According to this logic, by virtue of the Roosevelt Corol-
lary, the United States would become the policemen for the enforce-
ment of international law in the Western hemisphere.
3. The Panama Canal
At that particular time, the United States felt a special need to
play the role of policeman in Central America and the Caribbean
because it had recently acquired a supposed "vital national security
interest" 378 in protecting the approaches to the proposed Panama
Canal. United States marines had assisted in the establishment of
the Republic of Panama in 1903 and in the negotiation of the Hay-
Bunau Varilla Treaty that year. This granted the United States, in
perpetuity, a ten-mile wide canal zone across the isthmus of Panama
with all the rights, power and authority therein to be exercised as "if
it were the sovereign of the territory." 379 There was no debate over
376. See Alvarez, Latin America and International Law, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 269 (1909);
Drago, supra note 372, at 714-16.
377. See, e.g., Armstrong, Should the Monroe Policy Be Modified or Abandoned?, 10
AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1916); Chandler, supra note 372, at 518; Editorial Comment, President
Wilson and Latin America, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 329 (1913); Editorial Comment, Secretary
Knox's Visit to CentralAmerica, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 493 (1912); Editorial Comment, The De-
velopment of the Monroe Doctrine, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 712 (1912). See also Hughes, Observa-
tions on the Monroe Doctrine, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1923).
378. See, e.g., Germanicus, The Central American Question from a European Point of
View, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 213 (1914); Root, supra note 375, at 440.
379. Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty, Nov. 18, 1903, United States-Panama, art. III, 33 Stat.
2234, 2235, T.S. No. 431. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 between the United States
and Great Britain had prohibited either party from ever obtaining or maintaining for itself
any exclusive control over an interoceanic ship canal across the Central American isthmus.
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, Apr. 19, 1850, United States-Great Britain, 9 Stat. 995, T.S. No.
122. Later, the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 between the United States and the United
Kingdom on an interoceanic canal "superseded" the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty without, how-
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the recently controversial question whether this peculiar phraseol-
ogy of article 3 actually meant that the United States was not in law
the sovereign over the Canal Zone because at the time the United
States was deemed to be the practical sovereign for all essential pur-
poses. 380 There was, however, some severe criticism of the Panama-
nian intervention as a serious violation of the fundamental principle
of public international law concerning state equality and as an in-
stance where the United States had not, contrary to prior practice,
upheld the rights of a weaker nation in its foreign affairs. 38' Former
Secretary of State Richard Olney went so far as to suggest that the
United States should have compensated Columbia for the seizure of
the Canal Zone.
38 2
On the other hand, some American international lawyers at-
tempted to justify the intervention on the grounds of "permanent
national or international interests of far reaching importance" 383
which presumably permitted a derogation from the basic proscrip-
tions of public international law against military intervention. The
majority of United States international lawyers of this era essen-
tially accepted the forceful creation and permanent occupation of a
"United States" Panama Canal as an inevitable necessity of geopo-
litical life that existed beyond the domain of public international
law.384 This attitude was consistent with their general predilection
for concocting transparent legal justifications for United States in-
terventionism throughout the Western hemisphere on such patently
ever, impairing the "general principle" of neutralization for any canal across the Central
American isthmus established by article VIII of the latter Convention. Hay-Pauncefote
Treaty, Nov. 18, 1901, United States-Great Britain, 32 Stat. 1903, T.S. No. 401.
380. See, e.g., Note from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain to
United States Ambassador Bryce (Nov. 14, 1912), reprinted in 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 48, 53 (Supp.
1913) (British recognize that U.S. had become "practical sovereign" of the Canal by virtue
of the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty).
381. See Hicks, The Equality of States and the Hague Conferences, 2 AM. J. INT'L L.
530, 535, 560 (1908).
382. See Olney, The Development of International Law, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 426
(1907). The United States eventually paid a $25 million indemnity to Columbia "to remove
all the misunderstandings growing out of the political events in Panama in November 1903."
Treaty for the Settlement of Differences, Apr. 6, 1914, United States-Columbia, 42 Stat.
2122, T.S. No 661.
383. See, e.g., Hershey, The Caivo and Drago Doctrines, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 26, 42 (1907).
But see Root, supra note 375, at 440.
384. For a description of the role played by John Bassett Moore in support of U.S.
intervention into Panama, see S.F. BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
514-15 (rev. ed.1942). See also H. REID, INTERNATIONAL SERVITUDES IN LAW AND PRAC-
TICE 241-46 (1932) (text of Moore memorandum in favor of intervention).
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spurious grounds.385
Military interventionism became the keystone of United States
foreign policy toward Central America and the Caribbean from
shortly after the Spanish-American War until at least a decade after
the conclusion of the First World War. Politically, the policy was
justified by the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Le-
gally, the policy was justified either by the terms of some treaty or
by the asserted right under customary international law for the
United States to intervene militarily in order to protect the lives and
property of its nationals abroad from dangerous civil conditions al-
legedly degenerating beyond the control of the host government. 386
Strategically, the fulcrum of United States interventionist foreign
policy toward Central America and the Caribbean turned on the
Panama Canal that linked the two American coasts and served as
the highway for political, military and economic communications
between the United States mainland and its recently acquired pos-
sessions in the Far East.
4. The Dominican Republic Loan Convention
The formal promulgation of the Roosevelt Corollary to the
Monroe Doctrine was precipitated by the situation in the Domini-
can Republic. The government of the Dominican Republic had lit-
erally fallen into a state of international bankruptcy and was faced
with the imminent prospect of military intervention by European
powers to enforce collection on debts owed to their nationals, thus
raising the specter of the volatile Venezuelan debt controversy. 387
Pursuant to a convention concluded between the United States and
the Dominican Republic in 1907, the President of the United States
was authorized to appoint a General Receiver for the collection and
proper administration of all Dominican customs duties revenues. 388
385. But cf. Friedlander, A Reassessment ofRoosevelt's Role in the Panamanian Revolu-
tion of 1903, 14 W. POL. Q. 535 (1961) (intervention was lawful).
386. See, e.g., Borchard, Basic Elements of Dilomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 7
AM. J. INT'L L. 497, 515-20 (1913); Goebel, The International Responsibility of Statesfor
Injuries Sustained by Aliens on Account ofMob Violence, Insurrections and Civil Wars, 8 AM.
J. INT'L L. 802 (1914). But see Arias, The Non-Liability of Slatesfor Damages Suffered by
Foreigners in the Course ofa Riot, an Insurrection, or a Civil War, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 724
(1913).
387. See D. MUNRO, INTERVENTION AND DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN THE CARIBBEAN 78-
125 (1964) [hereinafter cited as MUNRO, INTERVENTION].
388. Convention Concerning Customs Revenues, Feb. 8, 1901, United States-Domini-
can Republic, 35 Stat. 1880, T.S. No. 465. See Hollander, The Convention of1907 Between
the United States and the Dominican Republic, I Am. J. INT'L L. 287 (1907). An earlier 1905
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The American receiver was to apply these funds to the orderly pay-
ment of interest upon, and the amortization and redemption of, $20
million in new bonds issued and sold by the Dominican Republic.
The proceeds of these bonds, together with the customs revenues,
were to be paid to the government's creditors, who had already
agreed to a substantial reduction in the nominal amount of their
claims as part of the financial rearrangement. 389
The 1907 Convention with the Dominican Republic did not ex-
plicitly grant the United States a right to intervene to secure the
discharge of any of these obligations. However, pursuant to article
II, the United States could provide the General Receiver and his
assistants with "such protection as it may find to be requisite for the
performance of their duties." 390 In the shadow of the Great War in
Europe, on November 29, 1916, President Woodrow Wilson decided
to intervene. He placed the Dominican Republic under military oc-
cupation over an alleged failure to fulfill the terms of the Conven-
tion.39' The marines were withdrawn in 1924, but the customs
receivership was not terminated until 1940.392
The Dominican Republic Loan Convention proved to be a
rough-and-ready model for the negotiation of economic receiver-
ship agreements between the United States and Honduras in 1911
(which was not ratified);393 between the United States and Nicara-
Convention had failed to gain Senate support because the United States undertook the duty
of determining the validity of claims against the Dominican Republic. See Message to the
Senate by President Theodore Roosevelt (Mar. 6, 1905), in 9 RICHARDSON, supra note 34, at
7080; Fifth Annual Message to Congress by President Theodore Roosevelt (Dec. 5, 1905), id.
at 7353, 7377-78. Undaunted, Roosevelt effected a customs agreement on his own accord by
the conclusion of a modus vivendi pending the Senate's ratification of the treaty. See D.
PERKINS, THE MONROE DOCTRINE 1867-1907, at 435 (1966). "The assertion that the United
States initiated the receivership by means of military force would be approximately correct."
Rippy, The Initiation ofthe Customs Receivership in the Dominican Republic, 17 HISPANIC
AM. HIST. REV. 419, 448 (1937).
389. Act of Dominican Congress Authorizing Executive to Issue and Sell $20,000,000
Bonds, Sept. 18, 1907, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. 408 (Supp. 1907). See also Editorial
Comment, The San Dominican "Enabling Act," I AM. J. INT'L L. 978 (1907).
390. Convention Concerning Customs Revenues, Feb. 8, 1907, United States-Domini-
can Republic, art. III, 35 Stat. 1880, 1883, T.S. No. 465.
391. See Brown, The Armed Occupation ofSanto Domingo, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 394, 395-
96 (1917).
392. Convention Respecting Customs Revenues, Sept. 24, 1940, United States-Domini-
can Republic, art. I, 55 Stat. 1104, 1105, T.S. No. 965.
393. Convention Concerning a Loan, Jan. 10, 1911, United States-Honduras, in 4 Un-
perfected Treaties, supra note 68, at 195, reprinted in 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 274 (Supp. 1911). See
Editorial Comment, The Proposed Loan Conventions Between the United States and Hondu-
ras and the United States and Nicaragua, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 1044 (1911). See also Baker,
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gua in 1911 (not ratified),394 and again in 1914 (which was rati-
fied);395 and between the United States and Haiti in 1915.396 The
United States Marines intervened in Nicaragua in 1912, occupied
the country until 1925, returned the next year, and finally withdrew
in 1933. 397 United States Marines occupied Haiti from 1915
through 1934, though the receivership was maintained until 1947.398
The Marines landed in Honduras in 1924 and were not withdrawn
until the following year.399 "Dollar diplomacy" and "gunboat di-
plomacy" were to merge and proceed hand-in-hand in the formula-
tion of United States foreign policy toward Central America and the
Caribbean during the first three decades of the twentieth century.40 °
5. Cuba and the Platt Amendment
When a revolution broke out in Cuba during the summer of
1906 the United States, in order to preserve its security interests in
the approaches to the Panama Canal, decided to exercise its right of
intervention pursuant to article 3 of the U.S.-Cuban Treaty of May
22, 1903401 and article 3 to the Cuban Constitution of February 21,
1901.402 Both of these documents incorporated the terms of the Platt
Amendment.0 3 The Platt Amendment was the brainchild of then
Ideals and Realities in the Wilson Administration's Relations with Honduras, 21 AMERICAS 3
(1964).
394. Convention Concerning a Loan, June 6, 1911, United States-Nicaragua, in 4 Un-
perfected Treaties, supra note 68, at 213, reprinted in 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 291 (1911).
395. Convention Regarding a Canal Route and Naval Base, Aug. 5, 1914, United
States-Nicaragua, 39 Stat. 1661, T.S. No. 624. See H. DAVIS, J. FINAN & F. PECK, LATIN
AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 160-62 (1977).
396. Treaty Regarding Finances, Economic Development and Tranquility, Sept. 16,
1915, United States-Haiti, 39 Stat. 1654, T.S. No. 623, reprinted in 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 234
(Supp. 1916).
397. See L. LANGLEY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN 1900-1970, at 53-58,
116-25, 149-50 (1980); D. MUNRO, THE UNITED STATES AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
1921-1933, at 277, 309 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MUNRO, REPUBLICS]; Munro, Dollar Di-
plomacy in Nicaragua, 1909-1913, 38 HISPANIC AM. HIST. REV. 209 (1958).
398. MUNRO, REPUBLICS, supra note 397, at 72, 309-41.
399. Id. at 139-43. See also Baker, The Woodrow Wilson Administration and Guatema-
ian Relations, 27 HISTORIAN 155, 165-66 (1965) (U.S. troops landed in 1920 to protect lega-
tion); Wright, Honduras: A Case Study of United States Support ofFree Elections in Central
America, 40 HISPANIC AM. HIST. REV. 212 (1960).
400. See generaly Adler, Bryan and Wilsonian Caribbean Penetration, 20 HISPANIC AM.
HIST. REV. 198 (1940).
401. Treaty Defining Future Relations, May 22, 1903, United States-Cuba, 33 Stat.
2248, 2251, T.S. No. 437.
402. CUBAN CONST. of 1901, reprinted in 94 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 554, 577
(1900-1901).
403. Army Appropriation Act, ch. 803, art. III, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 31 Stat. 895, 897
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Secretary of War Elihu Root, who believed it essential to the protec-
tion of the United States strategic position in Panama.4o4 The
amendment was imposed upon Cuba as a condition for its indepen-
dence and the ultimate withdrawal of the United States occupation
forces left in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. The Platt
Amendment served as the legal pretext for a repeated series of ac-
tual or threatened military and diplomatic interventions into Cuba
by the United States. 40 5 In fact, the United States actually intro-
duced troops into Cuba in 1906, 1912, 1917 and 1920.406 The Platt
Amendment was finally abrogated in 1934 as part of President
Franklin Roosevelt's good neighbor policy toward Latin
America. 40 7 The doctrine of intervention enunciated by the Platt
Amendment was considered so salutary that it was generally recom-
mended that it serve as a comprehensive basis for the conduct of
American foreign policy throughout the Caribbean basin.40 8 One or
another of its conditions warranting intervention can be found scat-
tered throughout the various international agreements that the
United States government attempted to impose upon the countries
of Central America and the Caribbean during this era. The Platt
Amendment was to serve as a harbinger of the Roosevelt Corollary
to the Monroe Doctrine.
In addition to the Platt Amendment, the Roosevelt Corollary,
the right of self-defense and the need to protect the approaches to
the Panama Canal, United States international lawyers purported to
justify these armed interventions into and prolonged occupations of
sister American republics on such specious grounds as "the abate-
(1901): "That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the
right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a govern-
ment adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharg-
ing the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States,
now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba." See Editorial Comment,
The Restoration of Cuban Se/f-Government, 3 Am. J. INT'L L. 431 (1909).
404. Editorial Comment, The Origin and Purpose of the Platt Amendment, 8 AM. J.
INT'L L. 585 (1914).
405. See MUNRO, INTERVENTION, supra note 387, at 125-140, 469-529; MUNRO, RE-
PUBLICS, supra note 397, at 16-17; Capo-Rodriquez, The Platt Amendaent, 17 AM. J. INT'L
L. 761 (1923).
406. Treaty defining Relations, May 29, 1934, United States-Cuba, art. I, 48 Stat. 1682,
1683, T.S. No. 866.
407. See Baker, The Wilson Administration and Cuba, 1913-1921, 46 MID-AMERICA 48
(1964).
408. See Editorial Comment, A Caribbean Policyfor the United States, 8 AM. J. INT'L
L. 886 (1914); Smith, Cuba: Laboratory For Dollar Diplomacy, 1898-1917, 28 HISTORIAN
586, 597-98 (1966).
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ment of an international nuisance" or "in the defense of special
rights and the general interests of international law and order."40 9
Another superficial rationale espoused by United States interna-
tional lawyers became the supposed moral obligation of the United
States government to rescue the people of such backward nations
from their generally despotic, corrupt and inefficient rulers, who
threatened to propel the region into a condition of interminable an-
archy and chaos.410  The United States must assist its fellow
American people to advance toward a higher level of civilization
and self-government in both their international and domestic af-
fairs. Until they reached that stage, however, the fundamental rule
of international law dictating nonintervention simply did not apply
to protect Central American and Caribbean states from the imposi-
tion of what was tantamount to a United States protectorate. The
idea that such an allegedly beneficient and altruistic policy might
have been motivated principally by considerations of international
power politics, military strategy and economic greed was dismissed
out of hand by many United States international lawyers.4 11
6. The interaction between United States imperial policy in the
Americas and the United States attitude toward
Japanese imperial policy in the Far East
The above specious justifications for United States imperial be-
havior in the Western hemisphere set in motion a deleterious pro-
cess of interaction between United States foreign policies toward
Central America and the Caribbean, on the one hand, and the Far
East on the other. This interaction would serve as an ominous prel-
ude to the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor almost forty years
later. United States' acquisitions of Hawaii, 4' 2 Guam and the Phil-
ippines in 1898 signalled the opening thrust of American foreign
policy into the easternmost rim of the Pacific Ocean basin. Here,
the United States soon came into serious conflict with another rap-
idly expanding imperial power, Japan, flush from recent victories
409. See Brown, The Armed Occupation of Santo Domingo, II AM. J. INT'L L. 394
(1917).
410. See Brown, Editorial Comments, American Intervention in Haiti, 16 AM. J. INT'L L.
607 (1922); Brown, Editorial Comment, International Responsibility in Haiti and Santo Dom-
ingo, 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 433 (1922); Hughes, Observations on the Monroe Doctrine, 17 AM. J.
INT'L L. 611 (1923) (speech by U.S. Secretary of State).
411. Hughes, supra note 410, at 611.
412. The United States Congress formally annexed Hawaii on July 7, 1898, Pub. Res.
55, 55th Cong., 2d Sess., 30 Stat. 750 (1898).
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over China in 1895 and Russia in 1905. The victory over Russia
resulted in the creation of a Japanese protectorate over Korea in
1905, and its annexation in 1910. Japan's conquest of Korea was
accorded a shortsightedly benign interpretation by United States le-
gal commentators on the other side of the Pacific. They believed
that it merely constituted part of Japan's effort to obtain a degree of
equality in recognition from the great powers of the New and Old
Worlds, thereby assuming its legitimate "place in the sun" with
them.413 Of course this quest was similar to the contemporaneous
imperial pursuit undertaken by the United States since 1898 over
the Western hemisphere and in the Far East, using the purloined
Panama Canal, buttressed by the interventionist Roosevelt Corol-
lary, to serve as the strategic link between the twin portions of the
American empire. It would have been glaringly hypocritical for
American international lawyers to have reproached Japan for like-
wise exploiting seductive targets of opportunity in its recognized
"sphere of influence" on the continent of Asia. Just as the United
States was currently engaged in the process of consolidating its
hegemonial position in the Western hemisphere, Japan was some-
day destined to become the leader of an Asiatic empire encompass-
ing much of the eastern Pacific basin.414
Granting Japan imperial deference in the Pacific did not vitiate
the fact that protection of United States possessions in the Far East
depended upon preventing Japan from obtaining any additional ter-
ritorial acquisitions on the Asian mainland. 41 5 In particular, the in-
estimable strategic and economic value of China's territory,
population and resources could not fall under the domination of Ja-
pan. Nor could China be further balkanized into additional zones
of exclusive economic or political control exercised by the great
powers of Europe, which had already staked out their imperial
beachheads in China and Southeast Asia. Consequently, at the turn
of the century the cornerstone of American foreign policy toward
the Far East became the preservation of what remained of the terri-
torial integrity and political independence of China.41 6 These con-
413. See, e.g., Editorial Comment, The Emperor ofJapan, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 944, 948-49
(1912); Editorial Comment, The Annexation of Korea to Japan, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 923 (1910).
See also Editorial Comment, The International Status ofKorea, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 444 (1907).
414. See also BEMIS, supra note 384, at 493 (Taft-Katsura memorandum).
415. See Hart, Pacific andAsiatic Doctrines Akin to the Monroe Doctrine, 9 AM. J. INT'L
L. 802, 816 (1915).
416. See Editorial Comment, Arbitration Treaty with China, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 166
(1909).
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siderations induced the United States to specifically endorse the
British government's "open-door" policy toward China. This was
designed to ensure equality of treatment for commerce and naviga-
tion by all the imperial powers in China within their respective
"spheres of influence or interest."'4 7
The American interpretation of this open-door policy toward
China was expanded upon in a July 3, 1900 circular note by Secre-
tary of State John Hay to the various European powers then con-
templating the formation of an international expedition for the
relief of their legations currently besieged in Peking as a result of
the Boxer Rebellion.41 8 As stated by Hay, the purpose of United
States foreign policy toward China was to ensure the permanent
safety and peace of the Chinese empire; to maintain its territorial
and administrative integrity; to protect all rights of foreigners under
treaty or international law; and to safeguard the principle of equal
and impartial trade for all powers throughout China.4 19 The princi-
ples enunciated in the Hay circular note were eventually endorsed
by the major imperial powers in several important conventions con-
cluded between them prior to the outbreak of the First World War.
Of primary significance were the agreements of October 16, 1900,
between Great Britain and Germany defining their mutual policy in
China;420 the treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Japan of
January 30, 1902,421 replaced by a convention of August 12, 1905,422
which was revised and extended by another treaty of alliance of July
13, 19 11;423 articles 3 and 4 of the Peace of Portsmouth of September
417. Letter from John Hay to Joseph Choate (Sept. 6, 1899), reprinted in 1899 FOREIGN
REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 131, 132.
418. Circular Note to the Powers Cooperating in China, Defining the Purposes and
Policy of the United States (July 3, 1900), reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. 386 (Supp. 1907).
See Editorial Comment, The Integrity of China and the "Open Door," I AM. J. INT'L L. 954
(1907); Manning, China and the Powers Since the Boxer Movement, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 848
(1910).
419. Circular Note to the Powers Cooperating in China, Defining the Purposes and
Policy of the United States (July 3, 1900), supra note 418, at 386-87.
420. Agreement Concerning Maintenance of Interests in China, Oct. 16, 1900, Great
Britain-Germany, XCII Brit. For. 31, 189 Parry's T.S. 95, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. 387
(Supp. 1907).
421. Agreement Concerning Relations with the East, Jan. 30, 1902, Great Britain-Ja-
pan, MacMurray 324, 190 Parry's T.S. 457, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INr'L L. 14 (Supp. 1907).
422. Agreement Concerning Relations with the East, Aug. 12, 1905, United Kingdom-
Japan, XCVIII Brit. For. 136, 199 Parry's T.S. 90, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. 15 (Supp.
1907).
423. Agreement of Alliance, July 13, 1911, United Kingdom-Japan, CIV Brit. For. 173,
214 Parry's T.S. 107, reprinted in 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 276 (Supp. 1911).
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5, 1905 between Russia and Japan,424 as well as the St. Petersburg
Convention between them of July 17(30), 1907;425 an arrangement
concluded between Japan and France of June 10, 1907;426 and fi-
nally the Root-Takahira Agreement on Pacific Possessions of No-
vember 30, 1908 concluded between the United States and Japan.427
Hope was expressed that this general consensus on the Chinese open
door policy, together with the Triple Entente between Great Britain,
France and Russia, the Anglo-Japanese alliance, as well as the fact
that all these states were further interconnected with the United
States through a series of bilateral arbitration treaties, might create
conditions ripe for a worldwide peace pact that could embrace the
continents of Europe, Asia and America.428
7. The Mexican Revolution
With the severance of Mexican sovereign territory north of the
Rio Grande by the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848,429 the pri-
mary United States concern in Mexico prior to the First World War
was not strategic, but economic in nature. This was dictated by the
large amount of American capital invested in Mexico, which was
the main repository of United States funds invested abroad. 430 The
security of these investments was irreparably damaged by the out-
break of the Mexican revolution in 1910, which was precipitated by
President Diaz's decision to renege on his promise not to seek re-
election in that year and the consequent amendment of the Mexican
424. The Peace of Portsmouth, Sept. 5, 1905, Russia-Japan, arts. 3-4, XCVIII Br. For.
735, 199 Parry's T.S. 144, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. 17, 18 (Supp. 1907).
425. St. Petersburg Convention, July 17(30), 1907, Russia-Japan, I Jap. Tr. 606, 204
Parry's T.S. 339, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. 396 (Supp. 1907).
426. Agreement Concerning Policies in China, June 10, 1907, France-Japan, III Basde-
vant 1, 204 Parry's T.S. 227, reprinted in 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 313 (Supp. 1910). See Editorial
Comment, The Recent Agreements Concluded Between Japan and France, I AM. J. INT'L L.
748 (1907).
427. Root-Takahira Agreement on Pacific Posessions, Nov. 30, 1908, United States-
Japan, T.S. 511 1/. See Editorial Comment, United States and Japan in the Far East, 3 AM.
J. INT'L L. 168 (1909).
428. See Editorial Comment, The Revised Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 5 AM. J. INT'L L.
1054, 1055 (1911).
429. Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922,
T.S. No. 207. See Editorial Comment, Trpoli, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 149, 155 (1912) (Mexican
war was unjust and unjustifiable).
430. See Editorial Comment, Secretary Root's Visit to Mexico, I AM. J. INT'L L. 964,
065 (1907).
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constitution to permit him to do so.431 After instigating an armed
revolt against Diaz, Francisco Madero was elected president in
1911.432 On March 14, 1912, a joint resolution of Congress author-
ized the President to forbid the exportation of arms or munitions of
war to any American country in which he should find conditions of
domestic violence to exist.433 Pursuant thereto, President Taft
promulgated an arms embargo against Mexico in order to
strengthen the Madero government against its internal
adversaries. 4
34
Nevertheless, Madero was in turn overthrown and murdered in
1913 by General Victoriano Huerta, who ruled without the benefit
of a constitutional imprimatur.435 This defect provided the grounds
for the Wilson Administration's refusal to recognize the Huerta re-
gime. 436 Though not without precedent in United States dealings
with Latin American states, 437 refusal to accord diplomatic recogni-
tion because a government was not established in accordance with
its normal constitutional procedures contravened the usual practice
of United States diplomatic relations. This practice extended back
to President Thomas Jefferson's 1792-93 correspondence with
Gouverneur Morris, American Minister to France, in regard to the
French Revolution. President Jefferson stated that the United
States would "acknolege [sic] any government to be rightful which if
form [sic] by the will of the nation, substanially declared." 438 As
subsequently explained by Jefferson, this principle meant that the
United States considered every nation to have the right to govern
itself by whatever form of institution it desired, to change those in-
stitutions as it saw fit, and to conduct its foreign relations through
431. See Editorial Comment, Diaz and Mexico, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 714 (1911); Editorial
Comment, Mexico, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 475 (1912).
432. See Berbusse, Neutrality-Diplomacy of the United States and Mexico, 1910-1911,
12 AMERICAS 265 (1956) (United States government tacitly supported Madero's
insurrection).
433. S.J. Res. 89, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 37 Stat. 630 (1912), reprinted in 1912 FOREIGN
REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 745.
434. Presidential Proclamation No. 1185, 37 Stat. 1733 (1912). See Editorial Comment,
Mexico, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 475 (1912).
435. See DAVIs, FINAN, & PECK, supra note 395, at 174.
436. See Blaisdell, Henry Lane Wilson and the Overthrow of Madero, 43 Sw. Soc. Scl.
Q. 126 (1962) (acting without approval from Washington, U.S. Ambassador in Mexico sup-
ported Huerta in his overthrow of Madero).
437. See Editorial Comment, Mexico, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 832 (1913).
438. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Nov. 7, 1792), in 8 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 436 (Library ed. 1903).
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whatever organs it thought proper.4 39 For the United States to oper-
ate in accordance with some other principle of diplomatic recogni-
tion would be tantamount to an act of intervention into the
sovereign affairs of another people. By contrast, failure to extend
diplomatic recognition to the Huerta regime was calculated by the
United States to produce a change of governments in Mexico.
Thereafter the Wilson Administration would pursue a policy of
non-recognition toward Central American and Caribbean govern-
ments not created in accordance with their respective constitutional
procedures. This policy was a purposeful instrument of diplomatic
intervention supposedly designed to promote peace and stability in
the stategic region adjacent to the Panama Canal.440
When President Wilson later surmised that the arms embargo
had in fact worked in favor of Huerta and against the Constitution-
alist Party of Venustiano Carranza, the embargo was lifted on Feb-
ruary 3, 1914. 44 1 However, neither diplomatic intervention nor
manipulation of United States neutrality laws were enough to
achieve the desired American objective of replacing Huerta with
Carranza. This goal was ultimately accomplished, however, by
means of forceful American military intervention. The pretext for
the intervention was to make amends for a Mexican refusal to offer
an unconditional twenty-one gun salute to the United States flag for
the arrest and prompt release of United States Marines from the
warship Dolphin anchored at Tampico. 442 Upon the request of Pres-
ident Wilson, Congress passed a joint resolution on April 22, 1914,
giving the President authority to use the armed forces of the United
States to enforce his demand for unequivocal amends from the
Mexican government over the Dolphin incident. 443 An amendment
offered by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to broaden the reasons for
the authorization to include the failure of the Mexican government
to protect the lives and property of United States nationals during
439. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Mar, 12, 1793), in 9 id. at 36.
440. See Editorial Comment, President Wilson andLatin America, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 329
(1913).
441. Presidential Proclamation 1263, 38 Stat. 1992, reprinted in 1914 FOREIGN REL.
U.S., supra note 64, at 447. See Editorial Comment, Mediation in Mexico, 8 AM. J. INT'L L.
579, 580 (1914).
442. See DAVIS, FINAN, & PECK, supra note 395, at 174-75; Hinckley, Wilson, Huerta
and the Twenty-One Gun Salute, 22 HISTORIAN 197 (1960); Editorial Comment, Mediation in
Mexico, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 579, 581-82 (1914).
443. Pub. Res. 22, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 Stat. 770 (1914).
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the revolution, was defeated.4 " Congress did expressly disclaim any
hostility against the Mexican people as well as the desire to make
war upon Mexico. The day before receiving legislative authoriza-
tion, however, Wilson had already ordered the landing of marines at
Vera Cruz to seize the customs house and thereby prevent a ship-
ment of German arms and ammunition from reaching Huerta's
forces. This intervention prompted Carranza to declare the seizure
an act of hostility, whereupon Wilson decided on April 12 to reim-
pose the Mexican arms embargo. 4 5 Two days later, however, at the
annual banquet of the American Society of International Law, Sec-
retary of State William Jennings Bryan took the occasion to an-
nounce the offer and United States acceptance of the good offices of
the envoys from Argentina, Brazil and Chile to mediate the dispute.
Huerta accepted the offer the next day. 46
Meetings between representatives of the various governments
were held at Niagara Falls, Canada. The negotiations quickly pro-
ceeded beyond mere settlement of the Dolphin incident into consid-
eration of elaborating some modus operandi for full-scale
termination of the Mexican civil war. An agreement by Huerta to
step aside as part of an overall settlement led to the signature of a
protocol on June 24, 1914. It determined that a provisional govern-
ment would be established in Mexico which would receive recogni-
tion by the United States and the three mediating governments. 447
In return, the provisional Mexican government would negotiate for
the creation of international commissions for the settlement of
claims by foreigners for damages sustained during the civil war "as
a consequence of military acts or acts of national authorities. ' 44 8
On its face, this restrictive language seemed tacitly to accept the
teachings of Carlos Calvo, namely that a government was not re-
sponsible for injuries to aliens in time of civil war or internal distur-
bances, or resulting from mob violence for which the government
444. Amendment Offered by Senator Lodge to H.R.J. Res. 251, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 51
CONG. REG. 7005 (1914).
445. See Editorial Comment, Mediation in Mexico, supra note 441, at 582; Sellers,
Chronicle of International Events, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 615, 620 (1914).
446. See Editorial Comment, The Eighth Annual Meeting of the Society, 8 AM. J. INT'L
L. 597, 608 (1914).
447. Letter from Secretary Dodge to the Secretary of State and Text of Mediation Pro-
tocol (June 25, 1914), reprinted in 1914 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 547; Editorial
Comment, Mediation in Mexico, supra note 441, at 584-85.
448. Mediation Protocol art. 2(d), 1914 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 548.
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was not directly responsible."49 Hence, it represented an American
concession to Mexican sensibilities.
By late August, 1914, Carranza had taken the oath of office as
the Chief Executive of Mexico, and three weeks later President Wil-
son ordered the withdrawal of United States troops from Vera Cruz.
However, the American pullout was delayed, due to the continuation
of revolutionary disturbances throughout Mexico. 450 It was not un-
til October 19, 1915, that the United States recognized the Carranza
government as the de facto government of Mexico.45 l Nevertheless,
Carranza still exerted no real control over the forces of General
Pancho Villa, which had consolidated their military position in the
northern states of the country. On March 9, 1916, General Villa
launched his notorious raid into Columbus, New Mexico in which
seventeen American civilians and soldiers were killed.452 On March
10, President Wilson issued a statement that a military force would
be sent at once in pursuit of Villa while, in the process, the United
States would maintain "scrupulous respect" for the sovereignty of
Mexico. 453 On that same day, in a vain attempt to forestall the inev-
itable, the Mexican government offered to conclude an agreement
with the United States giving each country the reciprocal right for
the passage of troops to pursue cross-border bandits upon the terri-
tory of the other in the event an incident similar to Columbus re-
curred.454 The United States government treated this proposal to
negotiate as a formal offer to permit the entry of the United States
expedition against Villa and promptly accepted it as such. This in-
terpretation was quickly disavowed by Mexico and, ultimately was
coupled with a demand for the immediate withdrawal of United
States troops.455 The Mexican government challenged American
military intervention as a violation of its territorial sovereignty that
could only be construed as an act of hostility directed against Mex-
449. See Hershey, The Calvo and Drago Doctrines, I AM. J. INT'L L. 26, 31 (1907). See
also Editorial Comment, Carlos Calvo, I Am. J. INT'L L. 137 (1907).
450. Editorial Comment, Mexico 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 860, 863 (1914).
451. See generally Editorial Comment, The Recognition ofthe De Facto Government in
Mexico, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 357 (1916).
452. Sellers, Chronicle of International Events, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 379, 386 (1916).
453. Telegram from the Secretary of State to All American Consular Officer in Mexico
(Mar. 10, 1916), reprinted in 1916 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 484.
454. Telegram from Special Agent Silliman to the Secretary of State (Mar. 10, 1916),
reprinted in 1916 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 485.
455. Note from Secretary of State to Special Agent Silliman, (Mar. 13, 1916), reprinted
in 1916 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 487; Note from Mr. Arredondo to the Secre-
tary of State (Mar. 18, 1916), reprinted in 1916 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 493.
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ico warranting forceful measures of legitimate self-defense.456 In re-
sponse, the United States insisted upon the existence of an alleged
right under international law to undertake "hot pursuit" of the Co-
lumbus raiders into Mexico. It reasoned that the Mexican govern-
ment had proven itself totally incapable of preventing depredations
against American lives and property launched across the border by
Mexican bandit groups. 457 Until the Mexican government could
give sufficient guarantees of its willingness and ability to discharge
its undeniable obligations under international law in this regard, the
United States would continue to act in order to abate what was tan-
tamount to an international nuisance.
458
In late June, 1916, Mexican troops engaged General Pershing's
expedition in combat. This was upon direct order of the Carranza
government, which sought to impede the further movement of
American troops into the country. 459 The situation could have de-
generated into a condition of formal warfare between the two states
if cooler heads had not fortunately prevailed on both sides of the
border. On July 4, the Carranza government expressed its desire to
resolve the dispute peacefully. 460 On July 12, it proposed the forma-
tion of a joint commission for the negotiation of a complete settle-
ment to the Columbus affair, including withdrawal of United States
forces from Mexico, an agreement between the two states on the
reciprocal passage of troops in pursuit of bandit raiders across the
border, and an investigation and determination of responsibility for
past and future incidents.461 Later that month the United States ac-
cepted the idea of a joint commission,462 which opened its sessions
at New York City on September 4, 1916.463 This procedure for the
creation of a joint commission transpired in accordance with article
456. Note from the Secretary of Foreign Relations of the De Facto Government of
Mexico to the Secretary of State (May 22, 1916), reprintedin 1916 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra
note 64, at 552. See also Scott, Editorial Comment, The American-Mexican Joint Commission
of 1916, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 890, 892 (1916).
457. Note from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Foreign Relations of the De
Facto Government of Mexico (June 20, 1916), reprinted in 1916 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra
note 64, at 581, 588-91.
458. Id. at 591-92.
459. See Sellers, supra note 452, at 621.
460. Letter from Mr. Arredondo to the Secretary of State (July 4, 1916), reprinted in
1916 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 599.
461. Letter from Mr. Arredondo to the Secretary of State (July 12, 1916), reprinted in
1916 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 601.
462. Letter from Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Arredondo (July 28, 1916), reprinted
in 1916 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 604.
463. See Sellers, supra note 452, at 900-01.
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21 of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo which created such a device
for the noncompulsory arbitration of disputes between the two
countries to preserve their peaceful relations. 464
On November 24, the members of the joint commission signed
a protocol providing for the withdrawal of American forces from
Mexico so long as the border was made safe by Mexican troops.4 65
The protocol was preceded, however, by a statement from the
American Commissioners that the United States reserved the right
to pursue bandits into Mexico if necessary. 466 The Carranza gov-
ernment objected to the additional statement because it would ap-
pear to be sanctioning the presence of foreign troops in Mexico. 467
Failing to obtain a modification of the protocol the Carranza gov-
ernment refused to ratify it,468 and the joint commission dissolved
on January 15, 1917 .469 Nevertheless, under the pressure of impend-
ing American entry into the European war, President Wilson or-
dered the withdrawal of United States forces from Mexico on
January 28, 1917, and returned the United States ambassador to
Mexico on February 17.470 The Wilson Administration finally ac-
corded the Carranza government de jure recognition on August 31,
some four months after his election as president under the newly
proclaimed Mexican Constitution. 47 1
There was little discussion among American international law-
yers of whether the United States raid into Mexico violated the let-
ter, or at least the spirit, of article 21 of the Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo. The general sentiment among American international
lawyers was that the United States had a right under international
law to enter a foreign state in order to pursue and punish cross-
border raiders who had retreated into their own country for refuge
464. Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, art. 21, 9 Stat.
922, 938, T.S. No. 207. See Editorial Comment, Mexico and the United States and Arbitra-
don, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 577 (1916); Editorial Comment, The American-Mexican Joint Com-
mission of 1916, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 890 (1916).
465. Letter from American Commissioners to Secretary of State and Report on the
Proceedings of the Commission (Apr. 26, 1917), reprinted in 1917 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra
note 64, at 916, 920.
466. Id. at 925.
467. Id. at 927-28.
468. Id. at 932.
469. Id. at 937.
470. See Finch, Editorial Comment, Mexico and the United States, II AM. J. INT'L L.
399, 406 (1917).
471. See Kahle, Robert Lansing and the Recognition of Venustiano Carranza, 38 His-
PANIC AM. HIsT. REV. 353 (1958).
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when the territorial government proved completely ineffective at
suppressing them.472 Yet, it was argued that since the United States
had recognized the Carranza government it should not have inter-
vened with troops without the latter's knowledge and express per-
mission.473 To take the enforcement of international law into its
own hands under these circumstances was deemed to be an act of
badpolicy on the part of the United States.
B. The Inter-American System
Even those American international lawyers who generally sup-
ported the interventionist foreign policy of the United States gov-
ernment in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean during the
first three decades of the twentieth century recognized that unilat-
eral intervention by the United States under whatever legal and
political justifications was undesirable over the long-run. They fur-
ther argued that unilateral intervention was far less preferable than
some system for collective intervention, when necessary, that was
sanctioned by all states in the Western hemisphere to ensure that
each state lives up to its international responsibilities. 474 Such no-
tions, prevalent among American international lawyers of this era,
proved to be the motivating force behind the formation of an inter-
American system of international legal, political and economic rela-
tions that was intended to be distinct from and superior to the Euro-
pean balance of power system.
The American system of international relations purported to be
essentially different from, if not antithetical to, the European system
of public international law and politics that was irremediably
grounded in monarchism, the balance of power, spheres of influ-
ence, war, conquest, imperialism and the threat and use of force.
Although such policies might also be practiced at times by the
United States in its relations with certain Latin American countries,
472. See, e.g., Finch, supra note 470, at 404-05.
473. See Editorial Comment, The American Punitive Expedition into Mexico, 10 AM. J.
INT'L L. 337, 338 (1916).
474. See, e.g., KUEHL, supra note 25, at 118; Alvarez, Latin America and International
Law, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 269 (1909) (manner of contribution by Latin American nations to the
development of law of nations); Armstrong, Should the Monroe Policy be Modied or Aban-
doned?, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 77, 99 (1916); Hughes, Observations on the Monroe Doctrine, 17
AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1923) (historical perspectives and current usefulness of the Monroe
Doctrine); Olney, The Development of International Law, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 425-27
(1907); Woolsey, An American Concert ofPowers, 49 SCRIBNERS MAG. 364 (1909) (differ-
ences in theory and practice of state equality).
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they could never detract from the spirit underlying the Monroe
Doctrine and even the rationale of the Roosevelt Corollary. Such a
spirit was infused with the principles of sovereign equality, state in-
dependence, noninterventionism, peaceful settlement of disputes,
mutual cooperation and a fundamental commitment to democracy
as the ideal form of government. These philosophical bonds be-
tween sister American republics found their common origin in the
intellectual ferment of the European Enlightenment and were tem-
pered by the shared experience of wars of independence against Old
World mother countries. This similar heritage created a profound
awareness that all states in the inter-American region possessed a
mutual interest in the advancement of superior rules for interna-
tional behavior applicable to their own relations. Moreover, they
hoped that some time in the not-so-distant future this system could
be extended to relations between all states in the international com-
munity. For these reasons it was thought possible to create a system
of international law and politics in the inter-American region that
was governed by a set of principles more exacting, humane, enlight-
ened, liberal and moral than those currently in operation between
the states of the Old World. This was especially true when it came
to the threat or use of transnational force, notwithstanding the fact
that American states might have to continue to adhere to such re-
gressive and bankrupt rules in their relations with non-American
states.
Despite its imperalistic foreign policy in the region, the United
States did not dissent from the validity of these propositions. Rather
it constituted itself as the vanguard for the movement to create a
distinctively inter-American system of international law, politics
and economics. In this manner, the Manichaean tension between its
perceived national interests in the Western hemisphere and its pro-
fessed moral, legal and political ideals could hopefully be effectively
alleviated, if not altogether dissipated. This United States policy of
fostering the creation of a formal inter-American system in the
Western hemisphere coincided with and reinforced its contempora-
neous promotion of international law and organizations as part of a
war prevention program for the great powers of Europe and Japan.
Simultaneously, the existence of a viable and discrete inter-Ameri-
can system would advance the United States government's per-
ceived vital national security interest of getting and keeping the
latter countries out of the affairs of the Western hemisphere for
good.
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1. The First International American Conference
The start of an organized structure for the inter-American sys-
tem can be traced to United States Secretary of State James Blaine's
November 29, 1881 call for the convocation of a conference of
American states. This conference was to be held in Washington
D.C., the following year. Its purpose was to discuss means for the
prevention of warfare between the American states.475 The project
was sidetracked by Blaine's resignation after President Garfield's as-
sassination.476 Nevertheless, upon the initiative of President Cleve-
land's Secretary of State T.F. Bayard, the First International
American Conference would eventually meet at Washington in
1889. 4 77 It was followed by a second conference in Mexico City in
1901, a third conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1906, and a
fourth conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1910. A fifth inter-
American conference scheduled for 1914 was postponed because of
the world war and did not convene until 1923 in Santiago, Chile.
These various conferences and their postwar successors were to
serve as the institutional framework for the creation of the inter-
American system of international law, politics and economics,
which, after the Second World War, culminated in the foundation
of the Organization of American States.
478
Among other projects,479 the First International American Con-
ference adopted a plan of arbitration for the settlement of disputes
among American nations.480 According to article 1 of the model
treaty, the American republics adopted arbitration "as a principle of
American international law for the settlement of the differences, dis-
putes, or controversies that may arise between two or more of
them."48 ' Article 2 created obligatory arbitration for all controver-
sies concerning diplomatic and consular privileges, boundaries, ter-
475. Note from Mr. Blaine to Mr. Osborne (Nov. 29, 1981), reprinedin 1881-1882 FOR-
EIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 13. See Editorial Comment, The Fourth Pan-American
Conference, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 963, 963-66 (1909).
476. See Bastert, Diplomatic Reversal" Frelinghuysen's Opposition to Blaine's Pan-Amer-
ican Policy in 1882, 42 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 653 (1956).
477. See Wilgus, James G. Blaine and the Pan American Movement, 5 HISPANIC AM.
HIST. REV. 662 (1922).
478. See INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, THE IN-
TER-AMERICAN SYSTEM XV-XXXIII (1966) [hereinafter cited as INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM].
479. See 6 MOORE, supra note 107, § 969, at 599-602.
480. See INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN CONFERENCE, 2 REPORTS OF COMMITTEES AND
DISCUSSIONS THEREON 1078 (Eng. ed. 1890) (presenting the text of the Model Treaty).
481. Id. art. 1, at 1079.
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ritories, indemnities, the right of navigation, and the validity,
construction and enforcement of treaties.482 Article 3 was a general
provision that established obligatory arbitration for all other cases
"whatever may be their origin, nature or object," subject to the sin-
gle exception stated in article 4.483 Article 4 created an exemption
from obligatory arbitration for questions which, in the judgment of
any nation involved in the controversy, might endanger its indepen-
dence. In such a case, arbitration would be optional for that nation
but obligatory for its adversary.484
Article 5 provided that all controversies pending or thereafter
arising would be submitted to arbitration, even though they
originated in occurrences antedating the treaty.485 Article 6 made it
clear, however, that the arbitration treaty could not revive any ques-
tion concerning which a definite agreement should already have
been reached. In these cases, arbitration could be resorted to only
for the settlement of questions concerning the validity, interpreta-
tion and enforcement of such agreements. 486
Article 8 provided that the court of arbitration could consist of
one or more persons selected jointly by the nations concerned and,
in the event of disagreement, each nation involved had the right to
appoint one arbitrator on its own behalf.48 7 Whenever the court
consisted of an even number of arbitrators, the nations concerned
would appoint an umpire whose only function was to decide all
questions upon which the arbitrators might disagree. 488 If the na-
tions in dispute failed to agree upon an umpire, the umpire would
be selected by the arbitrators already appointed.489
The absence or withdrawal of a minority of arbitrators could
not impede the majority from the performance of their dispute du-
ties.490 The decision of a majority of the arbitrators would be final
unless unanimity on an issue was expressly required in the agree-
ment to arbitrate.49I Hence, in accordance with normal arbitral
practice, this model obligatory arbitration convention between
482. Id. art. 2, at 1079.
483. Id. art. 3, at 1079-80.
484. Id. art. 4, at 1080.
485. Id. art. 5, at 1080.
486. Id. art. 6, at 1080.
487. Id. art. 8, at 1080-81.
488. Id. arts. 9 & 11, at 1081.
489. Id. art. 9, at 1081.
490. Id. art. 14, at 1082.
491. Id. art. 15, at 1082.
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American republics contemplated the conclusion of a separate coM-
promis between the parties in dispute which specifically submitted
the matter to arbitration.
Article 18 provided that the treaty would remain in force for
twenty years from the date of the exchange of ratifications.492
Thereafter it was to continue in operation until one of the con-
tracting parties had notified all the others of its desire to terminate.
In the event of such notice, the treaty was to be obligatory upon the
party giving it for one year, but the withdrawal of one or more na-
tions would not invalidate the treaty with respect to the other na-
tions concerned.493
Shortly after the conclusion of the First International American
Conference, a formal treaty, almost identical to the wording of this
model arbitration convention, was signed by Bolivia, Brazil, Ecua-
dor, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the
United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. The treaty never came into
force because its signatories failed to exchange instruments of ratifi-
cation within the stipulated time.494
The First International American Conference also took up a
proposal by Argentina and Brazil, which provided that acts of con-
quest should thereafter be considered a violation of the public law
of America.495 The United States wanted to condition this principle
upon the conclusion of the aforementioned proposed treaty of obli-
gatory arbitration of disputes containing an exemption for matters
concerning a state's independence.496 A compromise plan unani-
mously adopted by the Conference (with the abstention of Chile)
recommended to the participants the adoption of the following dec-
larations: (1) that the principle of conquest shall not, during the
continuance of the treaty of arbitration, be recognized as admissible
under American public law; (2) that all cessions of territory made
during the continuance of the arbitration treaty shall be void if
made under threats of war or the presence of armed force; (3) that
any nation from which such cessions shall be exacted may demand
that the validity of the cessions shall be submitted to arbitration and
492. Id. art. 18, at 1082.
493. Id.
494. See THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES 1889-1928, at 40
n.4 (J. Scott ed. 1931) [hereinafter cited as INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES].
495. See 1 MOORE, supra note 107, § 87, at 290, 292.
496. INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN CONFERENCE, 2 REPORTS OF COMMITTEES AND Dis-
CUSSIONS THEREON 1123-24 (Eng. ed. 1890).
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(4) that any renunciation of the right to arbitration made under
threats of war or the presence of armed force shall be null and
void.497 Since the treaty of arbitration recommended by the Confer-
ence never came into force, this inter-American plan to declare con-
quest illegal did not take effect. 498 Nevertheless, the principle
behind this early American ideal for international law and politics
would eventually be espoused by the international community in
the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. 4 99 The United States government
later sought to effectuate this principle in reference to the Japanese
conquest of Manchuria by promulgating the Stimson Doctrine on
January 7, 1932, which received the endorsement of the League of
Nations two months later.500 This originally inter-American princi-
ple of international law and politics is now expressly recognized by
the entire international community in article 2(4) of the United Na-
tions Charter.50'
In retrospect, certainly the most significant result of the First
International American Conference was its recommendation for the
participating countries to form an association entitled the Interna-
tional Union of American Republics for the purpose of collecting
and distributing commercial information.50 2 The Union was to be
represented at Washington, D.C., by the Commercial Bureau of the
American Republics under the supervision of the United States Sec-
retary of State and to be charged with the care of all translations,
publications and correspondence pertaining to the Union. The
United States would advance a maximum of $36,000 to the Interna-
tional Union for the expenses of the Commercial Bureau during its
first year and a similar sum for each subsequent year of its existence.
The United States would in turn be reimbursed by other members
in accordance with a table of assessments determined by their re-
spective population ratios. The Union would continue in force for
ten years from the date of its organization during which period no
member could withdraw, and then for successive periods of ten
497. Id. at 1147-48.
498. 7 MOORE, supra note 107, § 1084, at 71.
499. Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
500. See Wright, Stimson Note of January 7, 1932, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 342 (1932).
501. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4: "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."
502. INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN CONFERENCE, I REPORTS OF COMMITTEES AND Dis-
CUSSIONS THEREON 404-08 (Eng. ed. 1890).
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years each, unless a majority of its members should give a twelve-
month notice of their wish to terminate the Union. The Commer-
cial Bureau of American Republics was established in 1890, 503 and
when the period of notification expired without any notices of with-
drawal by members, the Bureau continued automatically for an-
other ten years. 5°4
The First International American Conference adopted a rec-
ommendation to the countries of Europe that controversies between
them and American states be settled by means of arbitration.
0 5 It
also adopted formal recommendations50 6 concerning the adoption
of a uniform (i.e., metrical decimal) system of weights and meas-
ures; the adoption of a common nomenclature for merchandise; the
creation of an intercontinental railway; the adoption of a sanitary
convention; the adoption of the Montevideo treaties for the protec-
tion of patents and trademarks; the adoption of the Montevideo
conventions on private international law, civil law, commercial law
and procedural law; the establishment of steamship service between
the ports of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, and between
the United States and Brazil; the promotion of maritime, telegraphic
and postal communications between countries bordering the Pacific
Ocean; the establishment of an International American Monetary
Union; the conclusion of commercial reciprocity treaties;507 the sim-
plification of port dues; the establishment of an International Amer-
ican Bank; adhesion to the Montevideo treaty on penal international
law and the conclusion of extradition treaties with the United States
of America; the adoption of the Calvo Doctrine as a principle of
American international law; and freedom of navigation on shared
rivers for riparian states. Despite this plethora of formal recommen-
dations, the Reports, Recommendations and Resolutions adopted
by the First International American Conference were silent on the
matter of convening a second conference.
2. The Second International American Conference
Upon the initiative of President William McKinley, a Second
503. See INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES, supra note 494, at 36 n.2.
504. 6 MOORE, supra note 107, § 969, at 601.
505. See INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES, supra note 494, at 44.
506. See id. at 11-45.
507. This recommendation led eventually to the conclusion of some twenty reciprocity
treaties between the United States and governments in South America, Europe and the West
Indies. See Wilgus, James G Blaine and the Pan American Movement, 5 HISPANIC AM.
HIST. REV. 662, 707 n.128 (1922).
296 [Vol. 6:185
1983] American Foreign Policy Toward International Law 297
International American Conference convened at Mexico City from
October, 1901, to January, 1902.508 In response to a related sugges-
tion by the United States,509 this Conference adopted a protocol rec-
ognizing the principles set forth in the three conventions 5'0 signed at
the First Hague Peace Conference "as a part of Public International
American Law." The protocol also conferred authority on the gov-
ernments of Mexico and the United States, which were the only
American states in attendance at the First Hague Peace Conference,
to negotiate with the other Hague signatories for the adherence of
the American states to the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settle-
ment of International Disputes.5 " At the Second Hague Peace Con-
ference the United States secured the assent of the parties to this
1899 Convention to the adoption of a Protocol permitting the adher-
ence to the Convention of non-signatory states not represented at
the First Peace Conference,5' 2 which assent was required by article
60 of the 1899 Convention. Pursuant to this Protocol, the Nether-
lands Minister of Foreign Affairs opened a Proces-Verbal to receive
the adhesions of the Latin American states to the 1899 Conven-
tion.-513 Eventually Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia,
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay and Venezuela ad-
hered to the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes.5 14
The Second International American Conference also requested
the President of Mexico to ascertain the views of the participating
governments on the most advanced form of a general arbitration
508. 6 MOORE, supra note 107, § 969, at 602; Wilgus, The Second InternationalAmeri-
can Conference at Mexico City, 11 HISPANIC AM. HIST. REV. 27 (1931).
509. See 7 MOORE, supra note 117, § 1087, at 94.
510. The three 1899 Hague Conventions were: Convention for the Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 1788, T.S. No. 392; Convention with
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No.
403; and Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Ge-
neva Convention, Aug. 22, 1899, 32 Stat. 1827, T.S. No. 396.
511. See GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, SEC-
OND INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN CONFERENCE, MEXICO: 1901-1902, at 336-37 (Eng. ed.
1902) [hereinafter cited as SECOND INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE].
512. Protocol of Adhesion to the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, June 14, 1907, in REPORTS TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 & 1907, at 193-
94 (J. Scott ed. 1917), reprinted in 2 SCOTT, supra note 53, at 252.
513. Proces-Verbal of Adhesion to the Treaty on the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, June 25, 1907, in REPORTS TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 & 1907, at 254
(J. Scott ed. 1917), reprinted in 2 SCOTT, supra note 53, at 254.
514. See INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES, supra note 494, at 62 n.1.
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convention that could be drawn up and meet approval, and to pre-
pare a plan for such a convention with the necessary protocols to
carry it into effect.5 15 Toward the end of the conference, Argentina,
Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay,
Peru, El Salvador and Uruguay signed a convention for the obliga-
tory arbitration of disputes5 16 Article 1 of this convention bound
the parties to submit to arbitration all disputes that existed or might
arise between them that could not be settled by diplomacy unless it
affected the national independence or the national honor of an in-
terested party as determined by itself.5 17 Article 2, however, made it
clear that this exemption did not include any dispute about diplo-
matic privileges, boundaries, rights of navigation, or the validity, in-
terpretation and fulfillment of treaties5 18 Article 3 designated the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague as the arbitral tribu-
nal, unless any of the parties preferred the organization of a special
tribunal.5 19 Following the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settle-
ment of International Disputes, article 7 of this 1902 arbitration
convention conferred a right upon a contracting power to offer its
good offices or mediation to two or more parties in dispute, even
during the course of hositilities, without this being considered an
unfriendly act.520 Likewise articles 13 through 19 of the 1902 con-
vention established a procedure for the creation of International
Commissions of Inquiry to investigate and report upon disputes of
an international character arising from differences over facts. 52'
The treaty would take effect as soon as at least three of its signato-
ries expressed their approval to the Mexican government.5 22 It was
eventually ratified by the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico,
Peru, El Salvador and Uruguay.5 23
Spurred into action by the Venezuelan debt controversy, the
nine signatories of this 1902 Treaty of Obligatory Arbitration were
joined by the United States, Columbia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador,
Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua in the signature of a treaty at the
515. Id. at 62.
516. Treaty of Obligatory Arbitration, Jan. 29, 1902, XCV Brit. For. 1009, 190 Parry's
T.S. 432, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 299 (Supp. 1907).
517. Id. art. 1.
518. Id. art. 2.
519. Id. art. 3.
520. Id. art. 7.
521. See id. arts. 13-19.
522. Id. art. 21.
523. See INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE, supra note 494, at 100 n.1.
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Second International American Conference calling for the submis-
sion of all claims for pecuniary loss or damage presented by their
respective citizens that could not be settled by diplomacy and were
of sufficient importance to warrant the costs of arbitration, to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.5 24 The treaty was to
come into effect for a term of five years after ratification by five of
its signatories. This occurred in 1905 as a result of ratification by
Guatemala and El Salvador (1902), Peru (1903), Honduras (1904)
and the United States (1905).525 This 1902 Treaty for the Arbitra-
tion of Pecuniary Claims was also ratified by Columbia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador and Mexico.5 26 The Third International American Confer-
ence of 1906 agreed to celebrate a convention extending the life of
the 1902 Treaty for the Arbitration of Pecuniary claims until De-
cember 31, 1912.527 The 1906 Convention was subsequently ratified
by Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador and the United
States.5 28 Later, the Fourth International American Conference of
1910 adopted a Convention on the Arbitration of Pecuniary Claims
that would come into force immediately after the expiration of the
extended 1902 Treaty in 1913 and remain in force indefinitely.5 29 It
was subsequently ratified by Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
the United States and Uruguay.5 30
Among other projects,5 31 the Second International American
Conference also undertook a reorganization of the International Bu-
reau of American Republics.5 32 The management of the Bureau of
entrusted to a Board of Directors composed of the diplomatic repre-
sentatives of the signatory countries accredited to Washington, D.C.
The United States Secretary of State was to be its Chairman. The
Bureau was also given the explicit authority to correspond with the
524. Treaty for the Arbitration of Pecuniary Claims, Jan. 30, 1902, 34 Stat. 2845, T.S.
No. 443, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. 303 (Supp. 1907).
525. 7 MOORE, supra note 107, § 1087, at 95.
526. See INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES, supra note 494, at 104 n.2.
527. Id. at 132-33.
528. Arbitration of Pecuniary Claims: Extending Convention of January 30, 1902,
Aug. 13, 1906, 37 Stat. 1648, T.S. No. 574. See INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES, supra note
494, at 132 n.l.
529. See INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES, supra note 494, at 183.
530. Arbitration of Pecuniary Claims, Aug. 1I, 1910, 38 Stat. 1799, T.S. No. 594. See
INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES, supra note 494, at 183 n.1.
531. See INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 478, at XXII.
532. See SECOND INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE, supra note 511, at 248-52.
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Executive Departments of the American republics through their
diplomatic representatives in Washington.
Continuing the social, economic and humanitarian work of the
First International American Conference, the Second Conference at
Mexico City adopted a series of resolutions recommendations and
conventions 533 on subjects such as the Pan-American Railway and
Bank, a customs congress, codes on public and private international
law, copyrights, patents and trademarks, extradition, international
sanitary policy and a controversial convention on the rights of aliens
incorporating the Calvo Doctrine, which the United States refused
to sign. 534 Unlike its predecessor, the Second International Ameri-
can Conference did adopt a resolution calling for the convocation of
the next conference within five years. 535
3. The Third International American Conference
Pursuant to the above recommendation, the Bureau of the
American Republics determined that the Third Conference of
American states would meet at Rio de Janerio on July 21, 1906.536
An important matter dealt with at the Third Conference was inter-
national arbitration. The Third Conference approved a resolution
ratifying its adherence to the principle of arbitration and recom-
mending that the participants instruct their delegates to the upcom-
ing Second Hague Peace Conference to secure the celebration of a
worldwide general arbitration convention. 537 At the insistance of
the United States, the conference also approved a resolution inviting
the Second Hague Peace Conference to examine the question of the
compulsory collection of public debts and, in general, the best way
to reduce disputes among states of a purely pecuniary nature. 538
This resolution directly led to the adoption by the Second Hague
Peace Conference, of the 1907 Convention Respecting the Limita-
tion of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract
533. See INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES, supra note 494, at 63-109.
534. SECOND INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE, supra note 511, at 272-91. See Arias,
The Non-Liability of Statesfor Damages Suffered by Foreigners in the Course of a Riot, an
Insurrection, or a Civil War, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 724, 757 (1913).
535. See INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES, supra note 494, at 96-97.
536. Letter from the Brazilian Ambassador to the Secretary of State (Apr. 25, 1906),
reprintedin 1906 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 1565. See Wilgus, The ThirdInterna-
tional American Conference at Rio de lanerio, 1906, 12 HISPANIC AM. HIST. REV. 420 (1932).
537. See INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES, supra note 494, at 124.
538. Id. at 135-36. See 1 SCOTT, supra note 53, at 397-400; Hershey, The Calvo and
Drago Doctrines, I Am. J. INT'L L. 26 (1907).
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Debts.5 39 The Porter Convention was ratified with reservations by
Guatemala, El Salvador and the United States; by Haiti, Mexico
and Panama without reservations; adhered to by Nicaragua with
reservations; and never ratified by Chile, Cuba, Paraguay, Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Columbia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru and
Uruguay, all of which had signed it, though only the first three of
which without reservations.54 The fact that the Porter Convention
did not explicitly prohibit the use of force for the collection of pub-
lic debts under all circumstances rendered it objectionable to those
Latin American governments that fully subscribed to the undiluted
version of the Drago Doctrine.
The Third International American Congress continued the life
of the Bureau of the American Republics for another ten years and
significantly expanded its functions.5 4' The Conference also ex-
pressed support for the construction of a building to house the Bu-
reau's activities in Washington, D.C.542 In addition to continuing
the work of previous conferences in social, economic and humanita-
rian matters, the Third Conference adopted a convention calling for
the creation of an International Commission of Jurists. The func-
tion of this commission was to prepare draft codes of public interna-
tional law and of private international law "regulating the relations
between the Nations of America" for consideration by the Fourth
International American Conference.5 43 This commission eventually
met five years behind schedule in 1912 at Rio de Janeiro. There the
commission divided itself into six committees for the preparation of
draft codes on subjects such as maritime war, war on land and civil
war, international law in times of peace, the pacific settlement of
international disputes and the organization of international tribu-
nals, the rights of aliens, and other matters of private international
law.544 The outbreak of the First World War interfered with the
deliberations of the commission, though it resumed its work after
539. Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recov-
ery of Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, T.S. No. 537, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L
L. 81 (Supp. 1908).
540. INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES, supra note 494, at 135 n.2.
541. Id. at 125.
542. Id. at 129. See Editorial Comment, Dedication of the Pan-American Building, 4
AM. J. I NT'L L. 679 (1910); Editorial Comment, The New Building of the International Bureau
of American Republics, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 621 (1908).
543. Convention Establishing an International Law Commission, Aug. 23, 1906, 37
Stat. 1554, T.S. No. 565, reprinted in 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 173 (Supp. 1912).
544. See Editorial Comment, Congress of Jurists at Rio de Janerio, 6 AM. J. INT'L L.
931 (1912).
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the war.545
These efforts by governmental experts to codify American pub-
lic and private international law were supplemented by the labors of
the First Pan-American Scientific Congress in Santiago, Chile (Dec.
1908-Jan. 1909)146 and the Second Pan-American Scientific Con-
gress in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 27, 1915-Jan. 8, 1916).547 The Sec-
ond Congress was held in conjunction with the annual meeting of
the American Society of International Law and the newly founded
American Institute of International Law.548 The latter organization
was the brainchild of Alejandro Alvarez of Chile and James Brown
Scott, managing editor of the American Journal of International
Law, and was designed to consist of national societies of interna-
tional law in every American republic brought into affiliation with
the Institute.549 On January 6, 1916, the American Institute of Inter-
national Law adopted its seminal Declaration of the Rights and Du-
ties of Nations that was intended to epitomize the inter-American
attitude toward international law and politics. 550 Therein it was rec-
ognized that every nation had the rights of existence, independence
and equality, territory and exclusive jurisdiction over it, respect of
its rights by other nations and, finally, that international law was at
one and the same time both national and international. After the
First World War, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, speak-
ing before the American Academy of Political and Social Science on
the occasion of the centenary of the Monroe Doctrine in 1923, com-
mented favorably upon the American Institute's Declaration and
stated that it was "supported by decisions of the Supreme Court of
545. See INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES, supra note 494, at 144 n. 1.
546. See Editorial Comment, International Law at the First Pan-American Scientific
Congress, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 429 (1909); Editorial Comment, The Pan-American Scientfc
Congress, 3 AM. INT'L L. 919 (1915).
547. See Scott, The Second Pan-American Scientfic Congress, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 130
(1916). For the subsequent history of these Congresses, see INTER-AMERICAN CONFER-
ENCES, supra note 494, at 185 n.1.
548. See Editorial Comment, Postponement of the Annual Meeting of the Society, 9 AM.
J. INT'L L. 473 (1915); Editorial Comment, The Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Soci-
ety of International Law, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. (1915); Finch, The Annual Meeting ofthe Society,
10 AM. J. INT'L L. 133 (1916).
549. See Editorial Comment, Projectfor the Creation of an American Institute of Inter-
national Law, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 949 (1912); Editorial Comment, The American Institute of
International Law, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 923 (1915).
550. See Hershey, Projects Submitted to the American Institute of International Law. I 1
AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1917); Root, The Declaration of the Rights and Duties oNations Adopted
by theAmerican Institute of International Law, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 211 (1916); Editorial Com-
ment, The American Institute of International Law, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 121 (1916).
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the United States" and "embodies the fundamental principles of the
policy of the United States in relation to the Republics of Latin
America." 55'
4. The Fourth International American Conference
Pursuant to the terms of a resolution adopted by the Third In-
ternational American Conference, 552 the fourth in the series was
held at Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1910. Among other projects,55 3
the Fourth Conference adopted conventions on copyrights, 554 pecu-
niary claims,555 inventions and patents, 556 and trademarks. 557 The
Fourth Conference continued the International Union, created by
the First Conference and continued at the Second and Third, but
changed its name to the "Union of American Republics" and
renamed its Bureau the "Pan American Union," whose functions
were then significantly broadened. 558 The Pan American Union was
given another ten-year lease on life. The Fourth Conference did,
however, adopt a resolution recommending the celebration of a con-
vention that would organize the Pan American Union on a perma-
nent basis.559 This endeavor would eventually culminate at the
Ninth International American Conference at Bogata, Columbia in
1948, which adopted the Charter of the Organization of American
States.560 With the active participation and leadership of the United
States, the structural framework for the inter-American system of
international political, legal and economic relationships was
soundly built before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.
In the words of one astute and prophetic United States international
law professor of that era: "The International Conference of Ameri-
can Republics has assumed a well-defined and dignified position
among the great international organizations of the world." 56'
551. See Scott, Editorial Comment, International Cooperation and the Equality ofStates,
18 AM. J. INT'L L. 116, 118 (1924).
552. See INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES, supra note 494, at 146.
553. INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 478, at XXIII-IV.
554. Copyright Convention, Aug. II, 1910, 38 Stat. 1785, T.S. No. 593.
555. Convention on the Arbitration of Pecuniary Claims, Aug. I1, 1910, 38 Stat. 1799,
T.S. No. 594.
556. Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Aug. 20, 1910, 38 Stat. 1811,
T.S. No. 595.
557. Trade Mark Convention, Aug 20, 1910, 39 Stat. 1675, T.S. No. 626.
558. INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES, supra note 484, at 172.
559. Id. at 176.
560. INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 478, at XXXII.
561. Reinsch, The Fourth International Conference of American Republics, 4 AM. J.
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5. The Central American sub-system
In addition to sponsoring the foundation of a formal inter-
American system, which encompassed most of the Western hemi-
sphere, the United States actively supported attempts to create an
organized sub-system within its framework that would incorporate
the states of Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras and Nicaragua. The United States' primary motivation
was to establish a zone of peace and stability within the Central
American isthmus to protect its strategic and economic investment
in the Panama Canal. Since the Republic of Panama was placed
under virtual United States protectorate by its 1903 Treaty with the
United States, 562 there was no reason to integrate it into schemes for
the creation of a separate Central American sub-system of inter-
American relations.
When war broke out in 1906 between Guatemala, on the one
side, and Honduras and El Salvador, on the other, President
Roosevelt and President Diaz of Mexico offered their good offices to
settle the dispute.563 This led to the conclusion of a peace agreement
among the belligerents on the United States warship Marblehead.
564
Pursuant to the Marblehead peace convention, a conference of Cen-
tral American states was to be held within two months at San Jose,
Costa Rica, for the purpose of celebrating a "general treaty of peace,
amity and navigation." This conference did meet at San Jose, but
its labors were doomed to failure because Nicaragua refused to par-
ticipate and instead renewed war with Honduras and stirred up
trouble in El Salvador. 565 Mexico and the United States offered
their good offices once again, and in September, 1907, the five Cen-
tral American Republics signed a protocol for the convocation of a
Central American Peace Conference in Washington, D.C., later that
year.5
66
INT'L L. 777 (1910) (emphasis added). See also Hershey, Projects Submitted to the American
Institute of International Law, 11 Am. J. INT'L L. 390 (1917).
562. Hay-Bunau Varila Treaty, Nov. 18, 1903, United States-Panama, 33 Stat. 2234,
T.S. No. 431.
563. See MUNRO, INTERVENTION, supra note 387, at 143-46.
564. Treaty of Peace, July 20, 1906, Guatemala-Honduras-El Salvador, 1906 Descamps
742, 202 Parry's T.S. 217. See Editorial Comment, The Peace ofthe Marblehead, 1 AM. J.
INT'L L. 141, 142 (1907).
565. See DAVIS, FINAN & PECK, supra note 395, at 158-59.
566. Protocol Respecting the Meeting of a Conference at Washington for the Mainte-
nance of Peace in Central America, Sept. 17, 1907, 204 Parry's T.S. 418, reprinted in 1 AM. J.
INT'L L. 406 (Supp. 1907). See MUNRO, INTERVENTION, supra note 387, at 146-55.
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On December 20, 1807, the five participants in the Central
American Peace Conference signed eight conventions: a ten-year
general treaty of peace and amity, article 3 of which established the
absolute neutrality of Honduras; 67 an additional convention to the
general treaty establishing the principle of nonrecognition of gov-
ernments coming to power without popular endorsement by coup
d'etet or revolution, the principle of nonintervention in civil wars,
and the principle of alternation in power for governments;5 68 a con-
vention for the establishment of a Central American Court of Jus-
tice;5 69 and conventions on extradition,5 70 communications,57 the
establishment of a Central American Bureau 572 and of a Central
American Pedagogical Institute,5 73 and on the convocation of future
Central American conferences.5 74 Of all these projects, the crown-
ing achievement of the Central American Peace Conference of 1907
was generally deemed to be its successful establishment of the Cen-
tral American Court of Justice.
The Central American Court was proposed by the United
States and basically followed the United States plan for the Court of
Arbitral Justice recommended for adoption by the Second Hague
Peace Conference.5 7 5 The Central American Court possessed com-
pulsory jurisdiction over all controversies or questions, without ex-
ception, arising between the contracting powers that could not be
settled through diplomacy.5 76 It therefore bore the distinction of be-
coming the modern world's first permanently constituted tribunal
567. General Treaty of Peace and Amity, Dec. 20, 1907, 206 Parry's T.S. 63.
568. Additional Convention, id. at 70.
569. Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice, Dec.
20, 1907, 206 Parry's T.S. 78, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (Supp. 1908).
570. Extradition Convention, Dec. 20, 1907, 206 Parry's T.S. 104, reprinted in 2 AM. J.
INT'L L. 243 (Supp. 1908).
571. Convention of Communications, Dec. 20, 1907, 206 Parry's T.S. 126, reprinted in 2
AM. J. INT'L L. 262 (Supp. 1908).
572. Convention for the Establishment of an International Central American Bureau,
Dec. 20, 1907, 206 Parry's T.S. 111, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 251 (Supp. 1908).
573. Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Pedagogical Institute,
Dec. 20, 1907, 206 Parry's T.S. 119, reprinted in 2 AM, J. INT'L L. 256 (Supp. 1908).
574. Convention Concerning Future Central American Conferences, Dec. 20, 1907, 206
Parry's T.S. 97, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 259 (Supp. 1908). See Scott, The Central
American Peace Conference of 1907, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 121 (1908).
575. See MUNRO, INTERVENTION, supra note 387, at 154; Anderson, The Peace Confer-
ence of CentralAmerica, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 144 (1908).
576. Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice, Dec.
20, 1907, art. I, 206 Parry's T.S. 78, 80.
Loy. L.A. Intl & Comp. L. J[
for the compulsory adjudication of disputes between states.577 Simi-
lar to the International Prize Court Convention adopted by the Sec-
ond Hague Peace Conference, the Central American Court was also
given jurisdiction over questions which a national of one Central
American country might raise against any of the other contracting
governments over the violation of a treaty or of an international
character irrespective of the wishes of his government, provided he
had exhausted local remedies or demonstrated a denial of justice.5 78
During its ten years of existence (1908-1918), the court rendered
only two affirmative judgments and declared all five claims brought
by individuals to be inadmissible.5 7 9 Nevertheless, its first decision,
Honduras v. Guatemala & El Salvador580 is generally credited with
having prevented the outbreak of a major war throughout Central
America.581 The successful prevention of one war proved the estab-
lishment of the Central American Court of Justice to have been
well-worth the effort of its founders. Yet, the Wilson Administra-
tion's heedless insistence upon the ratification of the Bryan-
Chamorro Treaty with Nicaragua 582 seven years later was directly
and deliberately responsible for the destruction of the Central
American Court of Justice.5 83
The first Central American conference held pursuant to the
terms of the 1907 Convention, which was the second in the series
started by the Washington Conference, met in Tegucigalpa, Hondu-
ras in January 1909. It was followed by another conference at San
Salvador, El Salvador in February, 1910. The Second Conference
adopted conventions dealing with the unification of currency, the
unification of weights and measures, commerce, consular service,
577. See Editorial Comment, The First Case Before the CentralAmerican Court of Jus-
tice, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 835, 836 (1908).
578. Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice, Dec.
20, 1907, arts. II & III, 206 Parry's T.S. 78, 80.
579. See Hudson, The CentralAmerican Court of Justice, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 759 (1932).
580. Honduras v. Guatemala (1908), reprinted in 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 434 (Eng. trans.
1909).
581. See MUNRO, INTERVENTION, supra note 387, at 155-58; Editorial Comment, The
First Decision ofthe CentralAmerican Court ofJustice, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 434, 436 (1909).
582. Convention Regarding a Canal Route and Naval Base, Aug. 5, 1914, United
States-Nicaragua, 39 Stat. 1661, T.S. No. 624, reprinted in 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 258 (Supp.
1916). See Bailey, Interest in a Nicaraguan Canal, 1903-1931, 16 HISPANIC AM. HIST. REV. 2
(1936); Finch, The Treaty with Nicaragua Granting Canal and Other Rights to the United
States, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 344 (1916); Hill, The Nicaraguan CanalIdea to 1913, 28 HISPANIC
AM. HIST. REV. 197 (1948).
583. See Baker, The Woodrow Wilson Administration and El Salvador Relations 1913-
1921, 56 Soc. STUD., 97 (1965).
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the Central American Pedagogical Institute and the Central Ameri-
can Bureau.5 8 4 The next conference was held at Managua, Nicara-
gua, in January, 1912, and continued the momentum toward the
unification of Central America with the adoption of seven more
conventions dealing with similar functionally related subjects.585
This dramatic forward progress toward legal, economic and political
integration led to a confident prediction that the realization of a
Central American Union was inevitable.58 6 This prediction was
partially fulfilled by the signing of the Pact of Union of Central
America by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica on
January 19, 1921 .587 Nicaragua failed to join, however, so the plans
for the foundation of a Federal Republic of Central America were
abandoned. 88
IV. AMERICAN NEUTRALITY DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR
A. The Bryan Peace Plan
On April 23, 1913, President Wilson's Secretary of State Wil-
liam Jennings Bryan issued a circular note to the governments of the
world proposing for their consideration the conclusion of a series of
bilateral treaties. The purpose of these treaties was to establish
standing international commissions of inquiry for the peaceful set-
tlement of disputes that might arise between the contracting pow-
ers.589 This "Bryan Peace Plan" built upon the foundations laid by
two unratified arbitration conventions between the United States on
the one hand, and France and the United Kingdom on the other,
which were negotiated by Secretary of State Knox during the Taft
Administration. 90 The Knox treaties would have represented a dis-
584. See Editorial Comment, The Second CentralAmerican Peace Conference, 4 Am. J.
INT'L L. 416 (1910).
585. See Conventions Adopted by the Fourth Central American Conference, Mana-
gua, Jan. 1-11, 1912, reprinted in 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 34-41 (Supp. 1913).
586. See Editorial Comment, The CentralAmerican Union, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 829, 831
(1913).
587. Pact of Union of Central America, Jan. 19, 1921, 5 L.N.T.S. l0reprintedin 15 AM.
J. INT'L L. 328 (Supp. 1921). See Editorial Comment, The Federation of CentralAmerica, 15
AM. J. INT'L L. 255 (1921).
588. See L. LANGLEY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN 1900-1970, at 106-
107 (1980).
589. See Editorial Comment, Mr. Bryan's Proposed Commissions of Inquiry, 7 AM. J.
INT'L L. 566 (1913).
590. General Arbitration Treaty, Aug. 3, 1911, United States-France, in 4 Unperfected
Treaties, supra note 68, at 217, reprinted in 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 249 (Supp. 1911); General
Arbitration Treaty, Aug. 3, 1911, United States-Great Britain, in 4 Unperfected Treaties,
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tinct advance over the Root arbitration conventions because the for-
mer did not contain the typical express exemptions from obligatory
arbitration. Article 1 provided that all differences thereafter arising
between the parties that could not be adjusted by means of diplo-
macy, "relating to international matters in which the High Con-
tracting Parties are concerned. . . and which are justiciable in their
nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application
of the principles of law or equity" shall be submitted to the Perma-
nent Count of Arbitration at The Hague in accordance with the pro-
cedures thereof. The parties, however, were allowed to agree to
another tribunal in the compromis.591
In addition, article 2 of the Knox treaties provided for the insti-
tution of a Joint High Commission of Inquiry for the Investigation
of any controversy between the parties within the scope of article 1
before its submission to arbitration. The commission was also
granted the power to investigate any other controversy even if the
parties were not agreed that it fell within the scope of article 1.
However, either party could postpone such reference to the Com-
mission for one year to give diplomacy an opportunity to adjust the
controversy. The proposed Joint High Commission of Inquiry
would operate in accordance with the rules of procedure applicable
to international commissions of inquiry under the 1907 Hague Con-
vention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. 592 Arti-
cle 3 established a novel procedure: in cases where the parties
disagreed whether a dispute was subject to arbitration under article
1, the question was to be submitted to the Joint High Commission of
Inquiry. If all or all but one of the members of the Commission
agreed and reported that the difference was within the scope of arti-
cle 1, the matter would be referred to arbitration under the Knox
Treaty.593 This provision was particularly unacceptable to the
United States Senate, which amended the treaties to provide that
supra note 107, at 321-25; Editorial Comment, Admiral Togo-"The Peaceful Man of the
East," 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 1051, 1052 (1911).
591. General Arbitration Treaty, United States-France, art. 1, 4 Unperfected Treaties,
supra note 68, at 219-20, 5 Am. J. INT'L L. 250 (Supp. 1911); General Arbitration Treaty,
United States-Great Britain, art. 1, 4 Unperfected Treaties, supra note 68, at 227-28, 5 AM.
J.INT'L L. 254 (Supp. 1911).
592. General Arbitration Treaty, United States-France, art. 2, 4 Unperfected Treaties,
supra note 68, at 220-21, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 251 (Supp. 1911); General Arbitration Treaty,
United States-Great Britain, art. 2, 4 Unperfected Treaties, supra note 68, at 228-29, 5 AM. J.
INT'L L. 255 (Supp. 1911).
593. General Arbitration Treaty, United States-France, art. 3, 4 Unperfected Treaties,
supra note 68, at 221, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. at 251-52 (Supp. 1911); General Arbitration Treaty,
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decisions concerning the "justiciability" of a controversy should be
made by the President and the Senate together. Although other
amendments were also attached to the Knox treaties by the Senate,
in Taft's opinion, article 3 was the heart of the treaties. He therefore
decided not to proceed with their ratification. 594
In contrast, a typical Bryan peace treaty provided that all dis-
putes between the parties "of whatever nature they may be" that
were not subject to arbitration and could not be settled by means of
diplomacy, were to be referred for investigation and report to a pre-
existing five member international commission of inquiry.595 As
soon as possible after exchange of ratifications of the treaty, one
member was to be chosen from each country by its respective gov-
ernment; one member was to be chosen by each government from a
third country; and the fifth member was to be chosen by agreement
between the two governments but should not be a citizen of either
country. Thus, a majority of the commission would be composed of
members who were not nationals of parties to the dispute.
In the event of an unsettled dispute, each party had the right to
ask the commission to undertake an investigation thereof. The com-
mission was charged with the task of preparing a report within one
year after its investigation had commenced, and the report must be
adopted by a majority of the commission members. The commis-
sion would, as far as possible, be guided by the procedures set forth
in article 9 to 36 of the 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, which pertained to the Hague International
Commissions of Inquiry.
The parties to the treaty agreed not to declare war or begin
hostilities during the investigation and before the report was submit-
ted. In essence this created a one year cooling-off period for the
parties in dispute. Thereafter the parties reserved full liberty to act
independently on the subject matter of the dispute, presumably in-
cluding the threat or use of force and war. Nevertheless, the theory
behind the Bryan peace treaties was that an impartial investigation
and report would be tantamount to a peaceful settlement of the dis-
United States-Great Britain, art. 3, 4 Unperfected Treaties, supra note 68, at 229, 5 AM. J.
INT'L L. 255-56 (Supp. 1911).
594. James Brown Scott called the treaties "about the mushiest and most inconsequen-
tial, and therefore the most dangerous things, that have come across our diplomatic horizon
for many moons." See Campbell, Taft, Roosevelt, and the Arbitration Treaties of 1911, 53
AM. HIST. 279, 293 (1966).
595. See, e.g., Treaty for the Advancement of General Peace, Sept. 15, 1914, United
States-France, 38 Stat. 1887, T.S. No. 609.
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pute since compliance with the report by the parties would be de-
manded by their respective domestic constituencies and world
public opinion.5 96
The Bryan peace treaties were not intended to replace, but only
to supplement, any general arbitration treaties already in existence
between the contracting powers. Consequently, Bryan also had to
simultaneously negotiate renewals of the Root arbitration treaties of
1908, which had expired in accordance with their terms after five
years.597 Unlike the Root arbitration conventions, however, the
Bryan peace treaties did not contain the typical exemptions concern-
ing matters affecting the independence, honor or vital interests of
either party or the interests of third states. The international com-
missions of inquiry possessed jurisdiction to investigate and report
upon even those matters generally excepted from the obligatory ar-
bitration. Together the Bryan peace treaties and the renewed Root
arbitration conventions covered every possible source of dispute be-
tween the United States and another state. They ensured that the
dispute would be subject to some mechanism for its peaceful settle-
ment. Thus, they would enable the United States either to refrain
from going to war with contracting power or to stay out of an ongo-
ing conflict between other states, provided they were all contracting
powers.
During 1913 and 1914, Secretary of State Bryan concluded
thirty-one Treaties for the Advancement of General Peace on behalf
of the United States, nine of which failed to go into force.5 98 On
August 13 and 20, 1914, almost immediately after the outbreak of
the general war in Europe, the United States Senate gave its advice
and consent to eleven of the twenty Bryan peace treaties that had
thus far been submitted to it for consideration. 99 On September 15,
596. See Editorial Comment, Secretary Bryan's Peace Plan, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 565, 570
(1914). See generally Editorial Comment, The Bryan Peace Treaties, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 882
(1916); Editorial Comment, The Bryan Peace Treaties, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 823 (1913).
597. See Editorial Comment, Arbitration and Peace Treaties, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 341,
341-42 (1914).
598. See 4 Unperfected Treaties, supra note 68, at 263.
599. See Treaty for the Advancement of General Peace, Sept. 20, 1913, United States-
Guatemala, 38 Stat. 1840, T.S. No. 598 (advice and consent given Aug 13, 1914); Treaty for
the Advancement of General Peace, Nov. 3, 1913, United States-Honduras, 39 Stat. 1672,
T.S. No. 625 (advice and consent given Aug. 13, 1914); Treaty for the Advancement of
General Peace, Jan. 22, 1914, United States-Bolivia, 38 Stat. 1868, T.S. No. 606 (advice and
consent given Aug. 13, 1914); Treaty for the Advancement of General Peace, Feb. 4, 1914,
United States-Portugal, 38 Stat. 1847, T.S. No. 600 (advice and consent given Aug. 13, 1914);
Treaty for the Advancement of General Peace, Feb. 13, 1914, United States-Costa Rica, 38
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1914, Bryan used the occasion of the signing of the peace treaties
with China, Spain, France and Great Britain to utter his conviction
that "they will make armed conffict between the contracting nations,
almost, if not entirely, impossible." 600 Eventually the United States
entered into such treaty relations with all of the major Allied Powers
(France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy). However, despite re-
peated overtures, none of the major Central Powers (Germany, Aus-
tria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire) concluded a treaty with the
United States. One legal commentator felt that this would at least
prevent war between the United States and any one or all of the
Allied Powers over a dispute arising out of the Great War.
60 1
An ominous portent of United States entry into the war was
Bryan's resignation as Secretary of State. The resignation resulted
from Bryan's disagreement with President Wilson's hard-line ap-
proach toward Germany over the sinking of the British passenger
Stat. 1856, T.S. No. 603 (advice and consent given Aug. 13, 1914); Treaty for the Advance-
ment of General Peace, May 5, 1914, United States-Italy, 39 Stat. 1618, T.S. No. 615 (advice
and consent given Aug. 13, 1914); Treaty for the Advancement of General Peace, June 24,
1914, United States-Norway, 38 Stat. 1843, T.S. No. 599 (advice and consent given Aug. 13,
1914); Treaty for the Advancement of General Peace, July 14, 1914, United States-Peru, 39
Stat. 1611, T.S. No. 613 (advice and consent given Aug. 20, 1914); Treaty for the Advance-
ment of General Peace, July 20, 1914, United States-Uruguay, 38 Stat. 1908, T.S. No. 611
(advice and consent given Aug. 13, 1914); Treaty for the Advancement of General Peace,
July 24, 1914, United States-Brazil, 39 Stat. 1698, T.S. No. 627 (advice and consent given
Aug. 13, 1914); Treaty for the Advancement of General Peace, July 24, 1914, United States-
Chile, 39 Stat. 1645, T.S. No. 621 (advice and consent given Aug. 20, 1914).
600. Editorial Comment, The Bryan Peace Treaties, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 876, 877 (1914).
See Treaty for the Advancement of General Peace, Sept. 15, 1914, United States-China, 39
Stat. 1642, T.S. No. 619 (advice and consent given Oct. 12, 1914); Treaty for the Advance-
ment of General Peace, Sept. 15, 1914, United States-Spain, 38 Stat. 1862, T.S. No. 605
(advice and consent given Sept. 25, 1914); Treaty for the Advancement of General Peace,
Sept. 15, 1914, United States-France, 38 Stat. 1887, T.S. No. 609 (advice and consent given
Sept. 25, 1914); Treaty for the Advancement of General Peace, Sept. 15, 1914, United States-
Great Britain, 38 Stat. 1853, T.S. No. 602 (advice and consent given Sept. 25, 1914). See also
Treaty for the Advancement of General Peace, Apr. 17, 1914, United States-Denmark, 38
Stat. 1883, T.S. No. 608 (advice and consent given Sept. 30, 1914); Treaty for the Advance-
ment of General Peace, Aug. 29, 1914, United States-Paraguay, 39 Stat. 1615, T.S. No. 614
(advice and consent given Oct. 22, 1914); Treaty for the Advancement of General Peace,
Oct. 1, 1914, United States-Russia, 39 Stat. 1622, T.S. No. 616 (advice and consent given
Oct. 13, 1914); Treaty for the Advancement of General Peace, Oct. 13, 1914, United States-
Ecuador, 39 Stat. 1650, T.S. No. 622 (advice and consent given Oct. 20, 1914); Treaty for the
Advancement of General Peace, Oct. 13, 1914, United States-Sweden, 38 Stat. 1872, T.S.
No. 607 (advice and consent given Oct. 22, 1914).
601. See Editorial Comment, Secretary Bryan's Peace Plan, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 175
(1915). See generaly Editorial Comment, The Effect of Mr. Bryan's Peace Treaties upon the
Relations of the United States with the Nations at War, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1915).
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ship Lusitania.602 He was replaced as Secretary of State by Robert
Lansing, previously Counselor of the State Department and a
founding member of the American Society of International Law.
60 3
Bryan would have preferred that Wilson propose to Germany the
creation of an international commission of investigation along the
lines of the Bryan peace treaties. He also urged the United States to
warn, if not prevent, American citizens from travelling on belliger-
ent vessels or with cargoes of ammunition, even though they might
have the right to do so under the international laws of neutrality.
Instead of following his advice, Wilson chose to reiterate a previous
American demand for an official disavowal of the Lusitania sinking
and other illegal sinkings of merchant ships by German submarines.
Additionally the President demanded reparations as well as assur-
ances by the German government that it would prevent the recur-
rence of similar gross violations of the humanitarian principles of
sea warfare by its submarines.604 In Bryan's opinion, Wilson's ap-
proach to the problem was similar in tone and substance to the Aus-
trian ultimatum to Serbia that had started the Great War in 1914.
Wilson's insistence upon Germany adhering to the punctilio of the
international laws of neutrality could only propel the United States
into Europe's War.
B. The Laws of Neutrality
Since it was not on the Russian agenda, the First Hague Peace
Conference did not adopt any conventions on the subject of neutral-
ity per se but rather just a voeu to the effect that the next Conference
should consider the question of the rights and duties of neutrals in
warfare. 60 5 Pursuant to the wish, the Second Hague Peace Confer-
ence adopted the Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land606 and the
602. Editorial Comment, The Resignation of Mr. Bryan as Secretary of State, 9 AM. J.
INT'L L. 659 (1915).
603. Editorial Comment, The Appointment of Mr. Robert Lansing as Secretary of State,
9 AM. J. INT'L L. 694 (1915).
604. Telegram from the Secretary of State [Bryan] to the Ambassador in Germany [Ge-
rard] (May 13, 1915), reprinted in 1915 FOREIGN REL. U.S., supra note 64, at 393 (Supp.);
Telegram from the Secretary of State [Lansing] to the Ambassador in Germany [Gerard]
(June 9, 1915), reprinted in id. at 436 (Supp.).
605. Final Act of the International Peace Conference, July 29, 1899, reprinted in 1 AM.
J. INT'L L. 103, 106 (Supp. 1907). See HULL, supra note 24, at 146-47.
606. Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in
Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L
L. 117 (Supp. 1907). See HULL, supra note 24, at 199-213; De Bustamante, The Hague Con-
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Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in
Naval War.60 7 In addition, the 1907 Convention Relative to the
Laying of Submarine Mines 60 8 was primarily designed to protect
neutral shipping and the 1907 Convention Relative to Certain Re-
strictions on the Exercise of the right of Capture in Maritime War
contained protections for neutral postal correspondence. 60 9 When
the Great War in Europe erupted in the summer of 1914, the United
States was a party to these four Hague Conventions.
On the domestic level, United States neutrality legislation
dated back to the first Neutrality Act of June 5, 1794.610 This Act,
which had expired after two years, was renewed in 1797 for two
more years61 and was eventually made permanent with amend-
ments by an Act of April 20, 1818.612 The 1818 Act made it a crime
for an American citizen within United States territory to accept and
exercise a commission in the military forces of a foreign government
engaged in a war against another foreign government with which
the United States was at peace; to enlist or to procure the enlistment
of another person, or proceed beyond United States territory with
the intent to be enlisted in the forces of a foreign sovereign, subject
to a proviso for transient foreigners; to outfit and arm a vessel for
the purpose of engaging in hostilities on behalf of a foreign sover-
eign against another foreign sovereign with which the United States
was at peace; to outfit and arm a vessel of war for the purpose of
committing hostilities on United States citizens or their property; to
increase or augment the force of foreign armed vessels at war with
vention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Land Warfare, 2
AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (1908).
607. Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 545, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 202 (Supp. 1908).
See HULL supra note 24, at 148-66; Hyde, The Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 507 (1908). See also Editorial
Comment, The Purchase of Vessels of War in Neutral Countries by Belligerents, 9 AM. J.
INT'L L. 177 (1915) (violates neutrality).
608. Convention Relative to the Laying of Submarine Mines, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2332, T.S. No. 541, reprintedin 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 138 (Supp. 1908). See Stockton, The Use of
Submarine Mines and Torpedos in Time of War, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 276 (1908).
609. Convention Relative to Certain Restrictions on the Exercise of the Right of Cap-
ture in Maritime War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2396, T.S. No. 544, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L
L. 167 (Supp. 1908). See Baldwin, The Eleventh Convention Proposed by the Hague Confer-
ence of 1907, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 37 (1908).
610. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 3d Cong., 1st Sess., I Stat. 381.
611. Act of March 2, 1797, ch. 5, 4th Cong., 2d Sess., I Stat. 497.
612. Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 88, 15th Cong., Ist Sess., 3 Stat. 447 (currently reissued
as 18 U.S.C.A. § 967).
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another foreign government with which the United States was at
peace; and, finally, to set on foot any military expedition or enter-
prise against the territory of a foreign sovereign with which the
United States was at peace. The President was authorized to em-
ploy the land or naval forces or the militia for the purpose of effec-
tuating the provisions of the 1818 Act, or to compel any foreign ship
to depart from the United States waters when so required by the
laws of nations or treaty obligations. These fundamental proscrip-
tions of United States domestic neutrality legislation and practice,
together with principles drawn from the pathbreaking Treaty of
Washington of 1871 between the United States and Great Britain
that settled the Alabama claims, were eventually to find their way
into the two major 1907 Hague neutrality conventions governing
land and sea warfare. 6' 3
A joint resolution for Congress approved by the President on
March 4, 1915, was designed to better enforce and maintain United
States neutrality by authorizing the President to direct customs col-
lectors to withhold clearance from any vessel which they had rea-
sonable cause to believe was about to carry certain materials and
men to ships of a belligerent nation in violation of United States
obligations as a neutral state.614 It was thought that the 1818 Act
together with the 1915 joint resolution were sufficient to bring the
United States into full compliance with its obligations of neutrality
under international law.615 This was not surprising since the United
States had historically played a leading role in the development of
613. Treaty of Washington, May 8, 1871, United States-Great Britain, 17 Stat. 863, T.S.
No. 133. The three rules of article 6 provided that:
A neutral Government is bound
First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping,
within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is
intended to cruise or to carry on war against a power with which it is at peace; and
also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel
intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially
adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction to war-like use.
Secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or
waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the
renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men.
Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and, as to all
persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations
and duties.
See also Report of the Delegates of the United States to the Second International Peace
Conference at The Hague, in 2 Scorr, supra note 53, at 198, 238-39, 241.
614. Pub. Res. 72, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 38 Stat. 1226 (1916).
615. See Editorial Comment, The Joint Resolution of Congress to Empower the President
to Better Enforce and Maintain the Neutrality of the United States, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 490
(1915).
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the laws of neutrality by obtaining general acceptance of its policy
pronouncements on such matters from the countries of Europe
throughout the late eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies.6' 6 As the ferocity of the conflict intensified, however, by 1916
the United States felt the need to pass additional legislation to better
protect its neutrality from the ravages of the war.617 Somewhat
ironically, these proposed amendments were eventually enacted into
law after the United States had abandoned its neutrality and en-
tered the war on the side of the Triple Entente.6 18
Taken as a whole, the laws of neutrality were designed to oper-
ate in a system of international relations where war was considered
to be an inescapable fact of international life, and yet, in which the
outbreak of war between even major actors did not automatically
precipitate a total systemic war among all global powers. According
to the laws of neutrality, the conduct of hostilities by a belligerent
was only supposed to disrupt the ordinary routine of international
intercourse between a neutral and the belligerent's enemy to the
minimal extent required by the dictates of military necessity.619
Such arrangements were intended to permit the neutral power to
remain out of the conflict, while.at the same time they allowed its
nationals to take advantage of international commerce and inter-
course with all belligerents.
The political and strategic dimensions of the international laws
of neutrality were complicated by the fact that they operated upon
the basis of a legal fiction. That is, the neutral government was not
responsible for any non-neutral acts committed during wartime by
its citizens against a belligerent. Generally, a belligerent state could
not hold a neutral government accountable for the private activities
of the neutral's citizens even if they worked directly to the detriment
of the belligerent's wartime security interests.
The laws of neutrality were essentially predicated upon Lock-
616. See Hyneman, Neutrality During the European Wars of 1792-1815, 24 AM. J. INT'L
L. 279 (1930); Raymond & Frischholz, Lawyers Who Established International Law in the
United States, 1776-1914, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 802, 805-07, 812-13, 819-20 (1982).
617. Scott, Proposed Amendments to the Neutrality Laws of the United States, 10 AM. J.
INT'L L. 602, 605-09 (1916).
618. Espionage Act, ch. 30, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 40 Stat. 217 (1917). See Hyde, The
Espionage Act, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 143 (1918).
619. "Neutrals have the right to continue during war to trade with the belligerents,
subject to the law relating to contraband and blockade. The existence of this right is univer-
sally admitted, although on certain occasions it has been in practice denied." 7 MOORE,
supra note 107, at 382.
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eian assumptions concerning the nature of government and its
proper relationship to the citizen: namely, that the political func-
tions of government must impinge upon the private affairs of the
citizen to the least extent possible. This was especially true in the
economic realm where the right to private property and its pursuit
were deemed fundamental. 620 Typical of this Lockeian attitude was
the prohibition on the confiscation of private property found in arti-
cle 46 of the Regulations annexed to both the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land.621 In the same category were the futile attempts by the
United States at both the First and the Second Hague Peace Confer-
ences to secure agreement upon immunity from capture and confis-
cation of non-contraband private property during sea warfare.
622
The primary duty of a neutral government was to maintain
strict impartiality in its relations with all belligerents. Yet the laws
of neutrality specifically denied that the neutral government had
any obligation to guarantee that its nationals conduct their affairs
with belligerents in a similar fashion, or, indeed in accordance with
any but the most rudimentary set of rules. For example, according
to the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land,623 the terri-
tory of neutral powers was "inviolable," 624 and belligerents were
forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or
supplies across the territory of a neutral power.625 Yet a neutral
power was not required to prevent the exportation or passage of
arms, ammunition or anything useful to an army or navy through its
territory to belligerents.626 Neither was a neutral compelled to for-
bid or restrict the use, on behalf of belligerents, of telegraph or tele-
phone cables or wireless telegraph apparatus belonging to it or to
620. See generally Power Politics, supra note 12, at 936-37.
621. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899,
Annex, art. 46, 32 Stat. 1803, 1822, T.S. No. 403; Convention with Respect to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, art. 46, 36 Stat. 2277, 2306-07, T.S. No. 539.
622. See CHOATE, supra note 223, at 74-77; DAVIS, HAGUE I, supra note 64, at 127-28,
133-35, 175-76; DAVIS, HAGUE II, supra note 107, at 138-40, 171-72, 227-33; HULL, supra
note 24, at 126-41; Stockton, Would Immunityfrom Capture During War, of Non-Offending
Private Property upon the High Seas Be in the Interest of Civilization?, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 930,
932-33 (1907) (No!).
623. Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in
Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310.
624. Id. art. 1, 36 Stat. at 2322.
625. Id. art. 2, 36 Stat. at 2322.
626. Id. art. 7, 36 Stat. at 2323.
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companies or private individuals. 627 However, all restrictive or pro-
hibitive measures taken by a neutral power in regard to these mat-
ters were required to be applied uniformly to all belligerents.
Moreover, this rule was binding on companies or individuals own-
ing telecommunications facilities.628 The national of a neutral
power would not be deemed to have compromised his nation's neu-
trality by furnishing supplies or loans to one of the belligerents pro-
vided: (1) he did not reside in the territory of another belligerent or
territory occupied by it, and (2) the supplies did not come from
these territories.629 Article 10 of the Convention made it clear that it
could not be considered a hostile act for a neutral power to take
measures, even forcible, to prevent violations of its neutrality.
630
According to the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War,63' belligerents
were "bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral Powers and to
abstain, in neutral territory or neutral waters, from any act which
would, if knowingly permitted by any Power, constitute a violation
of neutrality." 632 In addition, any act of hostility committed by bel-
ligerent warships in the territorial waters of a neutral power was
deemed to constitute a violation of neutrality and was strictly for-
bidden.633 Similarly, a neutral government could not supply war-
ships, ammunition, or war materials of any kind to a belligerent
under any circumstances.634 However, the neutral government was
under no obligation to prevent the export or transit for the use of
either belligerent, of arms, ammunitions, or in general, of anything
which could be of use to any army or fleet. 635 Nevertheless, the neu-
tral power was required to treat the belligerents equally with respect
to any conditions for the entry of billigerent warships or their prizes
to its ports, roadsteads or territorial waters. 636 Finally, article 26 of
the treaty made it clear that a neutral government's exercise of its
rights under the convention could never be considered an "un-
627. Id. art. 8, 36 Stat. at 2323.
628. Id. art. 9, 36 Stat. at 2323-24.
629. Id. art. 18, 36 Stat. at 2326.
630. Id. art. 10, 36 Stat. at 2324.
631. Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415.
632. Id. art. 1, 36 Stat. at 2427.
633. Id. art. 2, 36 Stat. at 2427.
634. Id. art. 6, 36 Stat. at 2428.
635. Id. art. 7, 36 Stat. at 2428.
636. Id. art. 9, 36 Stat. at 2428.
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friendly act" by any belligerent that was a contracting power. 637
Contraband of war shipped by neutral nationals to a belligerent
was properly subject to capture and confiscation by the offended
belligerent. Yet, in the exercise of this prerogative, the belligerent
remained subject to the laws of war at sea and the international law
of prize. Historically, the United States, to ensure the economic
well-being of its citizens, opposed the imposition of mandatory em-
bargo upon trade in contraband between belligerents and neutral
nationals.638 It was later argued that the deterrence of peace time
militarism was a residual benefit of this policy. That is, the exist-
ence of neutral nations during a war would permit prospective bel-
ligerent states not to arm excessively in anticipation of hostilities
because of their foreknowledge that, as belligerents, they could
readily receive armaments from neutral merchants in the event of
war.639 The freedom of neutral nationals to trade with belligerents
would create a disincentive for major powers to engage in massive,
wasteful and unnecessary arms races between themselves. Accord-
ingly, the international laws of neutrality could contribute to the
preservation of world peace. In their advocacy of this argument,
however, early twentieth century American international lawyers
were attempting to elevate a consideration of expedience into one of
virtue.
Without the recognition of a status such as "neutrality" by in-
ternational law, nonbelligerents would virtually be compelled by
circumstances to choose sides in a war so as to maintain political
and economic relations with at least one set of belligerents. In the-
ory the neutral state had an economic disincentive to participate in
the war. The neutral state could greatly prosper from an increasing
degree of only moderately restricted international trade with all bel-
ligerents in desperate need for more goods purchased from nationals
of the neutral state. Conversely, a belligerent would not act to vio-
late the neutral's rights and those of its nationals to keep the neutral
from entering the war on the side of its enemy. Another theory held
that since the number and strength of neutral states in a future war
would be proportionately greater than those of belligerents, the
community of neutral states could impose obedience to the laws of
637. Id. art. 26, 36 Stat. at 2433.
638. See Raymond & Frischholz, supra note 616, at 806-07.
639. See Gregory, Neutrality and the Sale ofArms, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 543 (1916); Scott,
The Sale of Munitions of War, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 927 (1915).
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neutrality upon the belligerents.640
In practice, however, these theories were undercut by the fact
that each neutral's normal international trading patterns invariably
worked to the greater advantage of one set of belligerents during the
war.64' Thus, the disadvantaged belligerent had to engage in a com-
plicated cost-benefit analysis. It had to weigh the harm caused by a
strategic disadvantage in trade against the risk that the neutral
power might eventually enter the war against it if neutral commerce
were destroyed. Also, instead of acting as part of some international
community of neutrals, each neutral state constantly assessed, in ac-
cordance with its own calculations of national security, the relative
advantages and disadvantages of maintaining its own neutrality as
opposed to belligerency on one side or the other. Unless guaranteed
by treaty, the violation of one neutral's rights did not obligate an-
other neutral to declare war or even to engage in measures of retor-
tion against the violator.
The United States did not enter the first World War in order to
defend the international laws of neutrality in the abstract. This was
evidenced by its failure to consider the German invasions of either
neutral Belguim or neutral Luxemburg as a casus beli. It was only
when Germany's gross and repeated violations of American citizens'
neutral rights of trade and intercourse with Great Britain seriously
interfered with their ability to engage in international commerce
and resulted in the large-scale destruction of American lives and
property that the United States invoked the sacred cause of neutral-
ity as one of the primary justifications for its intervention into the
war.
642
Generally, the American international legal community ap-
proved this attitude of strict and impartial neutrality taken by the
United States at the start of the European War.643 Yet, as interna-
tional lawyers, they could reach no other conclusion but that Ger-
many and Austria-Hungry must assume the full legal responsibility
640. See Stockton, The International Naval Conference of London, 1908-1909, 3 AM. J.
INT'L L. 596, 614 (1909). See also Lammasch, Unjustifiable War and the Means to Avoid It,
10 AM. J. INT'L L. 689, 692, 702 (1916); Robinson, Autonomous Neutralization, 11 Am. J.
INT'L L. 607 (1917).
641. See, e.g., Phillips, American Participation in Belligerent Commercial Controls 1914-
1917, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 215 (1933).
642. See, e.g., Scott, The United States at War with the Imperial German Government, II
AM. J. INT'L L. 617 (1917).
643. Cf. Editorial Comment, The Attitude of Journals of International Law in Time of
War, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 924 (1915).
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for the outbreak of the war.644 In their opinion, the German inva-
sions of neutral Belgium 645 and of neutral Luxemburg, 646 in explicit
violation of international treaties, represented reprehensible behav-
ior for which there was no valid excuse.647 Deserving special oppro-
brium in the eyes of American international lawyers was the August
11, 1914, speech by German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg to the
Reichstag publically admitting the German invasions of Belgium
and Luxemburg to be in violation of international law but arguing
that Germany was "[i]n a state of necessity, and necessity knows no
law. ' '648 Later that same day he uttered his notorious statement to
the British ambassador that the 1838 treaty guaranteeing the neu-
trality of Belgium was a "scrap of paper." 649 The need to uphold
the rules of international law made it crystal clear to American in-
ternational lawyers on which side they should personally stand on
the war even if their government remained formally neutral. As far
as they were concerned, these egregious violations of international
law by Germany made continued American neutrality toward the
war a highly dubious proposition. 65° Such legalist perceptions
would exert a profound impact upon the evolution of the United
States' neutralist policy into a stance of "benevolent neutrality" in
favor of the Allies and against the Central Powers.65'
As the intensity of the war heightened and the Allies imposed
their stranglehold over commerce shipped from the United States to
the European continent,652 the Central Powers took the position that
644. See Dennis, The Diplomatic Correspondence Leading up to the War, 9 AM. J. INT'L
L. 402 (1915).
645. See Editorial Comment, Germany and the Neutrality of Belgium, 8 AM. J. INT'L L.
877 (1914). But see Editorial Comment, The Neutrality of Belgium, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 707
(1915) (defense of invasion by Professor Karl Neumeyer).
646. See Editorial Comment, The Binding Effect upon the German Empire of the Treaty
of London of 1867 Neutralizing Luxemburg, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 948 (1915).
647. Editorial Comment, The Hague Conventions and the Neutrality of Belgium and
Luxemburg, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 959 (1915).
648. See Editorial Comment, Germany and the Neutrality of Belgium, 8 AM. J. INT'L L.
877, 880 (1914).
649. See B. TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST 153 (1976).
650. See, e.g., Editorial Comment, The War in Europe, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 853, 857
(1914); Editorial Comment, The Right of Neutrals to Protest Against Violations of Interna-
tional Law, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1916). Cf. CooGAN, supra note 238, at 193.
651. See Smith, Robert Lansing and the Formulation of American Neutrality Policies,
1914-1915, 43 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 59 (1956).
652. See Scott, Editorial Comment, The Black List of Great Britain and Her Allies, 10
AM. J. INT'L L. 832 (1916); Scott, Editorial Comment, Economic Conference of the Allied
Powers, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 845 (1916). See also Brown, Editorial Comment, Economic War-
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the American government was under an obligation to take affirma-
tive measures to rectify the developing imbalance of trade in arms,
munitions and supplies that United States nationals were success-
fully transporting to the Allies but not to them. Both the United
States government and the American international legal community
were quite emphatic in their rejection of this complaint. If one bel-
ligerent was militarily unable to secure the safe passage of neutral
commerce to its shores because of the misfortunes of war, that was
the belligerent's concern and not that of the neutral government,
which possessed the right under international law to permit its citi-
zens to continue trading with the militarily more powerful belliger-
ent.653 For a neutral government to discriminate in favor of the
weaker belligerent to compensate for the military imbalance would
constitute an unneutral act that could precipitate a declaration of
war upon it by the stronger belligerent. Indeed, it was argued that
even if the neutral government were to embargo all trade in contra-
band of war by its citizens with both sets of belligerents, this affirm-
ative departure from the normal rules of neutral practice during the
course of a war could compromise its neutrality.654
The United States' insistence upon the international legal right
of its citizens to trade with the Allies, no matter how unequal the
military situation, played a significant part in the decision by the
Central Powers to pursue their policy of "unrestricted submarine
warfare." This policy was aimed at destroying this vital neutral
commerce, irrespective of the international laws of neutrality and of
the laws of war at sea. The United States eventually responded by
entering the war to secure those rights of its nationals and thus up-
hold the international laws of neutrality and armed conflict. Hence
consistent with its "legalist" approach to international relations, the
United States did not enter the First World War for some nebulous
reason such as "upholding" or "restoring" the European balance of
power system. 655 Instead, America abandoned its neutrality for the
very realistic purpose of redressing these egregious violations of its
fare, i I AM. J. INT'L L. 847 (1917); Clark, Shall There Be War After the War?, 11 AM. J.
INT'L L. 790 (1917).
653. See Gregory, Neutrality and the Sale of Arms, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 543 (1916);
Morey, The Sale of Munitions of War, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 467 (1916); Editorial Comment,
The Sale ofArms and Ammunitions by American Merchants to Belligerents, 9 AM. J. INT'L L.
687 (1915). See also Editorial Comment, American Neutrality, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 443 (1915).
654. Morey, The Sale of Munitions of War, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 467 (1916).
655. See generally Smith, National Interest andAmerican Intervention, 1917: An Histori-
ographical Appraisal, 52 J. AM. HIST. 5 (1965).
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fundamental rights under international law committed by the Cen-
tral Powers, and, in the usual and most effective recourse sanctioned
by the international community at that time: resort to war. The
laws of neutrality formed a substantial part of that definitional
framework of international legal rules. The wanton violation of
these norms by the Central Powers was responsible to a great degree
for the decision of the United States to enter the First World War on
the side of the Triple Entente. 656 This became the ultimate sanction
behind the international laws of neutrality.
Of course, coupled with this legal justification came the polit-
ical rationalization and propagandistic moralization that by aban-
doning its neutrality America thereby joined a great universal moral
crusade on behalf of the forces of good (i.e., democracy) arrayed
against the forces of evil (i.e., autocracy). 657 Autocratic govern-
ments were thereafter presumed to be inevitably warlike in nature,
and democratic governments inherently peaceful. Therefore, the
peace of the entire international community required the utter de-
struction of autocracy throughout the world and its replacement by
democratic forms of government everywhere. In the words of Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson: "The world must be made safe for
democracy." 65 8
In his April 2, 1917 address to a joint session of Congress, Wil-
son, a lawyer and political scientist, successfully fused the classic
American "legalist" approach to international relations with these
newly invented "moralist" elements in his request for a declaration
of war against Germany. Nevertheless, Wilson's fusion violated the
cardinal tenet of the founders of the American "legalist" approach
to international relations, namely, that all such considerations of
moralizing should be excluded from the "science" of positivist inter-
656. See also Morrissey, The United States and the Rights of Neutrals, 1917-1918, 31
AM. J. INT'L L. 17 (1937) (U.S. generally did not recant its position on laws of neutrality
after it entered the war).
657. See Scott, Editorial Comment, The Dawn in Germany? The Lichnowsky and Other
Disclosures, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 386 (1918); Willoughby, The Prussian Theory of Government,
12 AM. J. INT'L L. 266 (1918); Willoughby, The Prussian Theory ofthe State, 12 AM. J. INT'L
L. 251 (1918); American Bar Association, Resolution of September 4, 1917, in 3 A.B.A.J.
567-77 (1917) (submitted by Elihu Root; adopted unanimously), reprinted and approved in
Gregory, Editorial Comment, The Annual Meeting of/the American Bar Association, 11 AM. J.
INT'L L. 851 (1917). See also Baldwin, The Share of the President of the United States in a
Declaration of War, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1918) (there might exist Constitutional authority to
wage war in order to secure the liberty of foreign peoples).
658. Address of the President Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Con-
gress (Apr. 2, 1917), reprinted in 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 350, 356 (Special Supp. 1917).
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national legal studies.659 Although Wilson might properly be
credited with having founded what contemporary international
political scientists call an American "legalist-moralist" approach to
international relations, the moralistic elements of Wilsonianism
were completely incompatible with the United States international
"legalism" that had been developed during the period between
1898-1917. This international "legalism" had been developed by
the American international legal community through its scholarly
writings and its formulation of foreign policies at the United States
Department of State. As classically defined and articulated, Ameri-
can "legalism" was antithetical to Wilson's moralizing about the in-
herent superiority of democratic forms of government. Both at the
time and in retrospect the pre-World War I American international
legal community would most appropriately be categorized as
staunch "legal realists" who would have been proud to bear such an
appelation had it been in vogue then.
The incongruous suppositions underlying the international law
of neutrality could not withstand the rigors of twentieth century "to-
tal warfare" with its all-encompassing political, military, economic
and propangandistic dimensions. The First World War demon-
strated the abject failure of the laws of neutrality to perform their
intended purpose of constricting the radius of the war. This tragic
experience led many American international lawyers to the una-
voidable conclusion that in the postwar world, the international
community had to abandon neutrality as a viable concept of inter-
national law and politics and instead create a system of interna-
tional relations in which some organization would be charged with
the task of enforcing international law against recalcitrant na-
tions.660 Henceforth, the international legal rights of one state must
659. See also Fenwick, Germany and the Crime of the World War, 23 AM. J. INT'L L.
812 (1929) (article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles should not be interpreted as imputing
moral guilt and criminal responsibility for the war to Germany, for in 1914 there was no
clear basis upon which moral responsibility for a particular war could be judged); Myers,
The Control of Foreign Relations, II AM. POL. Sci. REV. 24 (1917) (strong legal realist posi-
tion); Woolsey, Reconstruction and International Law, 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 187 (1919) (irre-
spective of idealistic motives, the war was a defense against "evil domination"); Woolsey,
The Relations Between the United States and the Central Powers, II AM. J. INT'L L. 628
(1917) (after declaration of war upon Germany the United States should await the develop-
ment of events before ipso facto declaring war upon Austria and Turkey).
660. See, e.g., Brown, The Theory of the Independence and Equality ofStates, 9 AM. J.
INT'L L. 305 (1915); Graham, Neutrality and the World War, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 704 (1923);
Graham, Neutralization As a Movement in International Law, 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 79 (1927);
Hershey, Projects Submitted to the American Institute of International Law, 11 AM. J. INT'L
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be treated as rights pertaining to all states. National security could
no longer be a matter of solely individual concern, but rather a col-
lective responsibility shared by the entire international community.
Therefore, although the pre-World War I American international
legal community did not expend much energy promoting the forma-
tion of some executive "international police power," the experience
of the First World War and the failure of the laws of neutrality to
protect the United States from the scourge of war induced many of
its members to support the foundation of the League to Enforce the
Peace.661
In the opinion of many, though certainly not all, American in-
ternational lawyers, the United States government must at last de-
finitively repudiate its traditional policies of isolationism in peace
and neutrality in war to become a formal participant in the new
European and worldwide balance of power system. Admittedly,
this balance had been wrought by brute military force, but its con-
tinued existence could nevertheless be legitimized, if not sanctioned,
by the adoption and effective enforcement of the principles set forth
in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Therefore, America's
vital national security interest on the one hand, and its professed
philosophical and moral ideals on the other, could most successfully
be reconciled, and indeed would coincide and reinforce each other,
by means of membership in the League.
Despite this majority sentiment, the question of whether or not
the United States should join the League and, if so, upon what terms
provoked a sharp and irreparable divergence of viewpoints among
the members of the American international law community. A vo-
cal minority opposed membership in the League precisely because
this step would represent a definitive repudiation of America's clas-
sic position of isolationism in peace and neutrality in war vis-,A-vis
the European balance of power system that had served American
national security interests so well since Washington's Farewell Ad-
dress and the Monroe Doctrine. Others argued that whatever the
merits of continued American isolationism, the League of Nations
as currently proposed was fatally defective because article 10 of the
Covenant guaranteed the preservation of an essentially unjust status
quo in favor of France and against Germany that was not entitled to
L. 390 (1917); Root, The Outlookfor International Law, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1916); Spencer,
The Organization ofInternational Force, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 45 (1915); Wilson, Sanctionfor
International Agreements, II AM. J. INT'L L. 387 (1917).
661. See, e.g., R. BARTLETr, THE LEAGUE To ENFORCE PEACE 215-18 (1944).
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United States support during peace or war. Elihu Root and James
Brown Scott took the intermediate position that the United States
should join the League but enter a reservation as to article 10.662 In
any event, the fight over the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles
split the American international legal community into a pro-League
majority and an influential anti-League minority. From this point
in time on, it was no longer possible to speak about the existence of
one relatively homogenous American "legalist" approach to inter-
national relations.
V. CONCLUSION
Today, in the post-World War II era, with the enlightened but
uninspiring benefit of historical hindsight, it would be easy, yet sim-
plistic, for international political realists to argue that pre-World
War I American international lawyers and statesmen should have
foreseen that the worldwide interests of the newly imperial United
States demanded their active participation in the European balance
of power system after 1898. That such lawyers and statesmen
should have anticipated that America had succeeded to the geopolit-
ical position of Great Britain by effectively becoming the "holder"
of a worldwide balance of power that now only radiated from and
around Europe and that the primary obligation of the holder of the
balance was the willingness to abandon its "splendid isolation"
when necessary to "restore" the balance in the event the latter was
threatened or disrupted. Further, that the moment had come for the
United States to countermand its traditional policies of isolationism
in peace and neutrality in war by allying itself with the two other
major Western democracies, France and Great Britain, 663 in time to
forestall the development of a general war in Europe, or else, imme-
diately after its outbreak in 1914, to throw in its lot with the Triple
Entente; and, after the war, that America's global interests required
it to be willing to guarantee the existence of even an arguably unjust
status quo on Europe by joining the League of Nations to maintain
world peace. 664
In retrospect, contemporary political analysts are certainly enti-
tled to raise the general question whether the First World War deci-
662. See Dubin, Elihu Root and the Advocacy f/a League of Nations, 1914-1917, 19 W.
POL. Q. 439, 453-55 (1966); Root,Amending the Covenant, ADvoc. OF PEACE, July, 1919, at
211.
663. See Schvan, A Practical Peace Policy, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 51, 59 (1914).
664. See, e.g., H. HOLBORN, THE POLITICAL COLLAPSE OF EUROPE (1951).
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sively proved that the American legalist war prevention program for
world politics was an abysmal failure because it was essentially
predicated upon naive, idealistic and utopian asumptions concern-
ing the inherent utility of international law and international orga-
nizations. Yet, before this question can be properly answered, it is
necessary to consider a different set of questions drawn from an an-
tithetical historical perspective: What if Germany had not objected
to the principle of obligatory arbitration at the First Hague Peace
Conference, or to the conclusion of a multilateral obligatory arbitra-
tion treaty at the Second? What if the Latin American states had
not opposed the formation of the Court of Arbitral Justice at the
Second Hague Peace Conference over the issue of its composition,
which did not impede adoption of the plan for the International
Prize Court? What if the House of Lords had not rejected the Dec-
laration of London and the International Prize Court in 1911?
What if the nations of the world had proceeded on schedule in 1913
to enter into preliminary preparations for the convocation of the
Third Hague Peace Conference in 1915? Would there have been a
First World War in 1914 if any one or more of these international
legal developments had occurred prior thereto? Could the United
States have succeeded at its self-appointed task of remaining out of
the war by means of an operative International Prize Court which
adjudicated in accordance with a Declaration of London, or by
means of a Bryan Peace Treaty with Germany,665 or at least by vir-
tue of both mechanisms working in conjunction for the peaceful set-
tlement of America's major wartime disputes with Germany?
The historical record adduced above substantiates the proposi-
tion that with a little more support from a few defiant actors at key
moments in time, the elements of the pre-World War I American
legalist war prevention program for world politics could have fallen
into place soon enough to create a reformed structure of interna-
tional relations in which conditions favorable for the outbreak of a
general war in Europe could have been substantially ameliorated.
There is no evidence that the American legalist approach to interna-
tional relations was responsible for the eruption of the war to any
extent. Indeed, it is difficult to maintain that the adoption of any
one or more of its schemes for international law and organizations
would have rendered the First World War more likely to have oc-
665. Cf. A MORRISSEY, THE AMERICAN DEFENSE OF NEUTRAL RIGHTS 1914-1917, at
128 (1939) (the Department of State justified U.S. actions by stating that its relations with
Britain were in compliance with the Bryan treaty).
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curred. The breakdown of world order in 1914 was definitely not
caused by international law and international organizations or by
an American legalist foreign policy that promoted them. Rather, a
historical argument could be made that the First World War oc-
curred in substantial part because there was too little, and certainly
not too much, international law and organizations. When the Great
War amongst the European powers finally broke out, it occurred in
spite of, not because of, America's efforts to prevent and ultimately
confine a feared global conflagration through preemptive imple-
mentation of this legalist approach to international relations.
A similar rationale can be developed to refute political realist
claims. These claims charge that American reliance upon interna-
tional law and organizations was somewhat responsible for the out-
break of the Second World War. In the aftermath of the First
World War, to the extent that United States nonparticipation in the
work of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice vitiated the effectiveness of these organizations, and to
the extent that their inefficacy can accurately be said to have con-
tributed to the development of historical conditions ripe for the
eruption of the Second World War, responsibility for this situation
must be placed squarely upon the shoulders of the isolationist mem-
bers of the United States Senate and their supporters. The founda-
tion of the League of Nations and of the Permanent Court of
International Justice was the direct result, if not the ultimate con-
summation, of the pre-World War I American legalist approach to
international relations. Both before and after the First World War,
American international lawyers astutely led the way in promoting
support for the creation of these organizations, as well as their im-
mediate predecessors, among the states of the international commu-
nity. It was certainly not their fault that after the Great War the
Senate chose to repudiate those fundamental elements of the Ameri-
can legalist war prevention program for world politics that United
States international lawyers had meticulously planned and vigor-
ously championed from the time of the First Hague Peace
Conference.
During the period between the First and Second World Wars,
it was America's innate isolationist tendencies dating back to Wash-
ington's Farewell Address that reasserted themselves and triumphed
over America's relatively more recent internationalist foreign poli-
cies promoting international law and organizations. Thus, the
American legalist approach to international relations that was class-
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ically defined and articulated from 1898 to 1917 cannot fairly be
held responsible for either the First or the Second World Wars. If
anything, both world wars occurred in spite of, and not because of,
the best efforts by the American international legal community to
prevent them through the creation of new rules of international law
and new institutions for the peaceful settlement of international
disputes.
Indeed, in the aftermath of the Second World War, a profound
realization of the extreme dangers of continued American isolation-
ism and of the essential wisdom of the pre-World War I American
legalist approach to international relations convinced the United
States of the compelling need for it to sponsor and join the United
Nations Organization. When the United States Senate grudgingly
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice in 1946, the pre-World War I American legalist approach to
international relations finally attained its fullest fruition.666 Ever
since then American Legalism has substantially contributed to the
maintenance of international peace and security and to the preven-
tion of a suicidal Third World War.667
In 1898, the United States purposefully chose to emulate the
imperial countries of the Old World by setting out to become a ma-
jor global power by performing a series of naked acts of military,
political and economic expansion. Since that time it has struggled
to realize the irreversible consequences of those fateful decisions
which directly contradicted several of the most fundamental norma-
tive principles upon which the United States was supposed to be
founded. During this imperialist era of its history, the promotion of
international law and international organizations has usually pro-
vided the United States with the means for reconciling the idealism
of American values and aspirations with the realism of world poli-
tics and historical conditions. The United States' resolute dedica-
tion to pursuit of a legalist approach to international relations has
proven to be critical for the preservation of America's internal
666. See Hyde, The United States Accepts the Optional Clause, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 778
(1946); Jessup, Acceptance by the United States of the Optional Clause of the International
Court o/Justice, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 745 (1945); Potter, "As Determined by the United States,"
40 AM. J. INT'L L. 792 (1945); Preuss, The International Court of Justice, the Senate, and
Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 720 (1946); Wilcox, The United States
Accepts Compulsory Jurisdiction, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 699 (1946); Wright, The International
Court ofJustice and the Interpretation ofMultilateral Treaties, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 445 (1947).
667. See L. SOHN, CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW (2d ed. 1967).
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psychic equilibrium, which in turn has historically been a necessary
precondition for the successful advancement of its global position.
Both before and immediately after the First World War, as well
as immediately after the Second World War, the United States es-
tablished an excellent track record for pioneering innovative rules of
international law and novel institutions for the peaceful settlement
of international disputes. Drastic departures from the 1898-1917
tradition of American legalist diplomacy to follow instead a foreign
policy based upon isolationism after the First World War or, under
the influence of the modern political realists, upon Machiavelliam
power politics after the Korean War, have only produced a series of
unmitigated disasters for the United States government both at
home and abroad. One of the primary lessons to be learned from
the history of the 1898-1917 era is that the states of the contempo-
rary world, and especially the United States, must grow to possess
much more courage and foresight, and much less selfishness and
fear when it comes to the promotion of international law and organ-
ization as impediments to the development of a suicidal Third
World War.668
668. See Irrelevance, supra note 1, at 217-19 & n.67 (opinion of Hans Morgenthau).

